{"schema_version":"1.1","slug":"integrated-statecraft","title":"Integrated Statecraft","status":"published","publication":{"schema_version":"1.0","record_type":"current_publication_contract","recorded_on":"2026-09-19","public_availability":"published","evidence_cutoff":"2026-08-14","content_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1","deployment_attestation":{"mode":"external_immutable_receipt","receipt_namespace":"refs/tags/statecrafts-result-production-","rule":"Deployment of this source revision is attested by its matching successful release receipt, not by a build-time claim inside the research data."},"predecessor_release":{"source_sha":"f2e9ae18e74b53b1eef82491af98c79d7ac6b648","receipt_ref":"refs/tags/statecrafts-result-production-34774182825-1","result":"success","published_on":"2026-09-13","verification_date":"2026-09-19","run_url":"https://github.com/VeniceClaw/Statecrafts/actions/runs/34774182825"},"release_scope":"The capstone is a public research product. The predecessor receipt is historical context, not the current deployment claim. Use the matching successful production receipt to attest this revision; research publication state and deployment attestation are separate.","historical_records":["research-baseline.json","completion-manifest.json","publication-gate.json","critical-capabilities/research-baseline.json","critical-capabilities/completion-manifest.json","critical-capabilities/publication-gate.json"],"historical_record_rule":"Original private/pending statuses describe dated research and launch snapshots. They are preserved unchanged and are not current publication state or access-control instructions.","review_scope":"Integrity remediation and internal review; not external academic peer review. Published identifiers and fingerprints permit structural auditing but do not independently validate causal judgments."},"current_through":"2026-08-14","purpose":"Evaluate how the four instruments combine in actual strategy, independently identify internationally usable sources of power and strategic vulnerability, and expose where strategy aligns with or diverges from those requirements.","boundary":"Integrated Statecraft is a capstone, not a fifth instrument. It does not average domain positions, count edges, prescribe an operational campaign, or name an overall national winner.","decision_question":"How do current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies employ the four instruments; which independently established resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions provide internationally usable state power or leverage; where can adversaries or exogenous events degrade those sources and constrain state options or stability; and where do strategy and requirement align or diverge?","central_finding":"The two systems derive power from different conversion architectures. PRC-centered power is strongest where concentrated physical throughput, processing, construction and industrial absorption can be directed. U.S./partner power is strongest where autonomous states and firms consent to combine finance, technology, access, intelligence, legitimacy and specialized production. Each system is weakest when it must borrow the other's conversion model.","causal_chain":["Objective","Foundations","Instrument delivery","Integration","Response","Outcome","Persistence"],"instruments":[{"id":"ND","title":"National Defense","id_pattern":"ND-D01..ND-D10"},{"id":"EI","title":"Economics & Industry","id_pattern":"EI-D01..EI-D08"},{"id":"DC","title":"Diplomacy & Coalitions","id_pattern":"DC-D01..DC-D10"},{"id":"II","title":"Information & Influence","id_pattern":"II-D01..II-D09"}],"workstreams":[{"id":"SE","title":"National Strategy Evaluation","type":"evaluation","focus":"How current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies select, deliver, combine, and adapt the four instruments for declared objectives","intent":"Evaluate strategic coherence, implementation, cross-instrument interaction, response, outcome, cost, durability, and adaptation","question":"Given a predeclared objective, target or recipient, geography, time window, counterfactual, acceptable cost, and persistence threshold, how coherently and effectively did the system combine its available instruments, and what explains the observed result?","unit":"A bounded national strategy, strategic objective, campaign, or phase","imports":"Instrument evidence plus strategy records, authorities, resources, delivered actions, partner and target response, outcomes, cost, and adaptation","outputs":"Objective-bounded strategy, campaign, mechanism, implementation, outcome, and comparative-pathway findings","prohibited_inference":"A strategy-document claim, simultaneous activity, domain position, or capability inventory cannot establish integration or strategic success.","charter_file":"strategy-evaluation.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_fourteen_pathways_and_red_team_complete","route":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-evaluation","result":"Eighteen cases and fourteen cross-instrument pathways adjudicated"},{"id":"CCV","title":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","type":"international_power_and_strategic_risk","focus":"Which resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions can be converted into internationally usable state power or leverage, and which dependencies can external actors or exogenous events exploit to constrain state action, options, or stability","intent":"Identify what must be built, accessed, controlled, protected, substituted, restored, or responsibly employed to preserve freedom of action and produce bounded international effects independently of current strategy","question":"What gives a state usable power or leverage in international affairs; through what authority, delivery, and response mechanism is it converted; where can an adversary or exogenous shock disrupt that chain; and when would the resulting loss materially narrow external options, operational performance, coercion resistance, or state stability?","unit":"A source-of-power and conversion chain under a declared international objective, target or recipient, geography, time horizon, and adversarial or exogenous stress","imports":"Instrument evidence plus resource, authority, taskability, conversion, target and partner response, network position, dependency, external control, adversarial access, shock, substitution, recovery, adaptation, and strategic-effect evidence","outputs":"Power-source, conversion, strategic-dependency, vulnerability, advantage, mitigation, bounded-leverage, self-harm, recovery, and warning-indicator findings","prohibited_inference":"Domestic importance, sector size, resource possession, ownership, concentration, technical sophistication, or current strategy emphasis cannot establish internationally usable power, leverage, or strategic vulnerability. A domestic condition enters only through an evidenced mechanism that constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","charter_file":"critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_ten_focus_findings_twelve_responses_and_red_team_complete","architecture_directory":"critical-capabilities","route":"/integrated-statecraft/critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities","result":"Ten focus findings, eighteen cases, and twelve bounded responses"},{"id":"GAP","title":"Strategy–Requirement Gap Analysis","focus":"Where observed strategy aligns with or diverges from independently supported sources of internationally usable power, conversion requirements, strategic vulnerabilities, and advantages","intent":"Identify alignments, execution gaps, strategic blind spots, unrealized advantages, possible misallocation, leverage opportunities, strategic fratricide, and insufficient basis","unit":"A traceable match between one frozen strategy-demand finding and one independently frozen power-source, conversion, strategic-vulnerability, advantage, or leverage finding","input_rule":"Neither workstream can establish or strengthen the other's finding; the layer operates only after both inputs are independently supported and retain separate evidence identities.","output_rule":"Every gap or alignment remains traceable to both contributing records and cannot be aggregated into a national score or overall winner.","charter_file":"strategy-requirement-gaps.md","analysis_status":"twelve_traceable_matches_and_red_team_complete","type":"governed_match_layer","route":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-requirement-gaps","result":"Twelve traceable matches from independently frozen inputs"}],"extreme_asymmetries":{"US_partner":["Permissioned alliances, host access, coalition authorization and institutional aggregation","Dollar-centered finance, sanctions jurisdiction and trusted safe-asset depth","Selected advanced-semiconductor, software, research, services and talent nodes distributed across allies"],"PRC_centered":["Industrial and clean-technology manufacturing throughput, shipbuilding and infrastructure construction","Critical-mineral refining, rare-earth separation, permanent magnets and selected battery supply chains","Rapid manufacturing absorption, scale-up and deployment across dense supplier ecosystems"]},"extreme_weaknesses":{"US_partner":["Contested-time conversion of wealth, designs and coalition commitments into munitions, ships, maintenance and lift","Product-specific dependence on PRC midstream processing and magnets","Political continuity and host permission that can delay or revoke otherwise formidable network capacity"],"PRC_centered":["Globally distributed, trusted and pre-authorized partners for costly external security roles","Advanced semiconductor nodes controlled jointly by U.S., Dutch, Japanese, German, Taiwanese and Korean actors","Dollar-equivalent monetary trust, convertibility, safe-asset depth and crisis finance","Maritime oil exposure and the limited taskability of overseas commercial infrastructure"]},"strategy":{"focus":"How current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies select, deliver, combine, and adapt the four instruments for declared objectives","intent":"Evaluate strategic coherence, implementation, cross-instrument interaction, response, outcome, cost, durability, and adaptation","question":"Given a predeclared objective, target or recipient, geography, time window, counterfactual, acceptable cost, and persistence threshold, how coherently and effectively did the system combine its available instruments, and what explains the observed result?","unit":"A bounded national strategy, strategic objective, campaign, or phase","prohibited_inference":"A strategy-document claim, simultaneous activity, domain position, or capability inventory cannot establish integration or strategic success.","cases":[{"case_id":"IS-C01","title":"U.S. and European response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","overall_ruling":"partially_effective_not_terminated","objective_result":"The coalition preserved Ukrainian state and military resistance and imposed costs, but did not terminate the war or remove binding delivery and political-continuity constraints.","mechanism_findings":["Permissioned coalition aggregation worked","Industrial and replenishment conversion remained binding","Outcome persistence depends on policy continuity and Ukrainian agency"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P10","IS-P11","IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO001","IS-AO002","IS-AO003"],"source_ids":["IS-AS001","IS-AS002","IS-AS003"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Durable settlement","Major coalition withdrawal","Measured production reaches or misses stated requirements"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO003","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C02","title":"NATO and partner engagement in Afghanistan","overall_ruling":"strategy_failure","objective_result":"The effort did not produce a self-sustaining Afghan state and security system; changing objectives, unrealistic timelines, partner exclusion and externally dependent force design failed the persistence test.","mechanism_findings":["Ends, ways and means drifted","Diplomatic bargaining undercut the partner government","Defense design and economic support did not survive withdrawal"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO004","IS-AO005","IS-AO006"],"source_ids":["IS-AS004","IS-AS005"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Material contrary evidence on sustainability or negotiated transition"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO006","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C03","title":"Advanced-semiconductor controls and allied technology coordination","overall_ruling":"bounded_denial_partial","objective_result":"Controls created friction and delay at selected frontier nodes; permanent denial, military outcome and PRC policy compliance are not established.","mechanism_findings":["Small allied chokepoint coalition achieved coverage","Target adaptation forced repeated rule changes","Ecosystem revenue, partner alignment and substitution bound durability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P09","IS-P12"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO008","IS-AO009"],"source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Equivalent PRC frontier production","Measured military delay","Partner rule divergence or strengthened common coverage"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO009","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C04","title":"Europe's exit from Russian gas dependence","overall_ruling":"effective_with_high_cost","objective_result":"Europe replaced most Russian pipeline dependence, preserved strategic freedom and institutionalized phaseout, while absorbing significant price and distributional cost.","mechanism_findings":["Diplomacy, regulation, infrastructure, markets and public demand reduction combined","Alternative supply and partner coordination restored options","Sender coercion accelerated loss of its own network position"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P10"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO010","IS-AO011","IS-AO012"],"source_ids":["IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Renewed structural dependence","Phaseout reversal","Evidence that strategic freedom was materially lost despite substitution"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO010","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO012","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C05","title":"U.S.-Philippines alliance and EDCA access conversion","overall_ruling":"access_option_effective_permissioned","objective_result":"The strategy converted assurance, diplomacy and funding into distributed prepared access and cooperation; wartime activation and deterrence remain untested.","mechanism_findings":["Threat alignment increased host demand","Local permission and investment made agreement operational","Sovereign caveats remain part of capability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P09","IS-P11"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO013","IS-AO014","IS-AO015"],"source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013"],"confidence":"high_for_access_low_for_deterrence","revision_triggers":["Mission-specific authorization or refusal","Host government policy reversal","Measured throughput and survivability"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C06","title":"Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","overall_ruling":"bounded_objective_effective_persistence_incomplete","objective_result":"The coalition achieved territorial defeat through local partners and cross-instrument coordination; enduring defeat of the organization and ideology remains incomplete.","mechanism_findings":["Military, intelligence, finance and diplomacy reinforced one another","Local partner forces were decisive","Transition and detention risks limit persistence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P12","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO016","IS-AO017","IS-AO018"],"source_ids":["IS-AS006","IS-AS007"],"confidence":"high_for_territorial_outcome","revision_triggers":["Sustained ISIS territorial return","Partner transition failure","Independent attribution of coalition lines"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO017","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO018","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C07","title":"JCPOA bargaining, implementation, withdrawal, and durability","overall_ruling":"initial_success_reversed_into_failure","objective_result":"Negotiation produced verified limits and reciprocal implementation; unilateral withdrawal destroyed persistence and renewed pressure did not restore the bargain.","mechanism_findings":["Economic pressure needed a diplomatic off-ramp","Verification made compliance observable","Policy reversal created cross-instrument fratricide and credibility cost"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO019","IS-AO020","IS-AO021"],"source_ids":["IS-AS014","IS-AS015","IS-AS016","IS-AS017"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Restored verified limits","Evidence that reimposition produced a superior durable outcome"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C08","title":"FOCAC action-plan and PRC development-finance conversion in Africa","overall_ruling":"coherent_design_delivery_and_influence_unresolved","objective_result":"FOCAC displays broad policy-message coherence and exceptional means, but the current action plan is prospective and recipient-level conversion varies too much for an overall effectiveness call.","mechanism_findings":["Finance, infrastructure, security, governance and information are formally integrated","Provision scale is a real source of agenda access","Recipient agency and delivered performance prevent automatic influence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO022","IS-AO023","IS-AO024"],"source_ids":["IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS040"],"confidence":"moderate_for_design_low_for_outcomes","revision_triggers":["Audited 2025–2027 delivery","Recipient policy or access decisions causally linked to programs","Large cancellation or backlash wave"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO024","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C09","title":"World Bank and AIIB pandemic response and project delivery","overall_ruling":"both_delivered_no_zero_sum_influence_call","objective_result":"Both institutions rapidly converted capital and relationships into crisis operations; World Bank scale was much larger, while AIIB demonstrated credible delivery without evidence of displacing or controlling the older system.","mechanism_findings":["Existing country systems and cofinance accelerated delivery","Institutional legitimacy and technical capacity mattered","Project volume did not establish geopolitical alignment"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO025","IS-AO026","IS-AO027"],"source_ids":["IS-AS020","IS-AS021"],"confidence":"high_for_delivery_low_for_influence","revision_triggers":["Independent outcome evaluations","Governance or conditionality changes","Recipient preference evidence"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO026","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C10","title":"BRICS expansion, Rio commitments, and delivery","overall_ruling":"agenda_reach_supported_taskability_unproven","objective_result":"Expansion and the Rio agenda increased convening and narrative reach, but heterogeneous interests, voluntary implementation and a short observation window prevent a coalition-delivery judgment.","mechanism_findings":["Membership scale amplifies agenda setting","Consensus language masks divergent preferences","No common enforcement or pooled capability matches formal alliance taskability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO028","IS-AO029","IS-AO030"],"source_ids":["IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"confidence":"moderate_for_agenda_low_for_delivery","revision_triggers":["Funded common mechanisms","Repeated aligned member behavior","Implementation scorecard for Rio commitments"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO028","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO029","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO030","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C11","title":"PRC overseas port investment to military and strategic access","overall_ruling":"conditional_single_case_conversion","objective_result":"Djibouti demonstrates one real infrastructure-relationship-access sequence; Hambantota demonstrates why finance and operating control do not automatically become military permission.","mechanism_findings":["Host security interests and sovereign agreement are necessary","Commercial ownership is not military taskability","Generalization across ports is unsupported"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P07"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO031","IS-AO032","IS-AO033"],"source_ids":["IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"high_for_cases_low_for_generalization","revision_triggers":["Repeated crisis throughput at multiple ports","New host defense agreements","Evidence of denied access despite ownership"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C12","title":"PRC critical-mineral controls and diversification response","overall_ruling":"denial_effective_compellence_unproven","objective_result":"Concentration converted into real product-specific disruption, but targets adapted and no durable policy compliance was demonstrated.","mechanism_findings":["Midstream processing and qualification created leverage","Use revealed the dependency and accelerated substitution","Target agency separated cost from compellence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P10","IS-P12"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO034","IS-AO035","IS-AO036"],"source_ids":["IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"confidence":"high_for_denial_low_for_compellence","revision_triggers":["Verified target policy change","Qualified substitute scale","Sustained cutoff beyond inventories"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C13","title":"PRC-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic restoration","overall_ruling":"bounded_diplomatic_success","objective_result":"China helped deliver and sustain restoration of diplomatic relations; the evidence does not support a broader claim of regional security leadership or conflict resolution.","mechanism_findings":["Good offices and trusted venue matched parties ready to settle","Clear narrow terms enabled verification","Prior mediators and party agency limit exclusive Chinese credit"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07","IS-P08","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO037","IS-AO038","IS-AO039"],"source_ids":["IS-AS028","IS-AS029"],"confidence":"high_for_restoration_moderate_for_china_contribution","revision_triggers":["Embassy closure or agreement repudiation","Independent evidence on China's indispensable role","Broader security cooperation caused by the accord"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO038","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO039","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C14","title":"Taiwan Strait deterrence, coercion, and competitive shaping","overall_ruling":"contested_indeterminate","objective_result":"The status quo persisted, but PRC coercion intensified and neither no-war nor no-unification can be causally assigned to a single strategy.","mechanism_findings":["U.S. assurance and Taiwan defense raise denial prospects","PRC pressure shapes daily operating conditions","Actions generate countervailing signaling and coalition feedback"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P06","IS-P08","IS-P09","IS-P10","IS-P11","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO040","IS-AO041","IS-AO042"],"source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"low_for_causal_deterrence","revision_triggers":["Observable decision evidence","Major blockade or invasion","Stable reduction in coercive activity after a defined action"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C15","title":"South China Sea pressure and Philippine coalition response","overall_ruling":"tactical_prc_effect_strategic_counterbalancing","objective_result":"PRC gray-zone pressure achieved intermittent tactical denial and cost imposition but strengthened Philippine-U.S. cooperation and did not remove the Philippine outpost or produce a durable settlement.","mechanism_findings":["Coast guard and militia exploit threshold ambiguity","Documentation and alliance assurance mobilized partners","Provisional arrangements managed one flashpoint without resolving the contest"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P11","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO043","IS-AO044","IS-AO045"],"source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013","IS-AS032"],"confidence":"high_for_events_moderate_for_strategy","revision_triggers":["Permanent removal or secure resupply","Treaty activation","Sustained de-escalation or new host access"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO043","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C16","title":"IPEF supply-chain institutions and crisis-response conversion","overall_ruling":"institution_created_effectiveness_unproven","objective_result":"The United States converted diplomacy into a functioning institutional framework, but no major public stress case yet demonstrates preserved supply or faster recovery.","mechanism_findings":["Agreement and bodies were delivered quickly","No market access narrows incentives","Action teams remain upstream of output"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO046","IS-AO047","IS-AO048"],"source_ids":["IS-AS033","IS-AS034"],"confidence":"high_for_institution_low_for_effect","revision_triggers":["Crisis Response Network activation","Measured diversification","Member withdrawal or expanded commitments"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO048","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C17","title":"WTO Appellate Body impasse and U.S. institutional trade-offs","overall_ruling":"pressure_achieved_reform_not_achieved_fratricide_risk","objective_result":"The United States disabled the appellate mechanism but did not secure a broadly accepted replacement; pending appeals and MPIA adaptation reduced the value of the institution to U.S. rule-based leverage.","mechanism_findings":["Appointment control provided blocking leverage","Substantive complaints did not become negotiated reform","Alternative institutional action proceeded without the United States"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO049","IS-AO050","IS-AO051"],"source_ids":["IS-AS035","IS-AS036","IS-AS037"],"confidence":"high_for_status_moderate_for_net_effect","revision_triggers":["Agreed reform","U.S. accession to alternative","Evidence paralysis improved bargaining outcomes net of lost enforcement"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C18","title":"PRC development-finance delivery, renegotiation, and relationship repair","overall_ruling":"extreme_provision_mixed_conversion_adapting","objective_result":"PRC finance delivered infrastructure and relationships at exceptional scale, but distressed projects, borrower agency and nonautomatic strategic access forced a portfolio reboot and collaborative repair.","mechanism_findings":["Upstream finance and construction are a real advantage","Delivery quality and debt sustainability mediate legitimacy","Renegotiation demonstrates adaptation, not proof of original coercive design or success"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO052","IS-AO053","IS-AO054"],"source_ids":["IS-AS019","IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS038","IS-AS039"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Updated project outcomes","Recipient trust and policy decisions","Repeated strategic access conversion or widespread creditor losses"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO052","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]}]}],"pathways":[{"pathway_id":"IS-P01","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Industry becomes military effect only through qualified output, maintenance, logistics and mission timing. Ukraine supports allied aggregation but exposes U.S./partner physical bottlenecks; PRC scale is extreme upstream but distant operational conversion remains less observable.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO002","IS-AO007","IS-AO013"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Industrial capacity to fielded and sustained military effect","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P02","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Diplomacy can create usable access when hosts authorize, fund, exercise and sustain it. EDCA and Djibouti support the mechanism; Hambantota and sovereign caveats reject automatic conversion.","case_ids":["IS-C05","IS-C11","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO013","IS-AO015","IS-AO031","IS-AO032","IS-AO033"],"confidence":"high","title":"Diplomacy to usable access and military reach","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P03","position":"supported_bounded","ruling":"Military assurance contributes to partner commitment when threat perceptions, credible capability and political consultation align; accession and Philippine cooperation support the link, but no-war and retention cannot alone prove deterrence.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO001","IS-AO014","IS-AO040","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Military assurance to coalition commitment and durability","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P04","position":"insufficient_for_independent_effect","ruling":"Credible narratives may support coalition legitimacy, but across Ukraine, FOCAC, Taiwan and the South China Sea, material interests and threat perception dominate the observable decision record. Independent informational contribution is not isolated.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C08","IS-C10","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO014","IS-AO022","IS-AO028","IS-AO041","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"low","title":"Narrative credibility to coalition legitimacy and action","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO028","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P05","position":"supported_for_targeted_coverage","ruling":"Coalition coordination can align law and enforcement at a small number of pivotal nodes, as semiconductor, Iran and Russia cases show. Free riding, alternative routes, burden and institutional exclusion bound wider effectiveness.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C16","IS-C17"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO019","IS-AO034","IS-AO046","IS-AO049"],"confidence":"high","title":"Coalition coordination to economic denial or pressure","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P06","position":"cost_not_sufficient_for_compellence","ruling":"These purposively selected cases show that imposed costs were not sufficient for the intended policy change. Iran supports a bounded bargain, while other cases show adaptation or noncompliance. The sample identifies conversion mechanisms, not the prevalence or relative frequency of coercive success. Denial and compellence remain distinct.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C14"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO009","IS-AO019","IS-AO021","IS-AO036"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Economic pressure to target decision or behavior","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO009","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P07","position":"supported_but_nonautomatic","ruling":"Development finance and institutional delivery can create valued capability, relationships and agenda access. FOCAC, AIIB, Djibouti and BRI repair show real pathways, but host choice, project performance and nonexclusive alignment prevent automatic influence or military access.","case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C09","IS-C10","IS-C11","IS-C13","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO023","IS-AO027","IS-AO031","IS-AO033","IS-AO037","IS-AO054"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Economic development and finance to diplomatic access or institutional influence","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P08","position":"insufficient_for_state_conversion","ruling":"Cultural and informational attraction creates exposure and relationships, but the selected cases do not isolate a consequential policy choice caused by contact. Independent ecosystem attraction may advantage a country without becoming a taskable instrument.","case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C10","IS-C13","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO024","IS-AO028","IS-AO037"],"confidence":"low","title":"Cultural and informational attraction to relationships and revealed preference","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO024","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO028","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P09","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Technology and standards become strategic ecosystems when technical performance, production, rules, trust and users align. Semiconductor controls, 5G host choices and IPEF institution-building support pieces of the chain; none alone establishes durable strategic effect.","case_ids":["IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C16","IS-C17"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO008","IS-AO046","IS-AO047","IS-AO050"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Technology and standards to interoperable strategic ecosystems","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P10","position":"supported","ruling":"Resilience can preserve strategic freedom when substitution and recovery arrive before the state-option deadline. Europe's gas shift is the strongest affirmative case; mineral, maritime and semiconductor cases show that nominal alternatives may remain slow or costly.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C04","IS-C12","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO011","IS-AO012","IS-AO035"],"confidence":"high","title":"Resilience to sustained instrument availability and coercion denial","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO012","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P11","position":"insufficient_comparative_basis","ruling":"The cases show public attribution and coalition messaging accompanying decisions, but they do not provide matched exposure-to-decision evidence sufficient to isolate information-integrity effects on coalition resilience.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO014","IS-AO040","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"low","title":"Information integrity to decision and coalition resilience","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P12","position":"supported_in_selected_cycles","ruling":"Observed failure can improve later design: rare-earth diversification, iterative semiconductor rules and BRI portfolio repair show adaptation. Afghanistan shows that abundant warnings do not guarantee implemented learning, and cross-system comparison remains weak.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C03","IS-C06","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO004","IS-AO008","IS-AO035","IS-AO053"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Cross-instrument learning and adaptation to improved repeated performance","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P13","position":"supported_only_with_bounded_objective_and_off_ramp","ruling":"Imposed military or economic cost can support bargaining when demands and exits are clear. JCPOA and Saudi-Iran diplomacy show off-ramp value; Afghanistan and unresolved Taiwan/South China Sea contests reject a general cost-to-termination rule.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C06","IS-C07","IS-C13","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO005","IS-AO016","IS-AO019","IS-AO037","IS-AO042","IS-AO045"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Military capability and imposed cost to bargaining, crisis, or termination","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P14","position":"supported","ruling":"One instrument can damage the legitimacy, access, network or future option set that another requires. JCPOA withdrawal and WTO paralysis are direct U.S. cases; PRC coercive use of markets and materials can accelerate diversification and balancing.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C07","IS-C14","IS-C17","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO020","IS-AO036","IS-AO044","IS-AO049","IS-AO050","IS-AO051"],"confidence":"high","title":"Cross-instrument friction, fratricide, and strategic trade-offs","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","scope":"cross_case_context","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"cross_case_context","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]}],"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0","status":"strategy_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Eighteen strategy cases, fifty-four applied observations and fourteen pathway rulings","review_type":"precommitted internal adversarial review; not external peer review","hypothesis_results":[{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT01","result":"material_and_bounded","effect":"Synergy was credited only where sequence and directional connection were observed; co-occurrence was not counted."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT02","result":"decisive","effect":"Ukraine and semiconductor cases rejected scale-to-effect shortcuts and exposed qualification, maintenance, supplier and logistics bottlenecks."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT03","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"EDCA, Nordic accession and Ukraine retained partner agency, authorization, burden and policy-continuity conditions."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT04","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"FOCAC coherence was separated from delivery; BRI repair and mineral feedback exposed centralization and information limits."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT05","result":"decisive_withholding","effect":"Narrative and cultural pathways remained insufficient because material interests, threat and independent actors were not controlled."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT06","result":"decisive","effect":"Iran supported a bounded bargain, while Russia, minerals and other cases rejected cost-to-compellence generalization."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT07","result":"decisive","effect":"Djibouti showed possible conversion; Hambantota, AIIB and BRI variation rejected automatic finance-to-alignment or base claims."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT08","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Semiconductor, 5G and institutional cases retained partner autonomy, open diffusion, commercial response and ecosystem erosion."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT09","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"European gas recovery was credited after measured substitution; nominal buffers and no-collapse were not treated as resilience elsewhere."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT10","result":"decisive_withholding","effect":"Information-integrity pathway remained unscored without exposure-to-decision evidence and error or rights costs."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT11","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Learning was supported only for observed design changes; Afghanistan demonstrated warning without effective learning."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT12","result":"decisive","effect":"Taiwan received no deterrence-success call from the absence of invasion."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT13","result":"decisive","effect":"ISIS success was bounded to territorial defeat; Saudi-Iran to diplomatic restoration; no agreement was treated as complete termination."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT14","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Closed-system and classified observability limits prevented symmetric national comparison and an overall winner."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT15","result":"material_and_disclosed","effect":"The sample remains purposive and case-rich in coercion, conflict and documented institutions; no prevalence estimate is made."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT16","result":"pass_with_deduplication","effect":"Each applied observation has one identifier and is linked downstream without tallying repeated domain edges or sources."}],"audit_results":[{"test_id":"IS-T01","result":"pass","note":"Decision question, cases, pathways and gates were frozen before adjudication."},{"test_id":"IS-T02","result":"pass","note":"Foundations remained distinct from Defense, Economics, Diplomacy and Information."},{"test_id":"IS-T03","result":"pass","note":"Every applied observation records instrument IDs and one causal stage."},{"test_id":"IS-T04","result":"pass","note":"Shared events were assigned stable observation IDs and not recounted as separate advantages."},{"test_id":"IS-T05","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Integration claims identify at least two delivered instruments and a directional mechanism."},{"test_id":"IS-T06","result":"pass","note":"Case findings use chronology and do not infer orchestration from simultaneity."},{"test_id":"IS-T07","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Marginal contribution is bounded where counterfactuals are unavailable."},{"test_id":"IS-T08","result":"pass","note":"Substitution, redundancy, friction, fratricide and foregone options are visible."},{"test_id":"IS-T09","result":"pass","note":"Partner, recipient, private and local-force agency is separately attributed."},{"test_id":"IS-T10","result":"pass","note":"Target preferences and adaptation remain explicit rivals."},{"test_id":"IS-T11","result":"pass","note":"Deterrence, denial, compellence, shaping, crisis management and termination are never aggregated."},{"test_id":"IS-T12","result":"pass","note":"No deterrence inference rests on no war; no compellence inference rests on cost."},{"test_id":"IS-T13","result":"pass","note":"ISIS, JCPOA and Saudi-Iran findings include implementation and durability bounds."},{"test_id":"IS-T14","result":"pass","note":"Capability, strategy choice, execution and outcome are distinct fields."},{"test_id":"IS-T15","result":"pass","note":"Fact, mechanism and outcome confidence are disclosed separately where material."},{"test_id":"IS-T16","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Three pathways remain insufficient and Taiwan is indeterminate."},{"test_id":"IS-T17","result":"pass","note":"Afghanistan, Hambantota, WTO, minerals and unresolved cases challenge favored theses."},{"test_id":"IS-T18","result":"pass_bounded","note":"Phase and outcome sensitivity are reflected in split JCPOA, ISIS, gas and development-finance rulings."},{"test_id":"IS-T19","result":"pass","note":"No edge count, score, average or overall national winner exists."},{"test_id":"IS-T20","result":"pass","note":"User authorized full completion and publication remains subject to preview and production verification."}],"surviving_conclusions":["The U.S./partner system has exceptional permissioned aggregation capacity but recurrent physical and political conversion constraints.","The PRC-centered system has exceptional concentrated provision and throughput but recurrent recipient-permission, trust and durable-conversion constraints.","Economic and material denial is more common than compellence.","Host and recipient agency is the decisive bridge between provision and strategic access.","Instrument use can erode the network, market or credibility that creates future power."],"withheld_conclusions":["An overall national winner or composite score","A general causal ranking of deterrence strategies","Independent narrative, cultural or information-integrity contribution","Permanent semiconductor denial or broad mineral compellence","Automatic development-finance conversion to alignment or basing"]},"observations":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO001","case_ids":["IS-C01"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Ukraine","period":"2022-2025","observation":"Roughly fifty states built capability coalitions and armaments-director mechanisms that connected Ukrainian requirements to donations, procurement, production and sustainment.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_integration","source_ids":["IS-AS003"],"limitation":"Commitments and governance do not prove sufficient or timely delivery.","adjudication_effect":"supports_coalition_conversion","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO002","case_ids":["IS-C01"],"instrument_ids":["ND","EI"],"causal_stage":"binding_constraint","system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2022-2024","observation":"Audited U.S. replacement programs faced long component and raw-material lead times even as large appropriations and capacity investments were obligated.","evidentiary_role":"negative_physical_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS002"],"limitation":"U.S. replacement is not identical to total allied delivery or Ukrainian availability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_industrial_bottleneck","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO003","case_ids":["IS-C01"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome_and_persistence","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Ukraine","period":"2022-2026","observation":"Coalition support preserved a functioning Ukrainian state and military but did not produce war termination; political continuity, production and battlefield adaptation remained binding.","evidentiary_role":"mixed_bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS001","IS-AS002","IS-AS003"],"limitation":"The no-support counterfactual and classified requirements are unavailable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_partial_not_complete_strategy","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO004","case_ids":["IS-C02"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"objective_coherence","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Afghanistan","period":"2001-2021","observation":"U.S. objectives and timelines changed repeatedly while the reconstruction effort attempted to build institutions faster than the context and sustainability allowed.","evidentiary_role":"negative_strategy_coherence","source_ids":["IS-AS004","IS-AS005"],"limitation":"Retrospective oversight cannot measure every contemporaneous trade-off.","adjudication_effect":"supports_ends_ways_means_incoherence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO005","case_ids":["IS-C02"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"integration_and_partner_response","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Afghanistan","period":"2018-2021","observation":"Excluding the Afghan government from U.S.-Taliban talks and contradictory withdrawal signaling weakened partner legitimacy and readiness.","evidentiary_role":"negative_cross_instrument_effect","source_ids":["IS-AS004"],"limitation":"Taliban strength and Afghan political choices were independent causes.","adjudication_effect":"supports_diplomatic_defense_friction","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO006","case_ids":["IS-C02"],"instrument_ids":["ND","EI"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"Afghan_partner_system","period":"2002-2021","observation":"Security forces depended on U.S. contractors, logistics, air support and a force design they could not sustain; those dependencies became decisive when external support withdrew.","evidentiary_role":"negative_partner_sustainability","source_ids":["IS-AS005"],"limitation":"Public evidence cannot precisely allocate collapse across leadership, corruption, morale and logistics.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategy_failure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","case_ids":["IS-C03"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"U.S.-partner_actor_PRC_target","period":"2022-2026","observation":"Controls aligned U.S. legal reach with Dutch, Japanese and other allied nodes in advanced equipment, software, materials and fabrication.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_targeted_coordination","source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"limitation":"Formal coverage differs from enforcement and some partners retain distinct rules.","adjudication_effect":"supports_coalition_denial_pathway","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","case_ids":["IS-C03"],"instrument_ids":["EI","ND"],"causal_stage":"target_response","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2022-2026","observation":"PRC firms redesigned products, expanded mature-node capacity and pursued indigenous tools while restrictions were repeatedly revised to cover new pathways.","evidentiary_role":"target_adaptation","source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"limitation":"Public data cannot measure the classified military counterfactual.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_durability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO009","case_ids":["IS-C03"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"Both systems","period":"2022-2026","observation":"The strategy plausibly delayed selected frontier capabilities but has not publicly demonstrated permanent denial, PRC policy compliance or a net military outcome after ecosystem costs.","evidentiary_role":"bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"limitation":"A precise no-controls counterfactual is unavailable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_partial_strategy","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO010","case_ids":["IS-C04"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"initial_condition","system":"European_partner_system_Russia_supplier","period":"2021","observation":"Russian gas supplied about 45% of EU gas imports, creating relationship-specific exposure.","evidentiary_role":"vulnerability_baseline","source_ids":["IS-AS010"],"limitation":"Member dependence and contract structures varied.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_initial_dependency","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO011","case_ids":["IS-C04"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"European_partner_system","period":"2022-2025","observation":"REPowerEU combined procurement, infrastructure, demand reduction, regulation, alternative suppliers and public policy to reduce Russian gas imports from roughly 150 bcm to 52 bcm.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_cross_instrument_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"limitation":"Weather, prices, conservation and weak demand contributed.","adjudication_effect":"supports_integrated_recovery","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO012","case_ids":["IS-C04"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"outcome_and_persistence","system":"European_partner_system","period":"2022-2026","observation":"Europe preserved support for Ukraine and moved toward legal phaseout while Russian pipeline deliveries fell roughly 90% from 2021 to 2025.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_durable_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"limitation":"High costs and distributional effects prevent a costless-success judgment.","adjudication_effect":"supports_success_with_cost","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","case_ids":["IS-C05"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND","EI"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"U.S.-Philippines_alliance","period":"2023-2025","observation":"The allies expanded EDCA to nine sites, funded infrastructure, exercised forces and linked maritime security to treaty consultation.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_access_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013"],"limitation":"Prepared sites do not guarantee mission-specific wartime use.","adjudication_effect":"supports_diplomacy_to_access","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","case_ids":["IS-C05"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND","II"],"causal_stage":"partner_response","system":"Philippines","period":"2022-2025","observation":"Philippine policy shifted toward deeper U.S. and trilateral cooperation as PRC maritime pressure intensified.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_partner_choice","source_ids":["IS-AS013"],"limitation":"The Philippines acted for its own interests; U.S. assurance is not the sole cause.","adjudication_effect":"supports_partner_agency_and_assurance","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO015","case_ids":["IS-C05"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"U.S.-Philippines_alliance","period":"2023-2026","observation":"Access remains legally and politically permissioned under Philippine sovereignty, making local legitimacy and consultation part of operational capacity.","evidentiary_role":"binding_permission_constraint","source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013"],"limitation":"Future administrations and crisis decisions are unobserved.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_access_claim","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO016","case_ids":["IS-C06"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"Global_Coalition_and_local_partners","period":"2014-2019","observation":"The coalition and local forces removed ISIS territorial control in Iraq by 2017 and Syria by 2019.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS006"],"limitation":"Territorial defeat does not equal ideological or organizational elimination.","adjudication_effect":"supports_declared_territorial_objective","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO017","case_ids":["IS-C06"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"integration","system":"Global_Coalition","period":"2014-2026","observation":"Military action was paired with partner training, intelligence, finance, foreign-fighter and stabilization work under a multinational framework.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_cross_instrument_mechanism","source_ids":["IS-AS006","IS-AS007"],"limitation":"Public records do not quantify each line's marginal contribution.","adjudication_effect":"supports_integrated_campaign","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO018","case_ids":["IS-C06"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"Iraq_and_Syria","period":"2019-2026","observation":"ISIS lost territorial rule but retained cells, ideology and detainee-camp risks, requiring transition to enduring partner capacity.","evidentiary_role":"negative_persistence_limit","source_ids":["IS-AS006","IS-AS007"],"limitation":"Threat reporting varies and the campaign remains active.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_success_to_territorial_defeat","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","case_ids":["IS-C07"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"bargain_and_delivery","system":"E3_EU_plus_3_and_Iran","period":"2015-2016","observation":"A negotiated exchange of verified nuclear limits for sanctions relief reached Implementation Day after the IAEA confirmed required Iranian actions.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bargaining_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS014","IS-AS015","IS-AS017"],"limitation":"Sanctions were one cause among diplomacy, threat perceptions and Iranian politics.","adjudication_effect":"supports_initial_strategy_success","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO020","case_ids":["IS-C07"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"friction_and_reversal","system":"U.S.-anchored_and_partners","period":"2018","observation":"The United States withdrew and reimposed sanctions despite verified implementation, requiring partners and firms to wind down activity.","evidentiary_role":"negative_cross_instrument_reversal","source_ids":["IS-AS016"],"limitation":"U.S. objections included issues outside the nuclear agreement and later Iranian nonperformance matters.","adjudication_effect":"supports_credibility_and_durability_failure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO021","case_ids":["IS-C07"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"Iran_and_multilateral_system","period":"2018-2026","observation":"Maximum pressure did not restore the JCPOA limits; the monitoring and legal framework deteriorated and prior UN measures were eventually reapplied.","evidentiary_role":"negative_durable_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS014","IS-AS016","IS-AS017"],"limitation":"Regional conflict and other parties' choices also shaped the outcome.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategy_reversal_failure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO022","case_ids":["IS-C08"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II","ND"],"causal_stage":"strategy_and_commitments","system":"PRC-centered_and_African_partners","period":"2024-2027","observation":"FOCAC adopted a detailed plan spanning finance, infrastructure, industrial chains, health, media, governance, security and people-to-people programs.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_policy_coherence","source_ids":["IS-AS018"],"limitation":"A comprehensive action plan is actor theory, not delivery or recipient effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_cross_instrument_design","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO023","case_ids":["IS-C08"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"means_and_scale","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2013-2021","observation":"PRC infrastructure finance in selected sectors was estimated at USD679 billion versus USD76 billion from the United States, demonstrating exceptional upstream means.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_resource_scale","source_ids":["IS-AS019"],"limitation":"Finance estimates do not establish completion, quality, additionality or influence.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_provision_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO024","case_ids":["IS-C08"],"instrument_ids":["DC","II","EI"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"African_recipients_and_PRC","period":"2000-2026","observation":"Recipient benefit, relationship durability and policy conversion vary by project; institute or commitment counts cannot establish influence, and current 2025–2027 promises remain mostly prospective.","evidentiary_role":"withholding_and_recipient_agency","source_ids":["IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS040"],"limitation":"The portfolio lacks matched recipient outcomes for every FOCAC commitment.","adjudication_effect":"withholds_overall_strategy_effectiveness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO025","case_ids":["IS-C09"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"World_Bank","period":"2020-2022","observation":"The World Bank delivered pandemic financing at very large scale, including USD72.8 billion in IBRD and IDA commitments and vaccine support across scores of countries.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_multilateral_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS020"],"limitation":"Commitments and contracted doses do not equal health outcomes.","adjudication_effect":"supports_world_bank_crisis_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO026","case_ids":["IS-C09"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"AIIB","period":"2020-2023","observation":"AIIB approved 68 crisis-facility projects totaling USD18.48 billion across 26 members, much of it policy-based or cofinanced.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_new_institution_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS021"],"limitation":"Approvals, cofinance and member coverage do not establish independent additionality.","adjudication_effect":"supports_aiib_delivery_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO027","case_ids":["IS-C09"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"institutional_outcome","system":"Multilateral_system","period":"2020-2023","observation":"Both institutions converted capital and country relationships into crisis delivery, but the evidence does not show PRC control of AIIB, displacement of the World Bank or durable geopolitical alignment.","evidentiary_role":"negative_influence_inference","source_ids":["IS-AS020","IS-AS021"],"limitation":"Governance influence and recipient preferences require separate evidence.","adjudication_effect":"supports_complementary_not_zero_sum_ruling","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO028","case_ids":["IS-C10"],"instrument_ids":["DC","II"],"causal_stage":"institutional_reach","system":"BRICS","period":"2023-2025","observation":"Expansion increased membership and convening reach; the 2025 summit adopted a 126-paragraph declaration plus climate, AI and health initiatives.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_agenda_and_narrative","source_ids":["IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"limitation":"Document volume does not measure implementation or unity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_convening_power","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO029","case_ids":["IS-C10"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"integration_constraint","system":"BRICS_members","period":"2025","observation":"The declaration aggregates heterogeneous interests and generally relies on voluntary national or existing-institution action rather than common enforcement or pooled resources.","evidentiary_role":"negative_taskability","source_ids":["IS-AS022"],"limitation":"Some specialized initiatives may later acquire institutions and funding.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_coalition_comparison","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO030","case_ids":["IS-C10"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome_and_persistence","system":"BRICS_members","period":"2025-2026","observation":"At the evidence cutoff, many Rio commitments remained prospective; expansion and common rhetoric did not establish consistent member alignment in security or economic policy.","evidentiary_role":"withholding","source_ids":["IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"limitation":"The observation window is short.","adjudication_effect":"withholds_delivery_and_strategic_outcome","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","case_ids":["IS-C11"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"positive_conversion","system":"PRC-centered_and_Djibouti","period":"2013-2025","observation":"PRC finance and port relationships preceded a defense agreement and operational base in Djibouti.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_single_case","source_ids":["IS-AS024","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"Sequence does not prove finance purchased permission.","adjudication_effect":"supports_possible_port_to_access_path","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO032","case_ids":["IS-C11"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"negative_case","system":"PRC-centered_and_Sri_Lanka","period":"2017-2026","observation":"Hambantota produced long-duration commercial operating control but not a debt-for-equity loan cancellation or demonstrated PRC military base.","evidentiary_role":"negative_generalization","source_ids":["IS-AS025"],"limitation":"Incomplete contracts leave narrower access and influence channels uncertain.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_automatic_conversion","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","case_ids":["IS-C11"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"cross_case_outcome","system":"PRC-centered_and_hosts","period":"2013-2026","observation":"Across the observed ports, host security authorization—not finance or ownership alone—decided military taskability.","evidentiary_role":"mechanism_ruling","source_ids":["IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"The sample is small and purposive.","adjudication_effect":"supports_conditional_pathway","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO034","case_ids":["IS-C12"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"initial_power","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2010-2026","observation":"PRC refining and magnet concentration created product-specific licensing and denial power.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_power_source","source_ids":["IS-AS026"],"limitation":"Aggregate shares do not reveal every product, inventory or military end use.","adjudication_effect":"supports_material_control","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","case_ids":["IS-C12"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"target_response","system":"Japan_and_other_targets","period":"2010-2026","observation":"Targets used inventory, thrift, recycling, alternative supply, investment and legal action; current diversification remains slower for difficult midstream products.","evidentiary_role":"adaptation_and_persistence","source_ids":["IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"limitation":"Forecast projects may slip and attribution of the 2010 bilateral interruption remains contested.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_duration_and_reveals_residual_risk","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","case_ids":["IS-C12"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"strategic_outcome","system":"PRC-centered_and_targets","period":"2010-2026","observation":"Controls imposed real costs and occasional production curtailment but did not publicly demonstrate durable target policy compliance; use intensified counter-coalition investment.","evidentiary_role":"negative_compellence_and_feedback","source_ids":["IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"limitation":"Exact PRC demands and private policy deliberations are partly unavailable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_denial_not_compellence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","case_ids":["IS-C13"],"instrument_ids":["DC","II"],"causal_stage":"bargain","system":"China_Saudi_Arabia_Iran","period":"2023","observation":"China hosted a bounded agreement to restore diplomatic relations, reopen missions and resume prior cooperation frameworks.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_diplomatic_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS028"],"limitation":"Iraq and Oman had supported earlier talks, and the parties retained decisive agency.","adjudication_effect":"supports_mediation_success","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO038","case_ids":["IS-C13"],"instrument_ids":["DC"],"causal_stage":"implementation","system":"Saudi_Arabia_and_Iran","period":"2023-2025","observation":"Embassies reopened, ministers met and a trilateral committee continued to review implementation through 2025.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_persistence","source_ids":["IS-AS028","IS-AS029"],"limitation":"Diplomatic contact does not equal trust or settlement of regional conflicts.","adjudication_effect":"supports_bounded_durability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO039","case_ids":["IS-C13"],"instrument_ids":["DC","II","ND"],"causal_stage":"strategic_outcome","system":"Middle_East","period":"2023-2026","observation":"The agreement achieved restoration but did not establish China as regional security guarantor or resolve the parties' proxy, nuclear and security disputes.","evidentiary_role":"bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS028","IS-AS029"],"limitation":"Some effects may emerge over a longer horizon.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_regional_peace_overclaim","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","case_ids":["IS-C14"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II","EI"],"causal_stage":"strategic_condition","system":"U.S.-partner_PRC_Taiwan","period":"2016-2026","observation":"The cross-Strait status quo persisted without invasion while PRC military and gray-zone pressure intensified and U.S. support expanded.","evidentiary_role":"mixed_condition","source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"The absence of war cannot identify which action deterred whom.","adjudication_effect":"withholds_deterministic_deterrence_call","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO041","case_ids":["IS-C14"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"feedback","system":"Both systems","period":"2022-2026","observation":"U.S. support and political engagement can strengthen Taiwan's defense while triggering additional PRC coercion; PRC coercion can intimidate while hardening external balancing.","evidentiary_role":"cross_instrument_feedback","source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"Intentions and private decision thresholds are not observable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_competing_shaping_not_clean_success","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO042","case_ids":["IS-C14"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"Both systems","period":"2016-2026","observation":"Neither side achieved its maximal objective: the PRC did not unify Taiwan, and the U.S./partner system did not end coercion or create a stable, attributable deterrence equilibrium.","evidentiary_role":"contested_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"Maximal objectives may not be the operational objectives in every period.","adjudication_effect":"classifies_case_indeterminate","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO043","case_ids":["IS-C15"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"pressure","system":"PRC-centered_actor_Philippines_target","period":"2023-2025","observation":"PRC coast guard and maritime-militia pressure disrupted Philippine operations and produced tactical control or denial at selected moments.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_tactical_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS013","IS-AS032"],"limitation":"Incident accounts are contested and tactical gains vary by feature.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_gray_zone_effect","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","case_ids":["IS-C15"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND","II"],"causal_stage":"counter_coalition","system":"Philippines_and_U.S.-partners","period":"2023-2025","observation":"Pressure strengthened Philippine public documentation, U.S. treaty assurance, EDCA implementation and trilateral cooperation.","evidentiary_role":"negative_strategic_feedback","source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013","IS-AS032"],"limitation":"Alliance deepening also reflected leadership change and long-term trends.","adjudication_effect":"supports_coercion_backfire","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO045","case_ids":["IS-C15"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"bounded_outcome","system":"PRC_and_Philippines","period":"2024-2025","observation":"A provisional arrangement allowed continued resupply at Second Thomas Shoal while harassment persisted elsewhere, leaving tactical accommodation without a durable settlement.","evidentiary_role":"mixed_crisis_management","source_ids":["IS-AS013"],"limitation":"The arrangement's terms and durability are partly undisclosed.","adjudication_effect":"classifies_both_strategies_partial","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","case_ids":["IS-C16"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"institution_building","system":"IPEF_partners","period":"2023-2024","observation":"Fourteen partners negotiated a supply-chain agreement that entered into force and established a Council, Crisis Response Network and Labor Rights Advisory Board.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_institutional_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS033","IS-AS034"],"limitation":"Not all partners entered simultaneously and there is no market-access pillar.","adjudication_effect":"supports_diplomatic_rule_conversion","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO047","case_ids":["IS-C16"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"implementation","system":"IPEF_partners","period":"2024-2026","observation":"Partners designated officials and organized work on semiconductors, chemicals and critical minerals.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_early_implementation","source_ids":["IS-AS034"],"limitation":"Meetings and action teams are upstream of diversified supply or crisis performance.","adjudication_effect":"supports_process_not_outcome","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO048","case_ids":["IS-C16"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"IPEF_partners","period":"2024-2026","observation":"No admitted public case yet shows the Crisis Response Network preserving a strategic function during a major disruption.","evidentiary_role":"insufficient_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS033","IS-AS034"],"limitation":"The institution is young and may be intentionally preventive.","adjudication_effect":"withholds_effectiveness_ruling","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","case_ids":["IS-C17"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI"],"causal_stage":"institutional_action","system":"United_States_and_WTO","period":"2017-2026","observation":"The United States blocked appointments to press longstanding legal concerns; the Appellate Body became unable to hear appeals and had no members.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_disruption","source_ids":["IS-AS035","IS-AS036"],"limitation":"Other members and the body's prior practices contributed to the impasse.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_instrument_conversion_to_paralysis","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","case_ids":["IS-C17"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI"],"causal_stage":"substitution","system":"MPIA_participants","period":"2020-2026","observation":"A subset of members including China and the EU used Article 25 arbitration to preserve appeal review outside the disabled body.","evidentiary_role":"institutional_adaptation","source_ids":["IS-AS037"],"limitation":"MPIA is nonuniversal and has few awards.","adjudication_effect":"supports_workaround_and_us_exclusion_cost","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO051","case_ids":["IS-C17"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"strategic_outcome","system":"United_States_and_multilateral_system","period":"2017-2026","observation":"Paralysis was achieved, but a broadly accepted reform was not; appeals accumulated and an alternative proceeded without the United States.","evidentiary_role":"negative_net_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS035","IS-AS036","IS-AS037"],"limitation":"A future reform may vindicate some U.S. leverage and substantive complaints remain material.","adjudication_effect":"supports_cross_instrument_fratricide_risk","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO052","case_ids":["IS-C18"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"upstream_delivery","system":"PRC-centered_and_recipients","period":"2000-2023","observation":"PRC official finance supported an exceptionally large global infrastructure portfolio and gave borrowers options unavailable at comparable U.S. scale.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_provision_power","source_ids":["IS-AS019","IS-AS038"],"limitation":"Commitments and project counts do not establish quality, completion or influence.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_upstream_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO053","case_ids":["IS-C18"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"failure_and_adaptation","system":"PRC-centered_and_recipients","period":"2016-2025","observation":"Troubled projects, debt distress and public backlash drove a shift toward smaller, safer, collaborative and rescue-oriented finance.","evidentiary_role":"learning_and_repair","source_ids":["IS-AS038","IS-AS039"],"limitation":"Dataset coverage and causal attribution vary by borrower and project.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_adaptation_after_failure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO054","case_ids":["IS-C18"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"outcome_and_persistence","system":"PRC-centered_and_recipients","period":"2000-2026","observation":"Some projects delivered valued infrastructure and relationships, but debt distress did not automatically yield asset seizure, military permission or exclusive alignment; host agency remained decisive.","evidentiary_role":"mixed_cross_case_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS019","IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS038","IS-AS039"],"limitation":"The portfolio is heterogeneous and public strategic-access evidence is sparse.","adjudication_effect":"supports_conditional_not_automatic_conversion","status":"applied"}],"metric_contracts":[{"metric_id":"IS-M01","causal_stage":"objective","name":"Objective specificity","decision_question":"Is the desired strategic change precise enough to test before observing the result?","definition_or_formula":"Record actor, target or recipient, geography, issue, requested or deterred behavior, success threshold, acceptable cost, observation window, and persistence checkpoint before adjudication.","unit":"complete_objective_contract","required_denominator":"all eleven objective-contract fields","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same specificity rule to U.S./partner and PRC-centered cases; actor rhetoric may define intent but not success.","admissible_evidence":"Contemporaneous strategy, decision memorandum, law, negotiation demand, operational order, partner statement, or independently reconstructed pre-action objective.","mandatory_exclusions":"Retrospective goal substitution; broad national interest; victory rhetoric; unstated desired end state.","decision_rule":"No outcome or comparative conclusion when the objective, target behavior, and success threshold cannot be bounded.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M02","causal_stage":"objective","name":"Baseline and counterfactual","decision_question":"What would likely have happened without the integrated action or under a credible alternative?","definition_or_formula":"Declare the pre-action baseline, comparison case or period, rival intervention, target trajectory, and observable counterfactual implications.","unit":"documented_baseline_and_counterfactual","required_denominator":"all consequential outcome claims","comparison_requirement":"Use matched cases, interrupted time series, synthetic comparisons, within-case process tracing, or an explicitly weaker contribution claim when a counterfactual cannot be estimated.","admissible_evidence":"Pre-period data, matched case, target plans, forecast, natural experiment, quasi-experiment, independent scenario record, or probative process-tracing evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Before-and-after change alone; actor forecast treated as fact; assuming no other cause; comparing unlike objectives.","decision_rule":"A missing credible counterfactual caps the finding at bounded contribution and normally prevents a comparative edge.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M03","causal_stage":"foundations","name":"Enabler usability","decision_question":"Was the required technology, skill, resource, infrastructure, intelligence, state capacity, or resilience actually available to the pathway?","definition_or_formula":"Required enabler units available at the decision point divided by required units, with quality, location, authority, timeliness, and survivability recorded separately.","unit":"percent_and_constraint_profile","required_denominator":"all enablers declared necessary by the pathway","comparison_requirement":"Use common functional requirements rather than gross national stocks; classify inaccessible, unqualified, late, or non-survivable capacity as unavailable for that case.","admissible_evidence":"Audited inventory, qualification record, staffing and skill record, test, access authority, logistics trace, exercise, or observed use.","mandatory_exclusions":"National totals; planned capacity; undisclosed partner assets; technology maturity claim; nominal stockpile without access or condition.","decision_rule":"A pathway fails the foundations gate when a declared necessary enabler is unavailable and no observed substitute closes the gap.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M04","causal_stage":"foundations","name":"Enabler-to-instrument conversion","decision_question":"Did the foundation become a delivered capability of one of the four instruments?","definition_or_formula":"Trace elapsed time and completion through authorization, resources, implementation, qualification or trust, operational availability, and first relevant use.","unit":"stage_completion_and_time","required_denominator":"all claimed foundation contributions","comparison_requirement":"Apply the originating instrument's existing decisive-stage rule; do not grant cross-instrument credit before the domain-level conversion gate is met.","admissible_evidence":"Budget and obligation records, production and qualification, staffing, legal authority, distribution or consumption, relationship activation, exercises, and delivered output.","mandatory_exclusions":"Research spending; patent or publication count; announced reform; factory start; memorandum; collection volume; resilience plan.","decision_rule":"No cross-instrument pathway credit until at least one originating instrument action reaches its own decisive evidence stage.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M05","causal_stage":"foundations","name":"Partner contribution availability","decision_question":"Was a partner contribution voluntary, authorized, timely, usable, and causally connected to the case?","definition_or_formula":"Case-available partner output meeting role, authority, quality, timing, access, and interoperability requirements divided by required partner output.","unit":"percent_by_required_role","required_denominator":"all partner roles credited to either system","comparison_requirement":"Use the same role-based test; membership or general alignment cannot substitute for observed contribution; preserve partner agency and independent motives.","admissible_evidence":"National authorization, budget, delivered output, access record, exercise or activation, partner interview or statement, and independent verification.","mandatory_exclusions":"Alliance membership; communique signature; cultural affinity; GDP aggregation; theoretical industrial capacity; assumed host permission.","decision_rule":"Partner capacity counts only for the observed role and window; absent public evidence reduces confidence rather than coding zero.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M06","causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","name":"Delivered instrument action","decision_question":"What did each instrument deliver, to whom, when, and at what quality and cost?","definition_or_formula":"For every action, record owner, authority, input, delivered output, recipient, timing, quality threshold, direct cost, and originating-domain decisive stage.","unit":"action_level_delivery_record","required_denominator":"all actions claimed in the integrated pathway","comparison_requirement":"Code each action separately under National Defense, Economics & Industry, Diplomacy & Coalitions, or Information & Influence before assessing interaction.","admissible_evidence":"Fielded mission output, enforced economic measure, activated coalition role, consumed and understood information, or other evidence satisfying the source domain contract.","mandatory_exclusions":"Spending; announcement; signature; content volume; potential reach; force inventory; meeting count; partner promise.","decision_rule":"Two or more delivered actions are necessary for an integration claim, but simultaneity alone is insufficient.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M07","causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","name":"Domain-stage integrity","decision_question":"Does each claimed input stop at the deepest stage actually supported by its originating evidence?","definition_or_formula":"Record the originating domain's causal stage and prohibit promotion beyond it when imported into the synthesis.","unit":"deepest_supported_domain_stage","required_denominator":"all imported instrument observations","comparison_requirement":"Use existing Statecrafts domain contracts and evidence cutoffs; a synthesis cannot raise confidence or causal depth merely by combining sources.","admissible_evidence":"Current domain assessment trace plus new case-specific evidence that explicitly advances the stage.","mandatory_exclusions":"Copying a domain position; tallying edges; treating reach as influence, commitment as delivery, capacity as mission effect, or cost as behavior.","decision_rule":"The synthesis inherits the lowest relevant evidence boundary and must disclose any newer evidence that changes it.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M08","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Sequence and timing","decision_question":"Did the actions occur in the order and window required for the hypothesized mechanism?","definition_or_formula":"Observed elapsed time between predeclared action nodes compared with the pathway's maximum useful interval; record premature, late, reversed, and interrupted sequences.","unit":"hours_days_months_and_sequence_state","required_denominator":"all required links in the pathway","comparison_requirement":"Match event trigger and time horizon; faster is not better when consultation, credibility, or de-escalation requires delay.","admissible_evidence":"Decision logs, dated laws and orders, delivery records, platform archives, diplomatic chronology, operational reports, and target response timing.","mandatory_exclusions":"Same calendar year; post hoc narrative order; publication date used as action date; speed without quality.","decision_rule":"A missed necessary sequence or time window bounds or contradicts the integration claim unless an observed substitute mechanism succeeds.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M09","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Reinforcement and marginal contribution","decision_question":"Did one instrument materially increase another instrument's reach, credibility, access, coverage, speed, survivability, or effect?","definition_or_formula":"Difference between observed joint performance and the best supported single-instrument or alternative-package counterfactual, expressed quantitatively where possible and as a process-traced contribution otherwise.","unit":"effect_difference_or_contribution_grade","required_denominator":"all claimed reinforcing pairs","comparison_requirement":"Require a directional connection and test whether background threat, target weakness, or partner self-interest explains the apparent gain.","admissible_evidence":"Factorial or phased design, natural experiment, matched cases, mediation evidence, decision records, or hoop and smoking-gun process tests.","mandatory_exclusions":"Co-occurrence; common owner; shared slogan; greater total spending; favorable final outcome.","decision_rule":"No reinforcement finding without evidence that the receiving instrument or downstream response changed because of the contributing action.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M10","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Substitution and redundancy","decision_question":"Could another instrument or partner role replace a failed or unavailable link without losing the objective?","definition_or_formula":"For each necessary link, identify observed substitute, activation time, capacity, cost, quality, and outcome difference relative to the original pathway.","unit":"coverage_percent_and_recovery_time","required_denominator":"all failed or stressed links","comparison_requirement":"Compare functional roles rather than labels; disclose when substitution shifts cost or risk to partners or creates a different outcome.","admissible_evidence":"Rerouting, alternative supplier, partner lead, diplomatic off-ramp, reserve use, independent messenger, distributed access, or policy redesign with observed performance.","mandatory_exclusions":"Hypothetical alternative; nominal spare capacity; unused authority; announced contingency.","decision_rule":"Redundancy receives credit only when activated or representatively tested within the relevant time window.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M11","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Friction, fratricide, and integration cost","decision_question":"Did an instrument degrade another instrument, foreclose an option, shift risk, or impose a cost material to the objective?","definition_or_formula":"Record negative cross-effects, affected actor, timing, magnitude, opportunity cost, recovery, and whether the effect was anticipated and accepted.","unit":"cost_and_cross_effect_profile","required_denominator":"all materially affected instruments and partners","comparison_requirement":"Use the same cost categories for both systems and keep short-run gains separate from long-run ecosystem, legitimacy, escalation, and partner costs.","admissible_evidence":"Budget displacement, commercial exit, partner defection, access loss, credibility change, escalation record, delayed delivery, or documented policy reversal.","mandatory_exclusions":"Criticism; disagreement; any cost; final failure without a connecting mechanism; moral judgment without a declared criterion.","decision_rule":"A pathway cannot be called reinforcing when an unaddressed cross-effect is large enough to reverse the declared net objective.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M12","causal_stage":"response","name":"Target or recipient uptake","decision_question":"Did the relevant actor notice, understand, accept, use, authorize, or respond to the integrated package?","definition_or_formula":"Observed target or recipient movement from awareness through comprehension, belief, decision opportunity, authorization, and behavior, stopping at the deepest supported stage.","unit":"stage_and_behavior_change","required_denominator":"all pivotal targets, recipients, and partners","comparison_requirement":"Use actor-specific baselines and separate voluntary preference, coercion, threat response, material incentive, and independent domestic causes.","admissible_evidence":"Survey experiment, interview, vote, authorization, procurement, basing decision, compliance act, force move, trade rerouting, or other consequential choice.","mandatory_exclusions":"Potential exposure; elite statement; meeting; favorable polling; agreement signature; contemporaneous movement without source or mechanism evidence.","decision_rule":"No strategic conversion claim when the pathway stops at exposure, activity, cost, or stated support.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M13","causal_stage":"response","name":"Opponent adaptation and counteraction","decision_question":"How did the opponent or target substitute, evade, escalate, learn, or impose reciprocal costs?","definition_or_formula":"Track adaptation onset, mechanism, restored capacity or behavior, residual effect, counter-cost, and time to stabilization after each major action.","unit":"time_to_adapt_and_residual_effect","required_denominator":"all consequential target and opponent responses","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical observability rules; opaque adaptation remains unknown, not absent; distinguish expected response from action caused by the intervention.","admissible_evidence":"Trade and production shift, sanctions evasion, doctrine or posture change, counter-coalition, counternarrative, legal retaliation, bargaining move, or verified learning.","mandatory_exclusions":"Rhetorical threat; unrelated trend; adaptation announced but not implemented; adversary failure credited automatically to the defender.","decision_rule":"Durable contribution requires the claimed effect to survive or adapt faster than material counteraction within the declared window.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M14","causal_stage":"outcome","name":"Strategic objective attainment","decision_question":"Was the predeclared outcome achieved at acceptable cost and without replacing it with a weaker retrospective goal?","definition_or_formula":"Observed distance from baseline to the predeclared success threshold, with cost, distribution, unintended effects, and target behavior reported separately.","unit":"objective_specific_result","required_denominator":"all declared objectives and affected groups","comparison_requirement":"Match objectives and windows before comparing systems; do not merge deterrence, denial, compellence, shaping, crisis management, and termination.","admissible_evidence":"Behavioral, territorial, institutional, access, production, compliance, violence, settlement, or other outcome measure defined before adjudication.","mandatory_exclusions":"Output totals; activity; target cost; process milestone; ceasefire without terms; absence of war without a deterrence design.","decision_rule":"A strategic outcome exists only when the declared threshold is met; partial movement is reported as bounded contribution, not relabeled success.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M15","causal_stage":"outcome","name":"Contribution strength and rival causes","decision_question":"How strongly did the observed integrated pathway contribute relative to plausible alternatives?","definition_or_formula":"Rate the contribution claim by theory-of-change completeness, implementation fidelity, temporal fit, mechanism evidence, counterfactual strength, disconfirmation tests, and unresolved rival causes.","unit":"insufficient_bounded_moderate_strong","required_denominator":"all outcome claims","comparison_requirement":"Use the same probative-evidence tests; centralization, transparency, secrecy, or actor confidence cannot substitute for mechanism evidence.","admissible_evidence":"Experimental or quasi-experimental estimate where feasible; otherwise structured process tracing, contribution analysis, matched cases, and contrary evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Citation count; source prestige alone; official certainty; analyst intuition; policy popularity; absence of an alternative explanation search.","decision_rule":"A comparative edge requires convergent outcome-level contribution evidence from matched or meaningfully comparable cases; one-sided evidence remains unscored.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M16","causal_stage":"persistence","name":"Persistence and second-order effects","decision_question":"Did the outcome survive time, cost, leadership change, counteraction, and policy shock without unacceptable downstream damage?","definition_or_formula":"Measure outcome retention at predeclared checkpoints and after at least one material shock; record attrition, reversal, spillover, distribution, and repair cost.","unit":"retention_rate_and_checkpoint","required_denominator":"all actors initially counted in the outcome","comparison_requirement":"Use comparable checkpoints and shocks; distinguish durable settlement from temporary compliance and resilient adaptation from costly exhaustion.","admissible_evidence":"Longitudinal behavior, renewed authorization, continued delivery, compliance monitoring, relationship retention, recurring survey panel, and second-order outcome data.","mandatory_exclusions":"Immediate post-action result; no formal withdrawal; repeated summit attendance; surviving institution; continuing conflict at lower intensity.","decision_rule":"No lead or durable-success claim without a persistence test or an explicit disclosure that the required horizon has not elapsed.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M17","causal_stage":"persistence","name":"Repeated-cycle learning","decision_question":"Did measured evidence change cross-instrument design and improve a later comparable result?","definition_or_formula":"Trace finding to owner, decision, implemented design change, later comparable cycle, outcome difference, rival causes, and retained institutional memory.","unit":"closed_loop_and_effect_change","required_denominator":"all consequential failed, mixed, or repeated campaigns","comparison_requirement":"Use common outcome definitions and disclose turnover, changed threat, and changed resources; public transparency is not automatically better learning.","admissible_evidence":"Evaluation, after-action record, revised authority or sequence, budget shift, exercise correction, repeated operation, and measured later result.","mandatory_exclusions":"Lessons document; doctrine update; reorganization; new technology; success claim; absence of repeated failure.","decision_rule":"Learning is unscored when the public record lacks either implemented change or comparable improved performance.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"}],"case_contracts":[{"case_id":"IS-C01","title":"U.S. and European response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","period":"2022-present; phase boundaries required","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with autonomous European and other partners","region":"Euro-Atlantic|Global","case_role":"mixed_high_integration_case","selection_reason":"Contains a failed prewar deterrence phase followed by military support, coalition activation, sanctions, energy adaptation, strategic communication, target counteradaptation, burden change, and unresolved termination.","predeclared_outcome":"Assess prewar deterrence, Ukraine's defense and territorial control, coalition delivery, imposed Russian constraints, bargaining movement, sender cost, and durability as separate outcomes rather than one success label.","strongest_counterclaim":"Russia's choice, Ukrainian agency and combat performance, European threat perception, and Russia's own errors may explain more than U.S. orchestration; post-invasion delivery cannot repair the initial deterrence failure or establish termination.","evidence_gaps":"Phase-specific objectives; complete military and economic delivery; partner counterfactuals; Russian adaptation; information exposure; bargaining records; territorial and durability endpoints."},{"case_id":"IS-C02","title":"NATO and partner engagement in Afghanistan","period":"2001-2021 with post-2021 durability","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with NATO and non-NATO partners","region":"Middle East|Global","case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"A broad, long, heavily resourced campaign tests whether large multi-instrument activity, coalition delivery, institution building, and narrative effort produced a durable political objective.","predeclared_outcome":"Reconstruct objectives by phase and test whether security, governance, partner-force, economic, and settlement outcomes met their own thresholds and survived withdrawal.","strongest_counterclaim":"The final political collapse does not prove every military or development output failed, while shifting objectives, Afghan agency, Pakistan, insurgent adaptation, corruption, and withdrawal decisions complicate orchestration claims.","evidence_gaps":"Phase-specific objective ledger; Afghan and partner sources; spending-to-delivery trace; information and legitimacy effects; force and institution outcomes; counterfactual strategy; post-withdrawal persistence."},{"case_id":"IS-C03","title":"Advanced-semiconductor controls and allied technology coordination","period":"2022-present; rule vintages separated","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with technology-producing partners","region":"Indo-Pacific|Global","case_role":"us_partner_bounded_affirmative_candidate","selection_reason":"Connects technological chokepoints, partner rules, enforcement, narrative legitimacy, ecosystem revenue, PRC substitution, and military-relevant capability without requiring a policy-compellence claim.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure denied or delayed access to predeclared technologies, effective partner coverage, leakage, PRC substitution, U.S./partner ecosystem cost, and resulting capability timelines.","strongest_counterclaim":"Market cycles, firm choices, indigenous policy, and technological difficulty may explain delays; controls may accelerate substitution or weaken the open ecosystem that creates the chokepoint.","evidence_gaps":"Rule-by-rule objective; covered items and foreign availability; licensing and enforcement; company and partner behavior; PRC inventories and substitution; capability and revenue counterfactuals."},{"case_id":"IS-C04","title":"Europe's exit from Russian gas dependence","period":"2021-present with 2025-2027 legal milestones","anchor_system":"European partner-led with U.S. supply and support","region":"Euro-Atlantic","case_role":"partner_affirmative_resilience_candidate","selection_reason":"Offers a measured physical conversion from exposure through law, infrastructure, demand change, alternative supply, and coalition endurance under shock.","predeclared_outcome":"Test whether Russian gas dependence fell and remained below the declared threshold at acceptable fiscal, industrial, distributional, and security cost, while keeping any effect on Russian war policy separate.","strongest_counterclaim":"Mild weather, market demand, preexisting infrastructure, Russian supply decisions, high prices, and European agency may explain much of the shift; reduced dependence does not establish compellence.","evidence_gaps":"Common denominator across pipeline and LNG; legal implementation; price and subsidy cost; industrial curtailment; U.S. additionality; Russian revenue; durability through a severe winter or supply shock."},{"case_id":"IS-C05","title":"U.S.-Philippines alliance and EDCA access conversion","period":"2014-present; emphasis 2023-present","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored bilateral alliance with Philippine agency","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"us_partner_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Directly tests whether commitment, local legitimacy, infrastructure, exercises, economic support, and information resilience create scenario-usable access and change coercive expectations.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure site readiness, legal permission, logistics throughput, exercise and crisis activation, local and national support, partner burden, and adversary behavior against a declared scenario.","strongest_counterclaim":"Shared Philippine threat perception and domestic politics may drive cooperation independently; sites can remain vulnerable, conditional, or unused, and the absence of attack cannot prove deterrence.","evidence_gaps":"Site-by-site funding and readiness; crisis authorities; logistics and survivability; Philippine sources; local consent; PRC response; economic package; counterfactual access and deterrence design."},{"case_id":"IS-C06","title":"Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","period":"2014-present; transition phases separated","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored mission coalition with local-force primacy","region":"Middle East|Global","case_role":"us_partner_mixed_case","selection_reason":"Combines bounded adversary territorial objectives, military and local-force action, coalition roles, financial pressure, counter-messaging, governance limits, and a long durability window.","predeclared_outcome":"Separate territorial denial, attack capacity, financing, recruitment, partner-force performance, civilian harm, political stabilization, transition, and recurrence at declared checkpoints.","strongest_counterclaim":"Local forces carried decisive burdens; territorial defeat did not eliminate the organization or solve governance; military effects may dominate while other instruments are additive or weakly attributable.","evidence_gaps":"Original objectives and phase changes; coalition role outputs; local actor evidence; financial network effects; message exposure and recruitment; civilian costs; recurrence and governance outcomes."},{"case_id":"IS-C07","title":"JCPOA bargaining, implementation, withdrawal, and durability","period":"2013-present; 2015-2019 core outcome window","anchor_system":"Multilateral bargaining coalition with U.S., European, PRC, Russian, and Iranian agency","region":"Middle East|Global","case_role":"matched_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Provides a documented chain from pressure and military risk through diplomacy, agreement, verification, compliance, unilateral withdrawal, reciprocal adaptation, and durability failure.","predeclared_outcome":"Test movement from stated nuclear and sanctions baselines through verified implementation, economic relief, compliance, breakout risk, coalition continuity, withdrawal, and later settlement or escalation.","strongest_counterclaim":"Iranian domestic politics, covert action, regional threats, election change, and independent technical constraints may explain behavior; initial agreement success and later durability failure require separate attribution.","evidence_gaps":"Objective and counterfactual by actor; verified nuclear measures; sanctions relief and economic effect; bargaining chronology; public legitimacy; withdrawal causes; post-2019 behavior and persistence."},{"case_id":"IS-C08","title":"FOCAC action-plan and PRC development-finance conversion in Africa","period":"2000-present; 2024-2027 action-plan focus","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with diverse African partner agency","region":"Africa","case_role":"prc_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Connects finance and project delivery, formal and party networks, narrative and cultural programs, recipient demand, institutional continuity, and possible diplomatic or access outcomes.","predeclared_outcome":"Track obligation-level delivery, additional assets and services, recipient ownership and satisfaction, relationship retention, policy choices, institutional participation, and any scenario-specific access without assuming pooled African alignment.","strongest_counterclaim":"African development demand, commercial value, domestic politics, and alternative partners may explain participation; projects and forum continuity do not prove affinity, policy alignment, or PRC control.","evidence_gaps":"Country and project sample; finance types; disbursement and completion; recipient audits and public opinion; party and alumni conversion; votes and policy decisions; military-access attribution; failures and exits."},{"case_id":"IS-C09","title":"World Bank and AIIB pandemic response and project delivery","period":"2020-present with completed-project checkpoints","anchor_system":"Matched U.S.-influenced and PRC-initiated multilateral institutions","region":"Global","case_role":"matched_institutional_case","selection_reason":"Uses institutions with different governance and sponsorship to compare activation, finance, delivery, oversight, legitimacy, member agency, and reputational claims under a common shock.","predeclared_outcome":"Compare trigger-to-approval time, disbursement, completion, output and outcome quality, recipient agency, oversight, burden, and member retention in matched project and country sets.","strongest_counterclaim":"Different mandates, borrower pools, project types, disclosure, and preexisting pipelines can explain observed differences; institution output cannot be assigned automatically to Washington or Beijing.","evidence_gaps":"Matched project sample; common outcome definitions; independent recipient evidence; governance decisions; sponsor additionality; implementation failures; persistence and institutional legitimacy."},{"case_id":"IS-C10","title":"BRICS expansion, Rio commitments, and delivery","period":"2023-present; 2025-2027 implementation window","anchor_system":"PRC-influenced but member-driven coalition","region":"Global|Africa|Middle East|Indo-Pacific","case_role":"prc_influenced_mixed_case","selection_reason":"Tests whether agenda attraction and narrative alignment among heterogeneous members become authorized and delivered economic, institutional, or diplomatic action rather than summit volume.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure pivotal membership and agency, obligation specificity, authorization, resources, implementation, common external behavior, internal dissent, and durability after cost or disagreement.","strongest_counterclaim":"Expansion may reflect dissatisfaction with Western institutions, member hedging, or status seeking rather than PRC influence; consensus and heterogeneity may limit delivery.","evidence_gaps":"Commitment-level ledger; national implementation; finance and trade outputs; partner motives; PRC sponsorship and burden; contrary votes; failed initiatives; durability through disputes."},{"case_id":"IS-C11","title":"PRC overseas port investment to military and strategic access","period":"2000-present; 2017-present access focus","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with sovereign hosts and commercial operators","region":"Global|Indo-Pacific|Africa|Middle East","case_role":"prc_affirmative_candidate","selection_reason":"Tests a widely asserted conversion from economic infrastructure through relationships and permissions to military logistics, presence, or crisis options using site-level evidence.","predeclared_outcome":"For each sampled port, trace ownership and finance, delivered commercial capacity, host relationship, legal permission, military use, resupply throughput, crisis availability, revocability, and strategic effect.","strongest_counterclaim":"Commercial logic, host development goals, routine port calls, and diversified foreign users may explain investment; access can be conditional, limited, or vulnerable rather than a base pathway.","evidence_gaps":"Global site universe; contracts and ownership; host law and consent; repeated military use; logistics capacity; crisis activation; local politics; matched U.S./partner commercial-to-access cases."},{"case_id":"IS-C12","title":"PRC critical-mineral export controls and diversification response","period":"2023-present; measure each control separately","anchor_system":"PRC-centered pressure with U.S., partner, and firm adaptation","region":"Global|Indo-Pacific|Euro-Atlantic","case_role":"prc_coercion_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Links concentrated processing, legal controls, official signaling, diplomatic bargaining, target costs, stockpiles, substitution, partner diversification, and defense-industrial exposure.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure licensed and denied volume, price and production effects, inventory drawdown, substitution and qualification, partner coordination, target policy movement, PRC cost, and residual leverage.","strongest_counterclaim":"Market concentration and precautionary buying may cause price effects independently; controls may seek security compliance or industry policy rather than compellence, and diversification may erode leverage.","evidence_gaps":"Commodity- and product-level denominators; licensing data; target inventory and output; declared demands; policy response; substitution timelines; allied delivery; PRC producer cost and adaptation."},{"case_id":"IS-C13","title":"PRC-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic restoration","period":"2021-present; 2023 agreement and durability","anchor_system":"PRC-brokered with Saudi, Iranian, Iraqi, and Omani agency","region":"Middle East","case_role":"prc_affirmative_candidate","selection_reason":"Provides a bounded diplomatic agreement with prior facilitators, strong economic relationships, reputational consequences, observable implementation steps, regional shocks, and a durability test.","predeclared_outcome":"Track restored relations, implementation of agreed steps, crisis communication, regional proxy behavior, trade and security interaction, relapse, and PRC follow-up at declared checkpoints.","strongest_counterclaim":"Saudi and Iranian interests, Iraqi and Omani mediation, conflict fatigue, and economic priorities may explain the agreement; restoration of ties is not regional conflict termination.","evidence_gaps":"Negotiation chronology; prior mediation; PRC material contribution; implementation ledger; proxy and crisis behavior; participant evidence; counterfactual timing; persistence after shocks."},{"case_id":"IS-C14","title":"Taiwan Strait deterrence, coercion, and competitive shaping","period":"2016-present with event-specific windows","anchor_system":"Both systems with Taiwan and regional partner agency","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"matched_high_stakes_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Stress-tests every major pathway under a live but nonwar condition where military posture, economic dependence, diplomatic recognition, partner access, information, resilience, and escalation interact.","predeclared_outcome":"Define and measure discrete deterred or compelled behaviors, coercive actions, Taiwan decisions, partner commitments, crisis stability, economic and societal costs, and escalation at event-specific checkpoints.","strongest_counterclaim":"The absence of invasion cannot identify deterrence or which instrument mattered; PRC preferences, Taiwan agency, U.S. policy ambiguity, commercial ties, and wider regional behavior are powerful rival causes.","evidence_gaps":"Predeclared event sample and behaviors; classified-evidence boundary; Taiwan and partner sources; military exercise and readiness effects; economic measures; information exposure; crisis channels; counterfactual deterrence design."},{"case_id":"IS-C15","title":"South China Sea pressure and Philippine coalition response","period":"2012-present; event-level matched episodes","anchor_system":"Both systems with Philippine and regional agency","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"matched_gray_zone_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Offers repeated below-war episodes connecting maritime capability, legal and diplomatic action, alliance access, economic exposure, media evidence, public legitimacy, and target adaptation.","predeclared_outcome":"For matched episodes, measure control or access behavior, coercive acts, Philippine policy and operational response, partner activation, economic cost, public support, escalation, and persistence.","strongest_counterclaim":"Local operational dynamics, Philippine leadership change, legal rulings, fishing and commercial incentives, and autonomous partner behavior may dominate U.S. or PRC cross-instrument orchestration.","evidence_gaps":"Episode universe; common coercion and response coding; vessel and access data; Philippine sources; economic measures; message exposure; alliance decisions; crisis communication and unintended escalation."},{"case_id":"IS-C16","title":"IPEF supply-chain institutions and crisis-response conversion","period":"2022-present; first live or representative trigger required","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with autonomous Indo-Pacific partners","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"us_partner_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Tests whether negotiated institutions, information sharing, common definitions, and standing crisis mechanisms can produce alternative supply or coordinated action rather than procedural readiness alone.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure trigger recognition, decision time, participation, shared data, assigned roles, delivered alternative supply, affected-firm outcomes, cost, and institutional learning in a real or representative disruption.","strongest_counterclaim":"The arrangement may remain procedural, partners may act through preexisting bilateral or market channels, and a mild test cannot establish performance under a major disruption.","evidence_gaps":"Common critical-sector universe; exercise or live-trigger record; decision and delivery data; firm and partner evidence; counterfactual coordination; severe-stress test; durability after government change."},{"case_id":"IS-C17","title":"WTO Appellate Body impasse and U.S. institutional trade-offs","period":"2016-present","anchor_system":"Universal institution with U.S. policy central to the causal claim","region":"Global","case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Tests whether pursuit of economic and legal leverage degraded institutional leadership, coalition trust, rule enforcement, and narrative credibility, and whether alternatives restored the declared objective.","predeclared_outcome":"Reconstruct stated U.S. objectives, blockage mechanism, dispute-settlement performance, negotiated reform, partner behavior, economic consequences, alternative arrangements, and institutional legitimacy.","strongest_counterclaim":"The Appellate Body had substantive flaws and member-wide bargaining failures; paralysis may create leverage or alternative reform even while imposing systemic costs.","evidence_gaps":"Objective and reform demands; appointment and negotiation chronology; case backlog and trade behavior; partner positions; alternative mechanism performance; credibility evidence; long-run rule-system effects."},{"case_id":"IS-C18","title":"PRC development-finance delivery, renegotiation, and relationship repair","period":"2000-present; matched completed, distressed, and cancelled projects","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with recipient governments and implementing firms","region":"Africa|Indo-Pacific|Latin America and the Caribbean|Global","case_role":"prc_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Balances celebrated projects with delay, cancellation, debt distress, renegotiation, local contestation, and repair to test whether delivery and relationship effects survive cost and failure.","predeclared_outcome":"For a preselected project portfolio, measure commitment-to-disbursement-to-completion, additionality, asset performance, debt and fiscal cost, renegotiation, recipient trust, policy or access decisions, and persistence.","strongest_counterclaim":"Recipient demand, commercial terms, domestic governance, commodity cycles, and alternative lenders may explain both projects and outcomes; renegotiation may show adaptation rather than original failure or coercion.","evidence_gaps":"Matched success-failure sample; contracts and finance types; recipient audits; project output and outcome data; local public evidence; PRC additionality; policy decisions; alternative-finance counterfactual."}],"contract_limitation":"The preserved case register supplies outcome scope, period, selection rationale, rival explanation and evidence gaps. It does not contain separately completed eleven-field objective contracts, numerical success/failure thresholds or case-specific metric applications. General metric contracts are design rules, not completed measurements. These missing fields have not been reconstructed retrospectively."},"critical_capabilities":{"focus":"Which resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions can be converted into internationally usable state power or leverage, and which dependencies can external actors or exogenous events exploit to constrain state action, options, or stability","intent":"Identify what must be built, accessed, controlled, protected, substituted, restored, or responsibly employed to preserve freedom of action and produce bounded international effects independently of current strategy","question":"What gives a state usable power or leverage in international affairs; through what authority, delivery, and response mechanism is it converted; where can an adversary or exogenous shock disrupt that chain; and when would the resulting loss materially narrow external options, operational performance, coercion resistance, or state stability?","unit":"A source-of-power and conversion chain under a declared international objective, target or recipient, geography, time horizon, and adversarial or exogenous stress","prohibited_inference":"Domestic importance, sector size, resource possession, ownership, concentration, technical sophistication, or current strategy emphasis cannot establish internationally usable power, leverage, or strategic vulnerability. A domestic condition enters only through an evidenced mechanism that constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","central_finding":"The two systems derive power from different conversion architectures. PRC-centered power is strongest where concentrated physical throughput, processing, construction and industrial absorption can be directed. U.S./partner power is strongest where autonomous states and firms consent to combine finance, technology, access, intelligence, legitimacy and specialized production. Each system is weakest when it must borrow the other's conversion model.","findings":[{"finding_id":"CCV-F01","title":"Permissioned alliance, access, and coalition networks","updated_ruling":"The U.S./partner system retains an extreme structural advantage. Ukraine, EDCA and Nordic accession show real conversion, while consent delays, industrial delivery and mission caveats prevent automatic credit. The PRC's Djibouti success remains real but exceptional rather than representative.","case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-13","ST-15"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO006","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO054","CCV-AO056","CCV-AO058","CCV-AO059"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS006","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"warning_indicators":["Host restrictions on mission use","Repeated delivery shortfalls","Alliance ratification or budget delays","Multiple PRC facilities with exercised crisis throughput"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_comparative","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO006","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO058","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO059","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F02","title":"Dollar-centered financial commanding layer","updated_ruling":"The U.S.-anchored system holds an extreme advantage in trusted financial centrality and reachable jurisdiction. Iran shows bounded bargaining conversion; Russia shows that even massive denial may not compel a high-resolve target; JCPOA reversal shows that credibility and off-ramps are part of the power base.","case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO002","CCV-AO003","CCV-AO004","CCV-AO039","CCV-AO040","CCV-AO041","CCV-AO042","CCV-AO053"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS051"],"warning_indicators":["Loss of partner sanctions participation","Sustained decline across reserves, invoicing and debt rather than one function","Expansion of liquid non-dollar safe assets","Controls without credible relief terms"],"confidence":"high","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO003","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO039","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F03","title":"Industrial throughput and physical conversion","updated_ruling":"PRC manufacturing breadth and scale are an extreme power source; U.S./partner innovation, capital and aggregate allied output remain formidable but are bottlenecked by qualified production, maintenance, supplier lead times and transport. Ukraine confirms that monetary resources and alliance commitments are not time-equivalent to fielded output.","case_ids":["ST-08","ST-11"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO008","CCV-AO009","CCV-AO010","CCV-AO011","CCV-AO012","CCV-AO029","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS011","CCV-AS012","CCV-AS013","CCV-AS014","CCV-AS023","CCV-AS034","CCV-AS048","CCV-AS052"],"warning_indicators":["Qualified output below replenishment demand","Single-source energetic or component tiers","Repair backlogs","PRC production growth without matching overseas permission"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_conversion","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO008","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO009","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO010","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO012","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO029","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F04","title":"Maritime power's mirror-image bottleneck","updated_ruling":"The PRC has extreme commercial shipbuilding and regional fleet scale but limited distant permissions and support; the U.S./partner system has global access and operational relationships but an aging, capacity-constrained shipbuilding, repair and sealift base. Red Sea disruption shows that presence alone may not normalize private routes.","case_ids":["ST-06","ST-11","ST-12","ST-13"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO010","CCV-AO011","CCV-AO012","CCV-AO013","CCV-AO014","CCV-AO034","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO047","CCV-AO048"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS007","CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS010","CCV-AS011","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"warning_indicators":["Surge sealift below readiness threshold","Repair and mariner shortages","Overseas replenishment rights exercised by the PRC","Insurance or rerouting costs persist despite protection"],"confidence":"moderate_comparative","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO010","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO012","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO013","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO014","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO048","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F05","title":"Critical-mineral processing, magnets, and controllable denial","updated_ruling":"PRC control is extreme at selected midstream stages and has produced real short-run denial. Japan and current controls show severe product-specific target vulnerability and slow qualification, but also that use accelerates substitution, stockpiling, recycling, partner investment and supplier-reputation loss. Strategic compellence remains unproven.","case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO016","CCV-AO018","CCV-AO019","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS016","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS018","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"warning_indicators":["Product-level inventory below qualification time","Controls expand from licensing delay to sustained cutoff","Non-PRC projects fail commissioning","Targets reach qualified substitute scale"],"confidence":"high","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO018","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F06","title":"Advanced-semiconductor allied control stack","updated_ruling":"U.S./allied control is extreme at selected frontier nodes and can impose delay, but China retains enormous mature-node, electronics, demand and manufacturing absorption capacity. Durable denial, military effect and policy compellence remain unproven; coalition coverage and ecosystem health are the binding conditions.","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-18"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO020","CCV-AO021","CCV-AO022","CCV-AO023","CCV-AO025","CCV-AO051","CCV-AO052"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022","CCV-AS030","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"warning_indicators":["Partner rule divergence","Frontier-equivalent indigenous PRC tools","Control-induced allied revenue or innovation loss","Taiwan or supplier common-mode outage"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_persistence","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO052","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F07","title":"Energy abundance versus seaborne import exposure","updated_ruling":"U.S. supply and allied producer diversity create meaningful partner options; PRC maritime oil dependence is severe. Europe shows that energy networks can be reconfigured at high cost, while the Malacca exposure is not a feasible peacetime lever absent supplier, shipping, route and escalation control.","case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO032","CCV-AO033","CCV-AO034","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO046","CCV-AO047"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS025","CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","CCV-AS046"],"warning_indicators":["Stock or pipeline buffers fall below disruption duration","Supplier coalition changes","Demand flexibility declines","Route threat and insurance failures become correlated"],"confidence":"moderate","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO033","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F08","title":"Innovation, talent, cloud, and absorption ecosystems","updated_ruling":"The U.S. leads in frontier quality, services, global talent attraction, software and privately coordinated networks; China leads in manufacturing absorption, deployment and scale. Neither ecosystem is wholly state-taskable. U.S. talent-policy and prototype-to-production fragility mirror PRC openness, trust and selected frontier dependencies.","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-11"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO028","CCV-AO029","CCV-AO030","CCV-AO031","CCV-AO051","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS034","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS052"],"warning_indicators":["Sustained international-talent decline","Cloud common-mode or forced fragmentation","PRC frontier substitution at controlled nodes","Failure to qualify prototypes for scale"],"confidence":"moderate_comparative","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO028","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO029","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO030","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO031","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F09","title":"Infrastructure provision does not equal strategic access","updated_ruling":"PRC provision scale is extreme, but access conversion depends on recipient demand and sovereign authorization. Djibouti supports one bounded conversion; Hambantota rejects automatic debt seizure and military access. U.S./partner provision is smaller but often connects to established security permissions.","case_ids":["ST-12","ST-13","ST-14"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO056","CCV-AO057"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"warning_indicators":["Multiple ports provide repeated military throughput","Host law or politics restricts access","Debt restructuring changes ownership or security rights","Commercial utilization remains below maintenance cost"],"confidence":"high_mechanism_moderate_generalization","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO057","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-14"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F10","title":"Strategic concentration requires a recovery test","updated_ruling":"Taiwan's 2024 earthquake showed extreme concentration and measurable disruption but rapid functional recovery below the strategic threshold. Red Sea, European gas and mineral cases show the converse: systems can avoid collapse yet remain strategically degraded for months or years. Recovery—not exposure—is the decisive variable.","case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06","ST-08","ST-18"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO025","CCV-AO026","CCV-AO027","CCV-AO038","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO047","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS030","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS035","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048"],"warning_indicators":["Recovery exceeds state-option deadline","Simultaneous supplier, power and transport failure","Customer buffers exhaust before qualification","Nominal substitute lacks equivalent quality or authority"],"confidence":"high_methodological","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO026","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO038","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]}]}],"cases":[{"case_id":"ST-01","title":"U.S. dollar, SWIFT, and secondary-sanctions leverage against Iran","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Dollar and banking centrality plus partner implementation imposed reachable financial pressure; diplomacy offered a verifiable off-ramp; Iran completed the required nuclear steps; U.S. withdrawal then reversed relief and the bargain lost durability.","rulings":{"US_power_source":"supported_extreme","Iran_vulnerability":"supported","conversion_to_bargain":"supported_bounded","durable_usable_leverage":"not_supported","self_harm_risk":"supported"},"threshold_result":"Financial centrality produced bargaining leverage and a temporarily implemented agreement, but not durable compliance independent of diplomatic credibility and continued reciprocal performance.","principal_lesson":"Permissioned financial networks are most effective when a coalition controls reachable nodes, states a bounded demand, and preserves an off-ramp; unilateral reversal can destroy the achieved result and weaken future credibility.","rivals_surviving":["Diplomacy and Iranian preferences, not sanctions alone, produced the bargain","Regional security developments and Iranian nonperformance also contributed to collapse"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO039","CCV-AO040"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS040"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO039","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-02","title":"Freeze of Russian reserves, bank restrictions, and financial adaptation","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Coalition jurisdiction immobilized central-bank assets and restricted payments; Russia absorbed substantial cost through controls, rerouting and commodity revenue while continuing the war.","rulings":{"US_partner_power_source":"supported_extreme","reachable_denial":"supported","Russia_vulnerability":"supported_bounded","conversion_to_war_termination":"not_supported","network_erosion":"plausible_not_yet_decisive"},"threshold_result":"The case demonstrates exceptional denial and cost-imposition capacity but does not establish compellence, war termination, or a decisive reduction in Russian military options.","principal_lesson":"The commanding financial layer can deny access faster than it can change a high-resolve state's strategy; adaptation and long-run network response must remain separate judgments.","rivals_surviving":["Commodity prices and domestic controls explain part of Russia's endurance","Battlefield and political variables dominate policy choice"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO041","CCV-AO042"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS064"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-03","title":"PRC–Japan rare-earth disruption and subsequent diversification","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Exceptional PRC processing concentration and Japanese dependence permitted abrupt supply disruption and price pressure; Japan used inventories, thrift, recycling, alternative investment, qualification, diplomacy and WTO action to reduce exposure.","rulings":{"PRC_power_source":"supported_extreme","Japan_vulnerability_2010":"supported","PRC_usable_leverage":"supported_bounded_short_run","Japan_recovery":"supported_multiyear"},"threshold_result":"The case supports short-run denial and material vulnerability, but not durable PRC control over Japanese policy; the exact attribution of the bilateral interruption remains contested.","principal_lesson":"Control is strongest before the target pays the fixed cost of adaptation; use activates substitution, legal action and coalition investment.","rivals_surviving":["Market and licensing changes explain part of the disruption","Demand change and price response aided recovery"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO016","CCV-AO018","CCV-AO019"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS018"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","scope":"cross_case_context","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO018","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-04","title":"PRC trade coercion against Australia and market substitution","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC restrictions concentrated losses in exposed sectors; fungible commodity flows and alternative markets preserved aggregate exports and Australian policy autonomy.","rulings":{"PRC_market_power":"supported","sector_vulnerability":"supported","national_strategic_vulnerability":"not_supported","policy_compellence":"not_supported","supplier_reputation_cost":"supported_bounded"},"threshold_result":"The pressure was economically real but failed the state-option threshold: Australia did not reverse the central policies associated with the campaign.","principal_lesson":"A large market is weak leverage when products can reroute and political pressure hardens target resolve; sector pain cannot stand in for national compellence.","rivals_surviving":["PRC measures had mixed legal and commercial rationales","Australian resilience was uneven across firms and regions"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO043","CCV-AO044"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T06","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO043","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-04"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-04"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-05","title":"European dependence on Russian pipeline gas and strategic substitution","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Pipeline concentration created severe exposure; supply manipulation and war accelerated LNG, alternative suppliers, demand reduction, storage and regulation; European Russian-gas dependence then collapsed.","rulings":{"Russia_initial_power_source":"supported_extreme_regional","Europe_initial_vulnerability":"supported","Russian_durable_leverage":"not_supported","Europe_strategic_recovery":"supported","power_base_self_erosion":"supported"},"threshold_result":"Europe absorbed high cost yet preserved its Ukraine policy and removed most of Russia's durable pipeline position, so short-run vulnerability did not become lasting strategic leverage.","principal_lesson":"Weaponizing a relationship-specific network can liquidate the installed base that creates leverage when targets can coordinate costly substitution.","rivals_surviving":["Weather, recession and conservation reduced demand","Russian revenues and exports partly shifted elsewhere"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO032","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO046"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS025","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T11","CCV-T12","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-06","title":"Red Sea attacks, shipping insurance, naval response, and rerouting","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Persistent attacks shifted shipping around Africa, raising ton-miles, insurance, time and freight cost; naval protection bounded loss but did not restore normal commercial routing.","rulings":{"route_vulnerability":"supported","commercial_substitution":"supported_costly","nonstate_disruption_power":"supported_bounded","coalition_normalization":"not_supported","state_option_loss":"bounded"},"threshold_result":"The network remained functional through rerouting but below its prior cost and reliability threshold; no state or coalition demonstrated full control over restoration.","principal_lesson":"Redundancy can prevent collapse while still allowing a low-cost attacker to impose large system costs; military presence does not automatically task private routing decisions.","rivals_surviving":["Commercial fleet conditions and demand also moved freight rates","Naval action may have prevented a worse counterfactual"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO047","CCV-AO048"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T06","CCV-T07","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO048","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-07","title":"U.S.–Japan–Netherlands semiconductor controls and PRC adaptation","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Allied control of EDA, advanced lithography, specialized tools, materials and fabrication enabled targeted denial; rules and partner measures changed repeatedly as PRC firms adapted.","rulings":{"US_partner_power_source":"supported_extreme_at_selected_nodes","PRC_frontier_vulnerability":"supported","conversion_to_delay":"supported","durable_denial":"insufficient","policy_compellence":"not_supported"},"threshold_result":"The case supports friction and delay at selected frontier nodes, not broad Chinese semiconductor weakness, military effect, permanent denial or policy compliance.","principal_lesson":"A permissioned control stack can deny a narrow technology frontier, but coalition coverage, enforcement, target redesign and ecosystem self-harm determine persistence.","rivals_surviving":["Commercial cycles and management choices affect firm outcomes","Controls can accelerate indigenous substitution"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO020","CCV-AO021","CCV-AO022","CCV-AO023"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T08","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-08","title":"PRC critical-mineral and magnet export controls","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Extreme refining and magnet concentration became licensing delay and production curtailment; target stockpiles and new projects could not immediately replace qualified product.","rulings":{"PRC_power_source":"supported_extreme","target_vulnerability":"supported_product_specific","denial_conversion":"supported","policy_compellence":"insufficient","long_run_leverage":"bounded_by_adaptation"},"threshold_result":"The controls crossed the production-disruption threshold for selected products but have not established durable policy leverage across target states.","principal_lesson":"Midstream processing and qualification—not ore possession—create the sharpest chokepoints; their use reveals dependencies and mobilizes costly diversification.","rivals_surviving":["Licensing administration and market cycles explain part of delay","Defense-specific inventories and end uses remain opaque"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-09","title":"Huawei restrictions, 5G substitution, and digital-network alignment","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC vendors achieved large installed positions; host governments converted security and trust judgments into restrictions; operators faced multi-year switching and qualification costs.","rulings":{"PRC_commercial_power_source":"supported","PRC_state_taskability":"not_supported","host_regulatory_power":"supported","installed_dependency":"supported_bounded","substitution":"supported_slow"},"threshold_result":"Installed scale created switching leverage and exposure but remained subordinate to host law, operator choice and alternative-vendor availability.","principal_lesson":"Digital infrastructure power is jointly produced by vendor scale, standards, trust and host permission; market share alone is neither state control nor permanent lock-in.","rivals_surviving":["Security designations are policy judgments, not controlled technical experiments","Restrictions may also serve industrial-policy goals"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO051","CCV-AO052"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T07","CCV-T09","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO052","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-10","title":"RMB internationalization, CIPS, swap lines, and alternatives to dollar finance","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC institutions expanded settlement and bypass options, but capital controls, asset depth, convertibility and trust kept the renminbi far below the dollar across reserves and foreign-exchange intermediation.","rulings":{"PRC_alternative_option":"supported_growing","PRC_global_financial_power":"weak_relative","US_dollar_power":"supported_extreme","rapid_displacement":"not_supported","long_run_erosion":"plausible"},"threshold_result":"CIPS and renminbi use improve resilience at the margin but do not yet replace the dollar-centered commanding layer.","principal_lesson":"Monetary power depends on a bundle of trusted assets, convertibility, markets and institutions; payment rails alone cannot manufacture it.","rivals_surviving":["Currency use differs by trade, reserves, debt and turnover","Sanctions and financial fragmentation could accelerate nonlinear change"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO002","CCV-AO003","CCV-AO004","CCV-AO053"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO003","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-11","title":"Ukraine support, munitions production, and allied burden sharing","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"A broad permissioned coalition aligned requirements, donations, procurement and sustainment, but component lead times, production capacity and political authorization repeatedly bounded timely physical delivery.","rulings":{"US_partner_network_power":"supported_extreme","conversion_to_delivery":"supported_partial","industrial_vulnerability":"supported_severe","partner_additionality":"supported","sufficiency_for_outcome":"not_supported"},"threshold_result":"The system demonstrated exceptional aggregation and real delivery, while exposing a binding inability to convert financial and allied potential into all required contested-time output.","principal_lesson":"Permissioned networks multiply power only through a physical chain of contracts, inputs, production, maintenance, transport and political continuity.","rivals_surviving":["Ukraine's domestic production and adaptation are major independent causes","Classified deliveries and requirements limit sufficiency judgments"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO054","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-12","title":"Philippines EDCA access, distribution, and political authorization","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Shared threat perception and alliance diplomacy expanded EDCA to nine sites; both states funded preparation and exercised cooperation while the Philippines retained sovereign control over use.","rulings":{"US_partner_access_power":"supported","host_authorization":"supported_peacetime","wartime_taskability":"insufficient","distribution_benefit":"supported","political_vulnerability":"supported_bounded"},"threshold_result":"EDCA created a real strategic option, not an unconditional base right; mission-specific permission, throughput and survivability remain untested.","principal_lesson":"Access is a diplomatic product renewed through local benefit, consultation and credible assurance; concrete and agreements do not eliminate host agency.","rivals_surviving":["Philippine policy reflects its own maritime interests","Funding and exercises may not translate to high-end conflict use"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO006","CCV-AO056"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS006","CCV-AS054"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO006","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-12"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-13","title":"PRC Djibouti base and infrastructure-to-access conversion","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC finance, trade, port relationships and diplomacy preceded a defense agreement and first overseas base; Djibouti retained leverage by hosting multiple foreign forces.","rulings":{"PRC_infrastructure_power":"supported","PRC_access_conversion":"supported_single_case","host_agency":"supported","general_port_to_base_pathway":"not_supported","global_sustainment":"bounded"},"threshold_result":"The case proves that conversion can occur, not that finance automatically purchases access or that the resulting facility supplies unrestricted global military reach.","principal_lesson":"Recipient incentives and sovereign permission are the indispensable bridge between infrastructure and military access.","rivals_surviving":["Security and evacuation requirements independently motivated the base","A rent-maximizing host can preserve nonexclusive relationships"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO036"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-14","title":"Hambantota port, debt restructuring, and disputed leverage claims","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Chinese loans financed an underused port; Sri Lanka later invited a cash-generating commercial concession; a PRC operator gained long-duration operational equity without loan cancellation or demonstrated military basing rights.","rulings":{"PRC_finance_and_operating_power":"supported","Sri_Lanka_fiscal_vulnerability":"supported_broader","debt_for_asset_seizure":"rejected","military_access_conversion":"not_supported","political_leverage":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The transaction created commercial control and relationship presence but fails the automatic debt-trap-to-base causal claim.","principal_lesson":"Infrastructure can produce option value without exclusive strategic control; contract, debt purpose, host security authority and subsequent use must be traced separately.","rivals_surviving":["Sri Lanka's broader fiscal crisis drove the lease","Incomplete disclosure leaves narrower influence channels uncertain"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO057"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T06","CCV-T08","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO057","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-14"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-15","title":"Finland and Sweden NATO accession, capability, and counteraction","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Russia's invasion changed partner preferences; two capable nonaligned states applied; unanimous allied ratification added geography, forces and industry to NATO while also extending collective obligations.","rulings":{"US_partner_aggregation_power":"supported_extreme","permission_conversion":"supported","Russian_counteraction_backfire":"supported_bounded","net_capability_gain":"supported","deterrent_effect":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The alliance converted voluntary political choice into additional capability and geography; deterrence cannot be inferred solely from accession or the absence of attack.","principal_lesson":"Autonomous partner choice is both the source of alliance legitimacy and a consent bottleneck; adversary coercion can strengthen the network it seeks to constrain.","rivals_surviving":["Longstanding partnership made integration unusually easy","New territory and commitments can increase defense burden and escalation exposure"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO058","CCV-AO059"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T13","CCV-T17","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO058","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO059","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-16","title":"PRC and U.S./partner vaccine provision and influence conversion","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Both systems delivered valued health goods through different networks; recipient capacity, product timing, uptake, trust and alternatives mediated public value; the admitted evidence does not connect doses to durable foreign-policy behavior.","rulings":{"US_provision_power":"supported","PRC_provision_power":"supported","recipient_agency":"decisive","durable_influence_conversion":"insufficient_both","delivery_as_influence_proxy":"rejected"},"threshold_result":"Provision crossed an exposure and delivery threshold, not the required affinity, access, alignment or behavior threshold.","principal_lesson":"A scarce public good can open diplomatic opportunity, but last-mile performance and recipient attribution determine whether any relationship effect persists.","rivals_surviving":["Humanitarian and commercial motives coexist","Pandemic urgency and product availability dominate many recipient choices"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO060","CCV-AO061"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS059","CCV-AS060","CCV-AS061"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T07","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO060","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-16"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO061","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-16"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-17","title":"Confucius Institutes, closures, rebranding, and cultural-network taskability","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC support expanded language programs, but agreements and operations varied by host; U.S. funding restrictions and university decisions then collapsed the network while demand for language education persisted through alternatives.","rulings":{"PRC_cultural_network_source":"supported","central_state_taskability":"not_supported","host_control":"supported","network_vulnerability":"supported_extreme_in_US","policy_influence":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The case demonstrates exposure, educational value and host revocability, not durable PRC influence over university or national decisions.","principal_lesson":"Cultural networks gain reach by relying on autonomous hosts; legitimacy loss or funding rules can remove state access while leaving the underlying cultural demand intact.","rivals_surviving":["Closures reflect U.S. domestic politics and security policy","Successor programs can preserve some relationships under new labels"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO062","CCV-AO063"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS062","CCV-AS063"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T05","CCV-T07","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO062","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-17"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO063","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-17"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-18","title":"Taiwan earthquake exposure and semiconductor strategic recovery","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"A major earthquake triggered safety shutdowns and measurable loss at highly concentrated fabs; engineering, trained personnel and restart procedures restored output before an international state option crossed its threshold.","rulings":{"concentration":"supported_extreme","event_degradation":"supported","strategic_vulnerability_realized":"not_supported","functional_recovery":"supported","larger_compound_scenario":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The event falsifies the inference that geographic concentration automatically equals realized strategic vulnerability; it does not test blockade, prolonged energy loss or simultaneous supplier failure.","principal_lesson":"Vulnerability must be measured as loss of function after recovery, not exposure or asset interruption alone.","rivals_surviving":["Customer buffers can hide short disruptions","A longer or compound event could exceed demonstrated recovery"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO025","CCV-AO026","CCV-AO027","CCV-AO038"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS030","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS035"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T06","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T12","CCV-T14","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO026","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO038","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]}]}],"responses":[{"response_id":"CCV-R01","title":"Protect the permissioned network as a capability","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Consultation, credible commitments, local benefit, burden sharing and mission-specific exercises are productive capacity because autonomous partner consent creates the network's advantage.","conditions":["Host sovereignty retained","Costs and risks shared","Alternatives prepared","Political commitments matched by delivery"],"disqualifiers":["Treating access as unconditional","Unfunded assurance","Partner exclusion from decisions"],"case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R02","title":"Convert demand signals into qualified contested-time output","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Multi-year procurement, interoperable requirements, supplier-tier visibility, repair capacity and allied co-production are necessary to turn financial and coalition strength into timely physical effect.","conditions":["Mission-thread requirements","Qualified inputs and workforce","Sustainment and transport included","Actual output measured"],"disqualifiers":["Counting announcements as capacity","Ignoring maintenance or supplier lead time","Crowding out more critical allied needs"],"case_ids":["ST-11"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R03","title":"Diversify the narrowest mineral and magnet products, not every input","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Prioritize product-specific exposures whose qualified inventory and substitution time fall below mission deadlines; combine stockpiles, offtake, processing, recycling and design substitution.","conditions":["Bill-of-material visibility","Equivalent quality qualification","Release authority","Partner coordination"],"disqualifiers":["Ore-share proxies","Universal autarky","Unqualified projects","Stockpiles without usable form or release plan"],"case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R04","title":"Use financial and technology leverage with coalition coverage and credible off-ramps","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation_and_bounded_leverage","finding":"Concentrated finance or technology control is most durable when objectives are narrow, partners cover substitutes, relief terms are credible and ecosystem damage is monitored.","conditions":["Defined demand","Reachable jurisdiction","Partner implementation","Target adaptation monitoring","Reversible relief"],"disqualifiers":["Pain as the outcome","No off-ramp","Unilateral reversal after compliance","Material erosion of the network that creates leverage"],"case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-07","ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS051"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R05","title":"Preserve openness where attraction and innovation are the power source","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Talent attraction, private research, cloud and cultural reach generate national advantage precisely because independent actors choose the ecosystem; security controls should be narrow enough not to destroy that selection effect.","conditions":["Risk-specific safeguards","Research and talent pathways","Private actor autonomy","Trusted legal environment"],"disqualifiers":["Nationality as a risk proxy","Automatic state taskability","Controls that shift users and talent without reducing threat"],"case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-17"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS062"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R06","title":"Build energy and maritime resilience around time, not nominal diversity","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Supplier diversity, route alternatives, storage, demand flexibility, insurance and repair matter only if they preserve the state option for the full disruption window.","conditions":["Scenario-specific duration","Qualified route and supplier capacity","Commercial incentives","Exercise under compound failure"],"disqualifiers":["Counting pipelines, ports or stocks without throughput","Assuming naval presence restores commercial routing","Ignoring price and partner burden"],"case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS027","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R07","title":"Convert PRC infrastructure through recipient value and explicit permission","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_conversion","finding":"Commercial delivery can create relationships and options, but trusted host consent, transparent terms, local benefit and security agreements—not debt exposure—determine strategic access.","conditions":["Recipient demand","Sustainable operation","Host-authorized rights","Nonexclusive relationships tolerated"],"disqualifiers":["Assuming ownership equals sovereign control","Debt distress as a basing mechanism","Visits as proof of sustained throughput"],"case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R08","title":"Avoid exhausting PRC material and market leverage through indiscriminate use","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Mineral and market concentration has greatest option value before targets pay for alternatives; broad or repeated pressure accelerates substitution, coalition alignment and supplier-reputation loss.","conditions":["Narrow product and objective","Target alternatives assessed","Sender revenue and reputation protected","Off-ramp available"],"disqualifiers":["Fungible products","No plausible target behavior","Pressure that strengthens counter-coalitions"],"case_ids":["ST-03","ST-04","ST-05","ST-08"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS017","CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045","CCV-AS048"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R09","title":"Reduce PRC frontier-chip and maritime-energy exposure without assuming rapid autonomy","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Indigenous substitution, efficiency, stocks, pipelines, supplier diversity and mature-node strengths reduce exposure, but frontier tools and seaborne oil remain time- and quality-specific dependencies.","conditions":["Equivalent performance","Qualified production","Inventory and route endurance","Cost and innovation trade-offs disclosed"],"disqualifiers":["Announced capacity","Gross domestic production","Pipelines or stockpiles without scenario sufficiency"],"case_ids":["ST-06","ST-07","ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS022","CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R10","title":"Treat financial internationalization as an institutional bundle","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_conversion","finding":"Payment rails and trade settlement provide resilience, but global monetary power also requires trusted assets, convertibility, legal predictability and deep markets whose expansion can conflict with domestic capital control.","conditions":["Market depth","Asset safety","Convertibility","Predictable governance"],"disqualifiers":["CIPS volume as a dollar-equivalence proxy","Trade share as reserve demand","Ignoring the control-openness trade-off"],"case_ids":["ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R11","title":"Measure provision-to-influence conversion at the recipient","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"measurement_and_power_conversion","finding":"Vaccines, infrastructure, education and media should be credited only when recipient-side evidence shows durable trust, access, preference or behavior beyond delivery and exposure.","conditions":["Recipient baseline","Alternative providers","Longitudinal relationship measure","Observed consequential choice"],"disqualifiers":["Doses, dollars, institutes or audience as influence","Provider-authored attribution","Ignoring host agency"],"case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14","ST-16","ST-17"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS059","CCV-AS061","CCV-AS062","CCV-AS063"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R12","title":"Stress common modes across instruments","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Taiwan fabrication, specialized chip tools, cloud providers, maritime routes, mineral processing, energy and host permissions can fail together; nominal diversification is invalid when substitutes share the same supplier, authority, geography or network.","conditions":["End-to-end dependency map","Compound scenarios","Functional recovery deadline","Private and partner authorization modeled"],"disqualifiers":["Asset counts","Geographic labels without supplier tiers","Recovery of equipment without recovery of state option"],"case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06","ST-07","ST-08","ST-09","ST-12","ST-18"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS020","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048","CCV-AS054"]}],"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0","status":"full_portfolio_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Forty-eight broad-screen records, ten frozen focus findings, eighteen case dispositions, and twelve bounded response findings","review_type":"precommitted internal adversarial review; not external peer review","rival_hypothesis_results":[{"id":"CCV-H01","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Commercial hulls, infrastructure finance, R&D spending, platform reach and broad semiconductor output were not counted as power without a conversion path."},{"id":"CCV-H02","result":"pass","effect":"No domestic-only service or welfare finding entered the focus set."},{"id":"CCV-H03","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Private cloud, semiconductor firms, commercial ships, universities and host-owned facilities retain separate taskability and permission judgments."},{"id":"CCV-H04","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Dollar, semiconductor, mineral, market and infrastructure centrality were separated from policy leverage."},{"id":"CCV-H05","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Rare-earth and semiconductor cases retain target adaptation and do not infer compellence from cost or denial."},{"id":"CCV-H06","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Alliance and access findings require authorization and delivery; aggregate allied spending is treated as an input."},{"id":"CCV-H07","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Taiwan, advanced lithography, cloud, mineral processing, shipping and energy routes remain common-mode dependencies despite nominal diversification."},{"id":"CCV-H08","result":"decisive_in_ST_18","effect":"The 2024 earthquake exposure recovered within threshold and was not labeled a demonstrated strategic vulnerability."},{"id":"CCV-H09","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"PRC energy-route exposure and U.S. access dependence are not treated as easily exploitable outside a specified high-escalation scenario."},{"id":"CCV-H10","result":"decisive_in_ST_18","effect":"Company loss and fab interruption were kept below scope absent an international state-option loss."},{"id":"CCV-H11","result":"pass_no_stability_ruling","effect":"No protest, election, hardship or regime-type claim became a state-stability finding."},{"id":"CCV-H12","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"U.S. innovation, culture, media, cloud and university advantages remain ecosystem benefits rather than wholly taskable state instruments."},{"id":"CCV-H13","result":"decisive_in_ST_03_and_ST_07","effect":"Japanese diversification and PRC semiconductor adaptation bound the duration and net effect of leverage."},{"id":"CCV-H14","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Financial, mineral and semiconductor leverage findings retain network fragmentation, substitution and supplier-reputation costs."},{"id":"CCV-H15","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Twelve protective and conversion responses survived as conditional findings only after partner, substitute, market, legal, escalation, and self-harm bounds; no blockade, operational target package, or general compellence recommendation was admitted."},{"id":"CCV-H16","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Intelligence, state endurance, deterrence, cyber and standards comparisons remain withheld or scenario-specific where public observability is asymmetric."}],"mandatory_test_results":[{"id":"CCV-T01","result":"pass","note":"All ten focus findings, eighteen cases, and twelve response findings specify an international option, external effect, coercion-resistance function, or cross-border network."},{"id":"CCV-T02","result":"pass","note":"Each focus finding identifies the exact source and rejects overall domain aggregation."},{"id":"CCV-T03","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Host, partner and private discretion are explicit; ownership and domicile are not control."},{"id":"CCV-T04","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Conversion is supported or bounded separately for both systems in every finding."},{"id":"CCV-T05","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Denial and pain are not promoted to target policy response where behavior evidence is absent."},{"id":"CCV-T06","result":"pass","note":"ST-18 remained below threshold; other vulnerability findings name the state option and response window."},{"id":"CCV-T07","result":"pass","note":"Independent ecosystems remain separately attributed throughout."},{"id":"CCV-T08","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Alliance, access, space and semiconductor findings count partners only through authorization, compliance or delivered mechanisms."},{"id":"CCV-T09","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Finance, minerals, semiconductors and infrastructure retain reachable-node, alternatives and response tests."},{"id":"CCV-T10","result":"pass_first_order","note":"Visible common modes are mapped; hidden supplier tiers remain a declared limit rather than a resilience credit."},{"id":"CCV-T11","result":"pass_with_dynamic_results","note":"Japan and Taiwan show real substitution or recovery; semiconductor and maritime substitutes remain incomplete."},{"id":"CCV-T12","result":"pass","note":"ST-18 measured restoration of production and lack of downstream state-option loss rather than asset repair alone."},{"id":"CCV-T13","result":"pass_with_scenario_bounds","note":"Energy and alliance vulnerabilities remain scenario-bound; material and semiconductor controls have observed access but bounded target effect."},{"id":"CCV-T14","result":"pass","note":"The earthquake was admitted, adjudicated, and kept below strategic threshold on observed evidence."},{"id":"CCV-T15","result":"pass_no_ruling","note":"No state-stability conclusion was attempted."},{"id":"CCV-T16","result":"pass","note":"Adaptation is central to rare-earth, semiconductor, finance, energy and infrastructure findings."},{"id":"CCV-T17","result":"pass_with_bounded_responses","note":"Self-harm bounds all leverage findings; twelve responses survived only as conditional power-preservation, vulnerability-reduction, measurement, or conversion findings."},{"id":"CCV-T18","result":"pass_with_surviving_rivals","note":"Every portfolio case retains material rival causes and actor-theory limits."},{"id":"CCV-T19","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Only stage-matched comparative calls were made; innovation and maritime findings remain split and several candidates are withheld."},{"id":"CCV-T20","result":"pass","note":"There is no score, edge count, composite or overall national winner; negative and insufficient results remain visible."}],"finding_dispositions":{"survived_as_extreme_stage_specific_asymmetry":["CCV-F01","CCV-F02","CCV-F03","CCV-F05","CCV-F06"],"survived_as_split_or_bounded_asymmetry":["CCV-F04","CCV-F07","CCV-F08","CCV-F09"],"survived_as_falsifying_recovery_case":["CCV-F10"],"rejected_inference_examples":["Infrastructure finance automatically produces a base","Financial or material pain automatically compels policy","Commercial shipbuilding share automatically produces global military sustainment","Semiconductor fabrication share equals full-stack control","Geographic concentration automatically equals realized strategic vulnerability"]},"continuing_limits_not_release_blockers":["The product is internally red-teamed public-source analysis and not external peer review or an intelligence assessment.","Product-level bills of material, inventories, and classified logistics remain necessary before operational implementation decisions.","Recipient and target-side evidence remains thin in several influence and compellence cases, which stay bounded or insufficient.","The purposive portfolio is explanatory rather than statistically representative."]},"observations":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"The dollar remained dominant across reserves, international debt and loans, foreign-exchange turnover and cross-border payments because deep markets and network effects reinforce one another.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple functions retain dollar plurality or majority","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_structural","source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_global_denominators","limitation":"Position does not show that a particular sanction changes target policy.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_us_financial_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO002","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"The dollar was on one side of 89.2% of global foreign-exchange trades while the renminbi was on 8.5%, a function-specific gap that cannot be explained by PRC trade scale alone.","quantitative_anchor":"USD 89.2%; RMB 8.5%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS002"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_common_denominator","limitation":"Turnover double-counts currency sides and is not reserve share or coercive reach.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_extreme_and_prc_relative_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO003","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2026-Q1","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"Disclosed official reserves remained concentrated in the dollar while the renminbi share stayed near 2%.","quantitative_anchor":"USD 57.13%; EUR 20.03%; RMB 1.99%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS003"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_common_denominator","limitation":"Valuation and unallocated reserves affect shares, and reserves are only one monetary function.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_extreme_and_prc_relative_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO004","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024-2025","causal_stage":"network_building","observation":"CIPS and renminbi settlement expanded materially, providing a real sanctions-resistance and bilateral-payment pathway even though they did not displace incumbent global functions.","quantitative_anchor":"CIPS processed roughly RMB175 trillion in 2024","evidentiary_role":"countertrend","source_ids":["CCV-AS004"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"actor_report_unmatched","limitation":"Gross transaction value can include repeated flows and does not establish independent clearing, convertibility or user preference.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_prc_extreme_weakness_to_global_substitution_function","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"aggregated_capacity","observation":"NATO combined 32 members, shared plans and institutions, and more than $1.4 trillion in estimated defense expenditure; all allies met the prior 2% guideline in 2025.","quantitative_anchor":"32 allies; over USD1.4 trillion; all allies at least 2%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS005"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_common_accounting","limitation":"Expenditure, membership and plans do not establish crisis authorization or delivered combat power.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_permissioned_network_input","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO006","case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2020-current","causal_stage":"conversion_mechanism","observation":"DOD acquisition and cross-servicing arrangements created a standardized mechanism for exchanging logistics with a very broad partner set.","quantitative_anchor":"104 countries documented as eligible in GAO review","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_mechanism","source_ids":["CCV-AS006"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_mechanism","limitation":"Eligibility, records and peacetime orders do not prove usable high-end crisis throughput.","adjudication_effect":"supports_access_conversion_but_preserves_permission_gate","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO007","case_ids":["ST-13"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2017-2024","causal_stage":"external_effect","observation":"The Djibouti base provided persistent regional presence and military diplomacy, but as of 2024 had not supported a noncombatant evacuation or the Red Sea shipping crisis and had minimal participation in protecting citizens or investments.","quantitative_anchor":"one acknowledged support base; zero cited evacuations or Red Sea support through 2024","evidentiary_role":"mixed_direct_case","source_ids":["CCV-AS007"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_case_unmatched","limitation":"U.S. assessment may not observe classified uses and nonparticipation can reflect policy choice rather than physical inability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_bounded_djibouti_conversion_not_generic_access","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO008","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024","causal_stage":"capacity_growth","observation":"The PRC had more than 500 ISR-capable satellites after launching 67 in 2024 and began proliferated communications constellations, materially improving sensing and long-range kill-chain support.","quantitative_anchor":">500 ISR-capable satellites; 67 launched in 2024","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS007"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_inventory_plus_assessment","limitation":"Inventory does not establish availability, data quality, survivability or comparative mission effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_space_strength_not_overall_edge","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO009","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"qualified_output","observation":"Virginia-class production was running at about one submarine per year in June 2025, half the Navy goal; two 2025 deliveries were each more than three years late.","quantitative_anchor":"1 per year versus 2 goal; two deliveries more than 3 years late","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS008"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"declared_goal_denominator","limitation":"Submarine output is only one ship class and does not compare platform quality or existing fleet capacity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_us_shipbuilding_conversion_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO010","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2024-2025","causal_stage":"mobilization_capacity","observation":"None of the seven U.S. shipbuilders constructing Navy battle-force ships was positioned to meet delivery goals despite major industrial-base investment.","quantitative_anchor":"0 of 7 positioned to meet goals","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS009"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"complete_named_us_universe","limitation":"The assessment does not quantify how much capacity can improve or compare PRC naval quality and design complexity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_systemic_not_program_specific_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO011","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"strategic_dependency","observation":"Military Sealift Command identifies sealift as the path for 90% of decisive wartime force movement and reports an average government surge-sealift fleet age of about 40 years.","quantitative_anchor":"90% of decisive force by sealift; average age 40 years","evidentiary_role":"dependency_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS010"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"actor_declared_requirement","limitation":"The statement does not measure readiness under a named conflict or the contribution of commercial and allied vessels.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategic_sealift_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO012","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2025","causal_stage":"industrial_scale","observation":"At the start of 2025 China held about 64% of the global shipbuilding orderbook by gross tonnage, owned 14.4% of fleet capacity, and Chinese-built ships represented 23% of the fleet by number.","quantitative_anchor":"64% orderbook; 14.4% owned capacity; 23% of fleet by ship count","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS011"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_global_denominators","limitation":"Commercial orders and ownership do not establish military suitability, taskability, crews, protection or overseas sustainment.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_physical_source_with_conversion_boundary","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO013","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2025","causal_stage":"industrial_scale","observation":"PRC clean-technology exports exceeded $165 billion and represented about half of global exports when intra-EU trade is excluded.","quantitative_anchor":">USD165 billion; about 50% of ex-intra-EU global exports","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS012"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_trade_denominator","limitation":"Product categories are civilian and market share does not establish coercive control or military conversion.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_industrial_and_trade_power","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO014","case_ids":[],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"cost_and_scale","observation":"IEA found facilities in the United States and Europe for selected solar, wind and battery technologies cost roughly 70% to 130% more to build than equivalent facilities in China.","quantitative_anchor":"70%-130% higher facility cost in U.S./Europe for selected technologies","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS013"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"selected_technology_comparison","limitation":"Subsidies, financing, utilization, quality, transport and future learning can change total delivered cost.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_scale_and_us_physical_conversion_gap","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"China was the leading refiner for nearly all assessed strategic minerals, and concentration continued to rise at processing and component stages even where mining diversified.","quantitative_anchor":"leading refiner in 19 of 20 assessed strategic minerals; average share around 70%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS014"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_material_set","limitation":"Average share hides product quality, inventories, recycling and strategic end-use sensitivity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_processing_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO016","case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"Rare-earth concentration intensified down the chain: China held about 60% of mining, 91% of refining and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet production.","quantitative_anchor":"60% mining; 91% refining; 94% magnets","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS015"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_stage_denominators","limitation":"Shares do not identify product grades, inventories, alternative motor designs or a target's policy sensitivity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_magnet_stack_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO017","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_targets","period":"2025","causal_stage":"delivered_disruption","observation":"PRC controls on seven heavy rare earths produced observable shortages and temporary automotive production curtailments or halts outside China.","quantitative_anchor":"seven heavy rare-earth controls; multiple reported auto interruptions","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS014"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"product_specific_but_not_full_portfolio","limitation":"The evidence establishes disruption, not a bounded political demand, target policy change or durable leverage.","adjudication_effect":"supports_conversion_to_denial_not_compellence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO018","case_ids":["ST-03"],"system":"Japan_target","period":"2009-2020","causal_stage":"adaptation","observation":"After the 2010 shock Japan combined alternative upstream projects, material thrift, recycling and multilateral legal action; China's share of Japan's rare-earth imports fell from 85% to 58%.","quantitative_anchor":"85% in 2009 to 58% in 2020","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_recovery","source_ids":["CCV-AS017"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"same_country_common_denominator","limitation":"The aggregate masks heavy-rare-earth and magnet-stage dependence and cannot isolate each policy's contribution.","adjudication_effect":"supports_adaptation_and_leverage_decay","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO019","case_ids":["ST-03"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_complainants","period":"2012-2015","causal_stage":"counteraction","observation":"The United States, EU and Japan challenged PRC rare-earth restrictions; the WTO found key duties, quotas and trading-right restrictions inconsistent, and China removed the disputed measures by May 2015.","quantitative_anchor":"three complainants; measures removed by May 2015","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_counteraction","source_ids":["CCV-AS018"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"legal_measure_trace","limitation":"The case does not adjudicate an informal 2010 Japan-specific embargo and later controls use different legal designs.","adjudication_effect":"supports_multilateral_constraint_and_sender_adaptation","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO020","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2025","causal_stage":"dependency_mapping","observation":"The semiconductor chain is both globally distributed and highly concentrated by segment; national fabrication share alone fails to identify control of design, tools, materials, packaging or end use.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple concentrated segments; no single national full stack","evidentiary_role":"boundary","source_ids":["CCV-AS019"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_stack_taxonomy","limitation":"Input-output data lag current capacity and public sources cannot map every supplier tier.","adjudication_effect":"requires_node_specific_not_national_chip_call","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO021","case_ids":["ST-07"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2020-2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"U.S.-headquartered firms held about 68% of EDA and semiconductor-IP revenue in 2022, while advanced lithography machines were almost exclusively produced by one Dutch firm with critical German optics.","quantitative_anchor":"68% EDA/IP revenue; near-single-source advanced lithography","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS020"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"segment_specific_common_denominator","limitation":"Corporate location does not prove government access; market shares and technical alternatives change.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_allied_control_stack_and_common_mode","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO022","case_ids":["ST-07"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2022-2025","causal_stage":"state_access_and_control","observation":"U.S. rules reached advanced computing, HBM, software and 24 equipment categories and used foreign-direct-product authorities, making allied and corporate compliance part of the control mechanism.","quantitative_anchor":"24 equipment categories plus software and HBM controls","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_mechanism","source_ids":["CCV-AS021"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"rule_specific","limitation":"Legal reach and item coverage do not establish enforcement, partner equivalence or target capability delay.","adjudication_effect":"supports_real_permissioned_chokepoint_mechanism","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO023","case_ids":["ST-07"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"adaptation","observation":"PRC firms and state programs responded through stockpiling, modified designs, indigenous equipment, evasion and substitution, while rule gaps and differing partner coverage required repeated revisions.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple rule revisions and documented adaptation pathways","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS022"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"case_specific_no_clean_counterfactual","limitation":"Public evidence cannot quantify the net time gained or military and AI capabilities foregone.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_usable_leverage_and_durability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO024","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"industrial_output","observation":"On a broad value-added definition China accounted for 30% of global semiconductor manufacturing, Taiwan 22%, the United States 19%, and South Korea 11%.","quantitative_anchor":"China 30%; Taiwan 22%; U.S. 19%; Korea 11%","evidentiary_role":"comparative_context","source_ids":["CCV-AS034"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_value_added_denominator","limitation":"The category includes mature and advanced components and does not reveal state access, node quality or chokepoints.","adjudication_effect":"prevents_false_prc_weakness_from_advanced_node_controls","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"Taiwan_partner_ecosystem","period":"2024","causal_stage":"concentrated_capability","observation":"TSMC reported 34% of its Foundry 2.0 industry definition and 69% of wafer revenue from 7-nanometer-and-beyond technologies, confirming exceptional firm-level strategic concentration.","quantitative_anchor":"34% Foundry 2.0 share; 69% advanced-technology wafer revenue","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_concentration","source_ids":["CCV-AS030"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"company_defined_denominator","limitation":"Company definitions and revenue shares do not directly equal global leading-edge physical capacity or military end use.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_common_mode_exposure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO026","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"Taiwan_partner_ecosystem","period":"2024-04-03","causal_stage":"strategic_recovery","observation":"After Taiwan's largest earthquake in 25 years, TSMC restored more than 70% of fab tools within 10 hours, exceeded 80% at newer fabs, and reported no damage to critical EUV tools.","quantitative_anchor":">70% tool recovery in 10 hours; >80% at new fabs; zero critical EUV tool damage","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_recovery","source_ids":["CCV-AS031"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_event","limitation":"Company-reported tool recovery does not measure yields, customer inventory or a larger and more geographically direct shock.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_strategic_loss_from_observed_earthquake","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO027","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"Taiwan_partner_ecosystem","period":"2024","causal_stage":"exogenous_shock_effect","observation":"TSMC later recognized about NT$3 billion in net earthquake losses but continued record 2024 output and revenue growth, with no evidenced international state-option loss from the April event.","quantitative_anchor":"about NT$3 billion net loss; record annual performance","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS030"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"event_to_company_outcome","limitation":"Annual performance can hide short customer delays and does not test blockade, prolonged power loss or simultaneous supplier failure.","adjudication_effect":"classifies_event_below_strategic_vulnerability_threshold","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO028","case_ids":[],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"innovation_input","observation":"PPP-adjusted R&D expenditure was approximately $1.028 trillion for China and $1.009 trillion for the United States, eliminating any defensible claim of overwhelming U.S. scale superiority.","quantitative_anchor":"China USD1.028T; U.S. USD1.009T PPP-adjusted","evidentiary_role":"comparative_context","source_ids":["CCV-AS023"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_ppp_denominator","limitation":"Spending does not measure quality, spillovers, duplication, mission relevance or state taskability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_split_innovation_model_not_overall_lead","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO029","case_ids":[],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"knowledge_to_output","observation":"China led KTI manufacturing with $2.4 trillion in value added, while the United States produced 43% of global KTI services—more than the EU-27 and China combined.","quantitative_anchor":"China KTI manufacturing USD2.4T; U.S. KTI services 43%","evidentiary_role":"comparative_asymmetry","source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS034"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_sector_denominators","limitation":"Value added combines heterogeneous industries and private output is not automatically available to the state.","adjudication_effect":"supports_physical_vs_control_layer_thesis","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO030","case_ids":[],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2023-2025","causal_stage":"talent_dependency","observation":"Foreign-born workers were 46% of the U.S. science-and-engineering doctoral workforce in 2023, while temporary visa holders earned 42% of S&E master's and 38% of S&E doctorates in 2024; international S&E enrollment then fell 9% in 2024-25.","quantitative_anchor":"46% workforce; 42% master's; 38% doctorates; enrollment -9%","evidentiary_role":"mixed_dependency","source_ids":["CCV-AS023"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_common_education_data","limitation":"Foreign birth and temporary status do not imply foreign control, and most doctorate recipients remain in the United States.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_attraction_power_and_talent_pipeline_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO031","case_ids":[],"system":"U.S.-anchored_private_ecosystem","period":"2020-2022 estimates published 2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"AWS, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud dominated examined cloud markets, creating global digital reach but also provider concentration and switching-cost exposure.","quantitative_anchor":"top two often held a large majority in examined jurisdictions","evidentiary_role":"mixed_network_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS024"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"jurisdiction_specific_mixed_years","limitation":"Market estimates differ by country and private firms retain commercial and legal discretion.","adjudication_effect":"supports_private_control_layer_not_direct_state_power","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO032","case_ids":["ST-05"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2024","causal_stage":"delivered_supply","observation":"The United States exported 11.9 billion cubic feet per day of LNG in 2024, remaining the world's largest LNG exporter, with Europe receiving 53%.","quantitative_anchor":"11.9 Bcf/d; Europe 53%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_conversion_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS025"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_energy_flow","limitation":"Exports were commercial, capacity was highly utilized, and volume does not establish policy leverage or spare crisis supply.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_energy_source_and_partner_option","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO033","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024","causal_stage":"strategic_dependency","observation":"China consumed about 16.3 million barrels per day of liquids, produced 4.3 million domestically and imported 11.1 million barrels per day of crude; roughly 92% of crude imports arrived by sea.","quantitative_anchor":"16.3 consumed; 4.3 produced; 11.1 imported; 92% seaborne","evidentiary_role":"dependency_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_energy_balance","limitation":"Gross import dependence does not account for strategic stocks, refined exports, pipelines, demand control or supplier diversity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_energy_and_route_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO034","case_ids":["ST-06"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_region","period":"2025-H1","causal_stage":"route_concentration","observation":"China received about 48% of crude and condensate import volumes passing through the Strait of Malacca in the first half of 2025.","quantitative_anchor":"China 48% of Malacca crude and condensate import flows","evidentiary_role":"dependency_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS027"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_route_flow","limitation":"Neither the United States nor a partner automatically controls the strait; alternate routes, pipelines and escalation dominate exploitability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_exposure_but_bounded_exploitability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2013-2021","causal_stage":"upstream_provision","observation":"GAO estimated PRC infrastructure financing at $679 billion versus $76 billion from the United States across selected sectors in 2013-2021, demonstrating an order-of-magnitude provision gap.","quantitative_anchor":"PRC USD679B; U.S. USD76B","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS028"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_selected_sector_estimate","limitation":"Finance is not delivered quality, ownership, recipient alignment, exclusive access or military rights.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_upstream_infrastructure_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","case_ids":["ST-13"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_Djibouti","period":"2013-2025","causal_stage":"conversion_chain","observation":"PRC investment and port relationships preceded a 2014 defense agreement and the 2017 base, but Djibouti also hosts other foreign forces and derives rent from preserving host bargaining options.","quantitative_anchor":"one PRC base within a multi-base host economy","evidentiary_role":"mixed_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS029"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"single_case","limitation":"Sequence does not prove the investment purchased the permission, that rights are exclusive, or that other financed ports will convert.","adjudication_effect":"supports_real_but_non_generalizable_access_pathway","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO037","case_ids":[],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"partner_conversion","observation":"The Space Force documented operational partnerships spanning SATCOM, hosted payloads, PNT, radar and commercial space-domain awareness, while GAO found staffing and coordination gaps that prevent full conversion.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple mission areas and partners; implementation milestones incomplete","evidentiary_role":"mixed_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS032","CCV-AS033"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_process","limitation":"Strategy examples and oversight do not establish wartime contribution or matched PRC performance.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strong_allied_space_source_with_conversion_gap","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO038","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_Taiwan","period":"2024 onward","causal_stage":"mitigation_pipeline","observation":"TSMC announced three Arizona fabs and more than $65 billion in planned investment, but the later fabs and most advanced nodes remained future capacity during the calibration event.","quantitative_anchor":">USD65 billion planned; three-fab program","evidentiary_role":"future_mitigation_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS035"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"project_specific","limitation":"Announced investment is not completed, qualified, cost-competitive or crisis-available output.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_current_diversification_credit","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO039","case_ids":["ST-01"],"system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Iran_target","period":"2013-2016","causal_stage":"leverage_to_bargain","observation":"Coalition-accessible financial restrictions and negotiated relief were connected to a bargain that Iran implemented sufficiently for the IAEA to verify the required nuclear steps on Implementation Day.","quantitative_anchor":"Implementation Day 16 January 2016","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bounded_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS040"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"single_case_process_trace","limitation":"The evidence supports bargaining and implementation, not a claim that sanctions alone caused Iran's decision or permanently changed preferences.","adjudication_effect":"supports_financial_leverage_for_bounded_bargain","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO040","case_ids":["ST-01"],"system":"U.S.-anchored_and_partners","period":"2018-2026","causal_stage":"reversal_and_persistence","observation":"U.S. withdrawal reimposed financial restrictions after verified implementation, while the multilateral arrangement subsequently unraveled and prior Security Council measures were reapplied in 2025.","quantitative_anchor":"relief reversed in 2018; prior UN measures reapplied in 2025","evidentiary_role":"negative_durability_and_self_harm","source_ids":["CCV-AS039","CCV-AS040"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"same_case_reversal","limitation":"Iranian nonperformance and wider regional developments also shaped collapse; the record does not assign sole responsibility.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_durable_compliance_and_flags_credibility_cost","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO041","case_ids":["ST-02"],"system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Russia_target","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"reachable_financial_denial","observation":"Coalition jurisdiction immobilized a very large share of accessible Russian central-bank assets and restricted banks and payment channels, demonstrating practical control over permissioned financial nodes.","quantitative_anchor":"about EUR210 billion of Russian central-bank assets blocked in the EU","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_denial","source_ids":["CCV-AS041"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"coalition_legal_and_asset_record","limitation":"Blocked assets are not the same as confiscated funds, reduced weapons output or a target policy change.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strong_financial_denial_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO042","case_ids":["ST-02"],"system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Russia_target","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"target_adaptation_and_outcome","observation":"Financial restrictions constrained accessibility, payments and growth, but capital controls, rerouted trade and continuing commodity revenue allowed adaptation; the admitted record does not show that financial pressure compelled war termination.","quantitative_anchor":"continued macroeconomic operation under tighter payment constraints","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence_to_compellence","source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS064"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"multi_source_target_response","limitation":"War finance, battlefield developments, fiscal data and counterfactual growth remain only partly observable in public evidence.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_usable_leverage_to_cost_and_resource_denial","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO043","case_ids":["ST-04"],"system":"PRC-centered_actor_Australia_target","period":"2020-2023","causal_stage":"market_pressure","observation":"PRC barriers imposed concentrated losses on selected Australian exporters and demonstrated access to a large destination market as a source of pressure.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple targeted commodity and goods categories","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_sector_pressure","source_ids":["CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"target_government_and_economy_record","limitation":"Formal, informal, sanitary and commercial measures differ, and exact PRC demands were not consistently public.","adjudication_effect":"supports_product_specific_exposure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO044","case_ids":["ST-04"],"system":"Australia_target_and_third_markets","period":"2020-2023","causal_stage":"substitution_and_policy_response","observation":"Australian firms redirected major commodity flows and aggregate exports remained resilient while the government did not reverse the principal policies commonly associated with the pressure campaign.","quantitative_anchor":"large coal and commodity diversion to alternative buyers","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence_to_national_compellence","source_ids":["CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"same_case_sector_and_aggregate","limitation":"Some firms and sectors bore severe costs, and policy continuity may also reflect domestic politics or security preferences.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_durable_prc_policy_leverage_in_case","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","case_ids":["ST-05"],"system":"European_partner_system_Russia_supplier","period":"2021-2025","causal_stage":"strategic_recovery","observation":"Europe reduced Russian gas imports from roughly 150 bcm in 2021 to 52 bcm in 2024, cut the Russian share from about 45% to 19%, reduced demand and diversified supply without abandoning support for Ukraine.","quantitative_anchor":"150 bcm to 52 bcm; 45% to 19%; gas demand down 17% over the reported period","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_substitution_and_coercion_resistance","source_ids":["CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"regional_common_flow","limitation":"The adjustment imposed high prices and unequal sectoral costs, and mild weather, demand destruction and macroeconomic weakness contributed.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategic_recovery_and_partner_option_preservation","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO046","case_ids":["ST-05"],"system":"Russia_supplier_Europe_target","period":"2021-2026","causal_stage":"power_base_erosion","observation":"Russia's initial pipeline position created severe short-run exposure, but supply coercion accelerated infrastructure, regulatory and demand changes that removed most of the enduring European market position.","quantitative_anchor":"Russian piped deliveries to the EU down about 90% from 2021 to 2025","evidentiary_role":"negative_feedback","source_ids":["CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"before_after_market_position","limitation":"Revenue was partly redirected and causality includes sanctions, war damage, policy choice and market response.","adjudication_effect":"supports_leverage_self_liquidation_risk","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","case_ids":["ST-06"],"system":"global_shipping_network","period":"2023-2025","causal_stage":"exogenous_and_adversarial_disruption","observation":"Red Sea attacks induced large-scale rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, higher insurance and freight costs, longer voyages and a 17% rise in global ton-miles in 2024.","quantitative_anchor":"global ton-miles up 17% in 2024","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_network_disruption","source_ids":["CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"observed_global_shipping_response","limitation":"Freight rates also reflect fleet supply, demand and other disruptions; ton-miles are not a direct measure of state-option loss.","adjudication_effect":"supports_route_common_mode_and_costly_substitution","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO048","case_ids":["ST-06"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_global_shipping","period":"2023-2026","causal_stage":"protection_conversion_limit","observation":"International naval and diplomatic responses reduced some risks but did not restore normal routing across the observation window; commercial networks substituted geographically while accepting higher cost and delay.","quantitative_anchor":"persistent rerouting through 2025","evidentiary_role":"mixed_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"campaign_to_commercial_outcome","limitation":"The counterfactual without naval protection is unavailable and force protection may have prevented worse losses.","adjudication_effect":"shows_defense_cannot_automatically_normalize_private_network","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered_actor_global_targets","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"material_denial_effect","observation":"New PRC mineral and magnet controls produced licensing delays and documented downstream production curtailments, converting refining concentration into immediate product-specific denial capacity.","quantitative_anchor":"China exceeded 90% refining share for several controlled materials","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS048"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"product_specific_supply_chain","limitation":"Controls varied by product and destination, inventories delayed effects, and military end-use impact is not fully public.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_material_control_and_target_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_other_targets","period":"2025-2035 outlook","causal_stage":"adaptation_and_recovery","observation":"Substitution, recycling, stockpiling and non-PRC projects can reduce exposure, but qualification, by-product economics and long project lead times prevent rapid replacement for several products.","quantitative_anchor":"diversification remains slow for the most concentrated refining stages","evidentiary_role":"mixed_recovery","source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"cross_material_outlook","limitation":"Projects and forecasts may slip; actual inventories and classified defense demand remain opaque.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_residual_vulnerability_but_bounded_long_run_leverage","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","case_ids":["ST-09"],"system":"European_hosts_PRC_vendors","period":"2020-2026","causal_stage":"host_regulatory_control","observation":"EU institutions and member governments designated Huawei and ZTE as high-risk suppliers and moved toward restrictions or phase-out, showing that host regulation and trust can override installed commercial scale.","quantitative_anchor":"EU-wide toolbox plus proposed three-year phase-out","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_host_control","source_ids":["CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"multi_host_policy","limitation":"Implementation remains uneven and policy designation does not quantify comparative technical performance or security risk.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_network_position_but_strategic_taskability_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO052","case_ids":["ST-09"],"system":"European_hosts_and_operators","period":"2023-2026","causal_stage":"switching_cost_and_recovery","observation":"Persistent high-risk supplier presence and a proposed multi-year transition show that vendor substitution is feasible but costly, slow and dependent on qualified alternatives.","quantitative_anchor":"three-year proposed phase-out window","evidentiary_role":"mixed_substitution","source_ids":["CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"policy_to_transition_window","limitation":"A common statutory deadline does not reveal operator-specific cost, coverage or service degradation.","adjudication_effect":"supports_digital_dependency_without_permanent_lock_in","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO053","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_global_finance","period":"2010-2026","causal_stage":"alternative_network_growth","observation":"Renminbi trade settlement, swap lines and CIPS provide real bypass and liquidity options, but financial links, convertibility, asset depth and trust—not trade scale alone—remain binding constraints on system-wide monetary power.","quantitative_anchor":"RMB 8.5% of FX turnover and about 2% of disclosed reserves versus dollar 89.2% and 57.13%","evidentiary_role":"mixed_network_growth","source_ids":["CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_global_denominators","limitation":"Currency roles differ by function and rapid policy or market change could alter shares.","adjudication_effect":"supports_growing_prc_option_but_extreme_relative_financial_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO054","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_Ukraine","period":"2022-2025","causal_stage":"coalition_conversion","observation":"A coalition of roughly 50 states built capability coalitions and armaments-director mechanisms linking battlefield requirements to donations, procurement, sustainment and production investments.","quantitative_anchor":"about 50 participating states; eight capability coalitions","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_permissioned_network_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS053"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"documented_governance_mechanism","limitation":"Governance and commitments do not establish that delivered quantities met every Ukrainian requirement or caused battlefield outcomes.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_us_partner_aggregation_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2022-2025","causal_stage":"physical_delivery_constraint","observation":"Replacement programs encountered long raw-material and component lead times; DOD invested nearly USD2 billion toward a sevenfold increase in 155 mm production while acknowledging delays across weapon programs.","quantitative_anchor":"nearly USD2 billion for 155 mm capacity; selected electronic lead time rose 19 to 34 months","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bottleneck","source_ids":["CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"audited_us_programs","limitation":"Replacement capacity is not identical to allied aggregate supply, and announced expansion may not arrive within the operational window.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_us_physical_conversion_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","case_ids":["ST-12"],"system":"U.S.-Philippines_alliance","period":"2023-2025","causal_stage":"access_preparation","observation":"The allies expanded EDCA to nine sites and paired access with bilateral infrastructure funding, exercises and maritime cooperation, creating a more distributed option set under Philippine sovereignty.","quantitative_anchor":"nine EDCA sites; U.S. FY2025 request of USD128 million across seven sites plus Philippine investment","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_access_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS054"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"bilateral_agreement_and_funding","limitation":"Prepared sites and peacetime exercise do not guarantee authorization for a specific conflict, adequate throughput or survivability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_usable_but_permissioned_access_option","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO057","case_ids":["ST-14"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_Sri_Lanka_host","period":"2017-2018","causal_stage":"commercial_control_and_fiscal_context","observation":"A PRC state-owned operator acquired 85% of the port operating company under a 99-year concession for about USD1.1 billion; proceeds strengthened Sri Lanka's cash position, while the transaction was not a cancellation of the port loans.","quantitative_anchor":"85% operating-company share; 99 years; about USD1.1 billion","evidentiary_role":"mixed_commercial_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"recipient_and_imf_records","limitation":"The arrangement still created long-duration commercial control and relationship access; incomplete contract disclosure limits full assessment.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_automatic_debt_seizure_and_military_access_inference","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO058","case_ids":["ST-15"],"system":"NATO_partner_system","period":"2022-2024","causal_stage":"alliance_aggregation","observation":"Finland and Sweden chose membership after Russia's full-scale invasion, completed unanimous accession, and brought geography, forces and industrial capabilities into a 32-member treaty and planning system.","quantitative_anchor":"Finland joined 4 April 2023; Sweden joined 7 March 2024; 32 allies","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_network_expansion","source_ids":["CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"completed_legal_and_institutional_change","limitation":"Added membership creates obligations as well as capability; official claims do not prove deterrence or net military effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_permissioned_aggregation_and_adversary_backfire","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO059","case_ids":["ST-15"],"system":"NATO_partner_system","period":"2022-2024","causal_stage":"permission_constraint","observation":"The accession process required each ally's ratification, demonstrating that the same sovereign-consensus architecture that legitimizes expansion can delay it through national bargaining.","quantitative_anchor":"unanimous ratification by 30 existing allies","evidentiary_role":"mixed_permission_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS057"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"institutional_process","limitation":"Delay can be a governance safeguard rather than only a weakness, and private bargaining motives are not fully observable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strength_and_vulnerability_of_permissioned_network","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO060","case_ids":["ST-16"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_PRC-centered","period":"2020-2024","causal_stage":"valued_good_delivery","observation":"The United States reported delivery of 693.65 million donated doses to 117 countries, while WHO emergency listing made a major PRC vaccine available for global procurement; both systems converted production and diplomacy into real provision.","quantitative_anchor":"U.S. 693.65 million doses to 117 countries; Sinopharm WHO-listed","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_delivery_not_influence","source_ids":["CCV-AS059","CCV-AS060"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"nonmatched_provider_measures","limitation":"The provider measures are not directly comparable and do not include all PRC deliveries, recipient need, uptake or health effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_provision_capacity_but_not_durable_influence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO061","case_ids":["ST-16"],"system":"multi_system_recipients","period":"2021-2023","causal_stage":"recipient_absorption","observation":"Cold chain, staffing, data, risk communication, uptake and local health capacity materially mediated whether delivered doses became vaccinations and public value.","quantitative_anchor":"implementation constraints varied widely by recipient","evidentiary_role":"recipient_agency_and_conversion_constraint","source_ids":["CCV-AS061"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"cross_recipient_process","limitation":"WHO implementation evidence does not isolate provider reputation or subsequent foreign-policy decisions.","adjudication_effect":"blocks_dose_count_to_influence_inference","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO062","case_ids":["ST-17"],"system":"PRC-supported_network_US_hosts","period":"2019-2024","causal_stage":"host_revocation","observation":"U.S. Confucius Institutes fell from roughly 100 in 2019 to fewer than five after federal funding restrictions and host decisions, demonstrating extreme vulnerability of the state-supported network to legitimacy and host authorization.","quantitative_anchor":"about 100 to fewer than five","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_network_vulnerability","source_ids":["CCV-AS062"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"national_host_sample","limitation":"The U.S. is not representative globally; closure does not establish prior strategic influence or PRC direction of every activity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_host_control_and_prc_cultural_taskability_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO063","case_ids":["ST-17"],"system":"PRC-supported_network_US_hosts","period":"2014-2019","causal_stage":"host_and_program_control","observation":"University directors reported varied operations, locally negotiated agreements, educational benefits and concerns, making institute count an invalid proxy for centralized strategic taskability.","quantitative_anchor":"operations varied across reviewed institutions","evidentiary_role":"mixed_network_governance","source_ids":["CCV-AS063"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"audited_contract_and_interview_sample","limitation":"Self-report can miss informal pressure and the review did not measure longitudinal attitudes or policy behavior.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_exposure_to_influence_inference","status":"applied"}],"metric_contracts":[{"metric_id":"CCV-M01","causal_stage":"scope_gate","title":"International strategic relevance","decision_question":"Does the candidate materially affect a state's international action, feasible options, coercion resistance, external reliability, or stability of the state?","definition_or_measure":"Record the exact state option or international effect, target or partner, theater or system, time horizon, and causal link; for domestic foundations record the threshold crossing into strategic effect.","unit":"structured_scope_contract","required_denominator":"All candidate benefits and disruptions, including domestic effects that do not cross the international gate","threshold_rule":"No CCV ruling when the asserted effect is solely domestic welfare, routine service continuity, sector importance, or political salience.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same international-effect gate to U.S./partner and PRC-centered candidates and to favorable and adverse evidence.","admissible_evidence":"Delivered state actions; foreign, partner, target, institution, market or network responses; mission effects; state-continuity evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Strategy emphasis; domestic loss alone; sector label; aggregate economic harm; public concern; unbounded national-security assertion.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M02","causal_stage":"power_source","title":"Power-source proposition","decision_question":"What resource, capability, relationship, institution, network position, legitimacy, or adaptive property is claimed as a source of power or leverage?","definition_or_measure":"Define the candidate, owner or provider, relevant state access, scarcity or advantage, international use case, and the effect it could plausibly enable.","unit":"candidate_specific_proposition","required_denominator":"All components required for the claimed use, not the most visible upstream asset","threshold_rule":"No supported power-source finding without a bounded use case and a noncircular mechanism connecting the source to a state option or external effect.","comparison_requirement":"Compare like use cases and functions; different objectives, theaters, targets, or time horizons remain separate findings.","admissible_evidence":"Capability records; institutional and network data; partner and operator evidence; observed uses; independent method and contrary evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Inventory; spending; GDP; market share; patent or publication count; alliance membership; audience size as automatic power.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M03","causal_stage":"access_and_control","title":"State access and practical control","decision_question":"Can the state lawfully, politically, commercially, technically, and operationally access or mobilize the candidate when needed?","definition_or_measure":"Map ownership, operation, authority, contracts, jurisdiction, private and partner discretion, crisis behavior, conditions, and revocation risk.","unit":"node_and_authority_map","required_denominator":"Every decisive node and actor from source to delivered effect","threshold_rule":"A candidate is bounded or withheld when nominal ownership, domicile, treaty, or contract cannot establish timely practical access.","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical control distinctions: ownership, jurisdiction, access, direction, denial, and reliable availability are not interchangeable.","admissible_evidence":"Law and agreements; contracts; operator decisions; crisis delivery; partner authorization; exercised access; restrictions and revocation.","mandatory_exclusions":"Company nationality; asset location; formal title; political alignment; membership; public commitment; state taskability inferred without evidence.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M04","causal_stage":"conversion","title":"Conversion capability","decision_question":"Can the state convert the source into a delivered instrument action or internationally consequential option at required scale, quality, place, and time?","definition_or_measure":"Trace source → authority and mobilization → instrument delivery → partner or target exposure → response or option effect, with conversion losses and delays.","unit":"causal_chain_with_time_and_scale","required_denominator":"Total available resource and total delivered usable effect under the declared case","threshold_rule":"No power finding when the chain stops at potential, announcement, funding, inventory, access, or output without usable state action.","comparison_requirement":"Use equivalent stages and time windows for both systems; do not compensate for an unobserved stage with strength elsewhere.","admissible_evidence":"Decision and delivery records; operational and market data; partner and recipient evidence; timing; quality; integration; observed use.","mandatory_exclusions":"Potential capacity; budget; commitment; co-occurring actions; resource abundance; modeling result without observed conversion.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M05","causal_stage":"external_response","title":"Target, partner, and system sensitivity","decision_question":"Does the external actor or system depend on, value, fear, trust, or respond to the source in the way required by the mechanism?","definition_or_measure":"Measure exposure, alternatives, preference, interpretation, authority, decision process, response, adaptation, and persistence for each target, recipient, partner, audience, or institution.","unit":"actor_or_system_response_record","required_denominator":"All relevant external actors, including nonresponders, substitutes, third countries, firms, and affected communities","threshold_rule":"No influence or leverage finding from exposure or dependence without evidence of sensitivity and response; target pain is not policy change.","comparison_requirement":"Match comparable actor roles and preserve agency; sender output cannot substitute for recipient evidence.","admissible_evidence":"Target and partner records; decisions; trade and network flows; surveys with methods; interviews; behavior; institution votes and implementation.","mandatory_exclusions":"Reach; contact; dependence share; price; audience size; signed statement; actor claim; correlation without response mechanism.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M06","causal_stage":"strategic_effect","title":"State-option gain or loss threshold","decision_question":"How much does the source or disruption expand, remove, delay, condition, or raise the cost of a meaningful state option?","definition_or_measure":"Predeclare the option, baseline, minimum usable effect, latest decision time, acceptable cost, alternatives, failure threshold, and persistence checkpoint.","unit":"option_set_and_threshold","required_denominator":"Complete feasible option set, including cheaper, partner, substitute, delayed, and non-action alternatives","threshold_rule":"Criticality requires that loss crosses the declared option or stability threshold and that adequate substitutes cannot arrive within time and cost.","comparison_requirement":"Use equivalent option definitions and avoid comparing different objectives or risk tolerances as one scale.","admissible_evidence":"Decision records; operational planning; cost and time; alternative options; partner availability; outcomes; counterfactual and sensitivity evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Generic importance; inconvenience; price increase; capacity loss; degraded domestic service; actor assertion that an option is vital.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M07","causal_stage":"network_position","title":"Network centrality, jurisdiction, and chokepoint potential","decision_question":"Does the state occupy and control a central node whose use can provide information, access, inducement, denial, or rule-setting advantage?","definition_or_measure":"Map topology, node centrality, flow share by function, jurisdiction, operator, switching and fragmentation, state institutions, target path, and alternatives.","unit":"network_node_and_flow_map","required_denominator":"All relevant flows, nodes, parallel systems, third countries, off-network activity, and affected partners","threshold_rule":"Centrality establishes potential only; leverage requires state access, target dependence, delivered action, response, and bounded erosion risk.","comparison_requirement":"Use the same functional network and denominator for both systems; reserve, payment, trade, data, and platform roles remain separate.","admissible_evidence":"Transaction and topology data; jurisdiction; operator and partner actions; target flows; denial or monitoring records; adaptation and alternatives.","mandatory_exclusions":"Market share; reserve share; traffic; company domicile; node count; network model without jurisdiction, target path, or state action.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M08","causal_stage":"partner_conversion","title":"Partner authorization and additionality","decision_question":"Does a partner contribution create an option or effect that the focal state could not deliver equivalently alone?","definition_or_measure":"Record commitment, decision authority, conditions, timing, delivered contribution, interoperability, burden, additionality, durability, and withdrawal risk.","unit":"partner_contribution_record","required_denominator":"Every partner counted in the claim and the focal state's unilateral alternative","threshold_rule":"No alliance or coalition credit without observed authorization and delivery connected to the declared effect.","comparison_requirement":"Attribute contributions to the partner and compare like partner roles; combined totals cannot obscure unavailable capacity.","admissible_evidence":"Partner law and decisions; operational and financial delivery; access use; interoperability; partner and local evidence; target response.","mandatory_exclusions":"Membership; treaty text; alignment; combined GDP or inventory; communiqué; exercise; affinity; assumed automatic support.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M09","causal_stage":"actor_control","title":"Private and independent actor taskability","decision_question":"Can the state direct, compel, incentivize, purchase, regulate, or merely benefit from the private, cultural, educational, scientific, media, or civil-society source?","definition_or_measure":"Classify actor independence, legal authority, contract, incentive, actual state request, response, refusal capacity, credibility effect, and attribution.","unit":"actor_control_class_and_event","required_denominator":"All material nonstate actors and the counterfactual without state direction","threshold_rule":"Independent effects may contribute to national advantage but cannot be counted as state capability or instrument delivery without control evidence.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same attribution rule to U.S./partner and PRC-centered firms, universities, media, platforms, and cultural actors.","admissible_evidence":"Governance and ownership; law; contracts; communications; operator choices; state requests; refusals; funding; recipient perceptions.","mandatory_exclusions":"Nationality; funding alone; regulation; beneficial effect; ideological affinity; state presence; assumption that authoritarian systems control every actor.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M10","causal_stage":"dependency","title":"Strategic dependency and common-mode exposure","decision_question":"Which suppliers, inputs, permissions, networks, partners, institutions, routes, and hidden tiers are necessary for access and conversion, and are apparently diverse paths truly independent?","definition_or_measure":"Build a node-edge map with control, concentration, geography, tier visibility, correlation, inventory, slack, qualification, switching, and unknown coverage.","unit":"dependency_graph_with_coverage","required_denominator":"Full source-to-effect chain, including private, partner, foreign, and shared upstream nodes","threshold_rule":"Vulnerability remains unscored when decisive tiers, control, substitute, or consequence are unknown; concentration alone is insufficient.","comparison_requirement":"Use equivalent mapping depth and report unknown shares rather than favoring the more transparent system.","admissible_evidence":"Bills of material; supplier and ownership records; contracts; network topology; operator and partner evidence; incidents; audits; qualification data.","mandatory_exclusions":"Sector import share; foreign supplier count; nominal diversification; ownership as control; missing data treated as resilience.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M11","causal_stage":"exploitability","title":"Adversary access and exploitability","decision_question":"Can another state identify, reach, time, and manipulate or disrupt the vulnerability at sufficient scale while managing attribution, counteraction, partner response, and escalation?","definition_or_measure":"Record adversary awareness, access, authority, delivery means, target sensitivity, timing, scale, denial or manipulation mechanism, detectability, countermeasures, and cost.","unit":"actor_mechanism_and_threshold","required_denominator":"All required adversary steps, failed attempts, alternative pathways, and defender controls","threshold_rule":"A vulnerability does not imply exploitability; exploitability does not imply acceptable or successful leverage.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same actor-capability and evidence threshold to both sides; capability estimates do not establish intent or use.","admissible_evidence":"Observed access and operations; doctrine and procurement; technical tests; target and partner response; attribution; costs; countermeasures.","mandatory_exclusions":"Adversary interest; public vulnerability; proximity; market position; theoretical cyber access; opaque capability; one past success generalized.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M12","causal_stage":"exogenous_shock","title":"Exogenous shock relevance","decision_question":"Can a non-adversarial event degrade the source or dependency enough to alter state action, options, coercion resistance, external reliability, or state stability?","definition_or_measure":"Predeclare hazard, exposure, warning, duration, direct loss, cascade, strategic threshold, foreign exploitation if any, substitution, recovery, and uncertainty.","unit":"scenario_specific_stress_record","required_denominator":"All affected power-source nodes and the strategic option set, not aggregate domestic damage","threshold_rule":"No CCV finding when a disaster or service loss lacks a material international-effect or state-stability trace.","comparison_requirement":"Use comparable shock severity and strategic function; do not rank states by disaster transparency or casualty reporting.","admissible_evidence":"Hazard and operational records; output and service loss; mission and policy effects; partner and market response; recovery; independent review.","mandatory_exclusions":"Casualties; economic loss; outage duration; emergency declaration; domestic disruption alone; assumed foreign exploitation.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M13","causal_stage":"substitution","title":"Functional substitution under strategic constraints","decision_question":"Can another source, provider, partner, route, technology, instrument, policy, or smaller objective deliver an equivalent state option within time, scale, quality, authority, and cost?","definition_or_measure":"Measure functional equivalence, spare capacity, qualification, switching time, political and legal availability, security, partner consent, distribution, and side effects.","unit":"substitute_option_record","required_denominator":"All plausible substitutes and the complete required function","threshold_rule":"A concentrated or disrupted node is not a critical vulnerability when an adequate substitute preserves the option within tolerance.","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical functional equivalence and switching assumptions to both systems; domestic substitution is not presumed superior.","admissible_evidence":"Qualification and exercises; real switching; capacity and inventory; contracts; partner permission; technical performance; price; delivery; side effects.","mandatory_exclusions":"Supplier count; announced project; nominal alternate; theoretical technology; domestic label; capacity lacking qualification or political access.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M14","causal_stage":"recovery","title":"Strategic functional recovery","decision_question":"How long does it take to restore the state option or international effect—not merely the asset or domestic service—to the required level?","definition_or_measure":"Separate detection, decision, mobilization, repair, restart, resupply, reauthorization, requalification, partner confidence, and full or partial functional recovery.","unit":"time_to_declared_strategic_function","required_denominator":"Required option or effect level, including degraded alternatives and recurrence","threshold_rule":"Critical vulnerability requires recovery beyond the declared decision or mission window after all credible temporary substitutes.","comparison_requirement":"Use functional rather than asset-restoration endpoints and comparable starting points.","admissible_evidence":"Incident and recovery timelines; output and mission data; exercises; partner and operator evidence; quality validation; recurrence; costs.","mandatory_exclusions":"Repair completion; reopened facility; restored average service; announcement; asset count; recovery assumed from plan.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M15","causal_stage":"sustainment","title":"Mobilization, throughput, and strategic endurance","decision_question":"Can the state and partners scale and sustain the source through the required campaign or structural horizon after consumption, losses, maintenance, learning, and competing demand?","definition_or_measure":"Measure initial availability, mobilization time, throughput, yield, consumption, attrition, maintenance, replenishment, fiscal cost, partner delivery, and adaptation.","unit":"usable_effect_per_time_against_demand","required_denominator":"Total declared strategic demand, including surge, losses, competing theaters, maintenance, and partner commitments","threshold_rule":"Initial inventory or capacity is insufficient when delivered net flow falls below demand before the persistence checkpoint.","comparison_requirement":"Match missions, intensity, time, and partner assumptions; do not compare peacetime output to wartime demand.","admissible_evidence":"Production and delivery; consumption and loss; maintenance; funding; labor; supplier tiers; partner contribution; operational availability.","mandatory_exclusions":"Spending; capacity announcement; gross production; inventory; employment; one delivery; theoretical surge.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M16","causal_stage":"adaptation","title":"Target, competitor, partner, and market adaptation","decision_question":"How do other actors reroute, substitute, innovate, retaliate, hedge, defect, cooperate, or change behavior after the source is used or disrupted?","definition_or_measure":"Record expected and observed adaptation, start time, cost, scale, effectiveness, spillover, policy response, and effect on persistence.","unit":"actor_specific_adaptation_timeline","required_denominator":"All material targets, partners, firms, markets, and third countries over the declared horizon","threshold_rule":"No durable advantage or leverage finding when adaptation erodes the mechanism before the required outcome or creates a stronger rival position.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same adaptation window and evidence rule to both systems.","admissible_evidence":"Trade, technology, finance and operational data; policy changes; firm behavior; partner actions; market entry; alternative networks; interviews and audits.","mandatory_exclusions":"Initial shock; announced response; isolated workaround; no observed adaptation treated as impossible; static market or alliance assumptions.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M17","causal_stage":"state_stability","title":"State-stability and strategic-continuity threshold","decision_question":"Does domestic political, fiscal, institutional, informational, or social stress materially threaten state authority, implementation, external commitment, coercion resistance, or continuity?","definition_or_measure":"Predeclare the institution, external action, burden, threshold, mechanism, warning indicator, time horizon, affected partner, and distinction among policy change, regime change, and state instability.","unit":"bounded_stability_mechanism","required_denominator":"Complete state-action chain and plausible lawful or political alternatives","threshold_rule":"Domestic conditions are admitted only when evidence supports a strategic-action or state-stability effect; disagreement or distress alone is insufficient.","comparison_requirement":"Do not equate open dissent with weakness or repression with stability; apply equivalent functional tests across regime types.","admissible_evidence":"Authority and implementation; fiscal and institutional function; public and elite behavior; external policy; partner and opponent response; historic and comparative cases.","mandatory_exclusions":"Approval; protest; election; censorship; inequality; repression; polarization; elite rumor; hardship; regime preference; unbounded collapse forecast.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M18","causal_stage":"net_effect","title":"Self-harm, fratricide, and power-base erosion","decision_question":"Would using or protecting the source damage the same network, alliance, market, legitimacy, innovation ecosystem, prosperity, or state stability that makes it valuable?","definition_or_measure":"Record direct benefit and costs to own system, partners, third parties, firms, communities, rights, law, markets, innovation, escalation, legitimacy, network migration, and long-run position.","unit":"multi_party_net_strategic_effect","required_denominator":"All material benefits and harms over short, medium, and structural horizons","threshold_rule":"No mitigation or leverage option advances without delivered additionality and a bounded net strategic benefit after self-harm and erosion.","comparison_requirement":"Apply symmetric own-system and partner-harm tests to U.S./partner and PRC-centered options.","admissible_evidence":"Implementation and outcome data; partner and target response; market and technology adaptation; legal review; distribution; network and legitimacy trends.","mandatory_exclusions":"Gross target cost; domestic spending; symbolic action; assumed acceptable partner harm; short-term gain; unpriced legal or escalation risk.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M19","causal_stage":"comparative","title":"Matched comparative power or vulnerability","decision_question":"Are both systems being compared for the same strategic function, target or theater, scenario, time, partner availability, evidence stage, and outcome?","definition_or_measure":"Create a match record for scope, unit, denominator, date, control, conversion, target response, substitutes, recovery, costs, observability, and uncertainty.","unit":"matched_pair_or_explicit_noncomparison","required_denominator":"Complete claim universe for both systems and participating partners","threshold_rule":"One-sided evidence, different functions, unmatched scenarios, or unequal causal stages remain insufficient comparative basis.","comparison_requirement":"No opacity bonus or transparency penalty; lower confidence where evidence is asymmetric.","admissible_evidence":"Parallel primary and independent records; matched data; cases; partner and target evidence; methods; uncertainty and sensitivity.","mandatory_exclusions":"Deficit-on-one-side inference; ranking by source count; separate case anecdotes; domain positions; gross-resource or composite comparison.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M20","causal_stage":"evidence_and_revision","title":"Evidence completeness, rivals, sensitivity, and confidence","decision_question":"How robust is each fact, access, conversion, external-effect, criticality, vulnerability, exploitability, leverage, mitigation, comparative, and observability judgment?","definition_or_measure":"Record source families, directness, coverage, denominators, uncertainty, opacity, contrary evidence, rivals, sensitivity, missing evidence, revision trigger, and separate confidence.","unit":"structured_confidence_and_gap_record","required_denominator":"Complete positive, negative, failed, adapted, partner, target, private-actor, and affected-party evidence universe","threshold_rule":"Missing decisive access, conversion, external-effect, substitution, recovery, target-response, or self-harm evidence forces insufficient basis.","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical admission and unknown rules; confidence cannot substitute for evidence or be averaged across judgment types.","admissible_evidence":"Primary, official and operator; independent audit and research; partner, target, recipient and affected-party; contrary and adaptation; dated data and methods.","mandatory_exclusions":"Source count; repeated citation of one data lineage; actor claim as validation; composite confidence; silence as zero; opacity as strength.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"}],"case_contracts":[{"case_id":"ST-01","case_title":"U.S. dollar, SWIFT, and secondary-sanctions leverage against Iran","primary_system":"U.S.-anchored_actor_Iran_target","period":"2010-2018","geography":"Global financial networks and Iran","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test currency and financial-network centrality, jurisdiction, partner compliance, target sensitivity, coercive conversion, negotiation effects, reimposition, and network costs.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires a trace from accessible financial nodes through partner implementation to Iranian economic and policy response, with the JCPOA and reversal phases separated.","thesis_challenge":"Severe financial pain may not produce durable policy compliance; unilateral overuse may damage alliances and encourage alternatives.","required_evidence_families":"Legal and sanctions record; SWIFT and banking participation; trade and finance; partner implementation; Iranian policy and adaptation; JCPOA record; humanitarian and third-party effects; network trends."},{"case_id":"ST-02","case_title":"Freeze of Russian reserves, bank restrictions, and financial adaptation after the invasion of Ukraine","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Russia_target","period":"2022-2026","geography":"Global financial system, Russia, Europe, and coalition jurisdictions","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test accessible versus gross reserves, coalition jurisdiction, payment and capital restrictions, sanctions absorption, target adaptation, war-finance effects, and long-run currency or network erosion.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires evidence that measures changed Russian strategic options, war financing, or policy—not merely assets, trade routes, prices, or welfare.","thesis_challenge":"Large frozen assets and initial shock may coexist with continued war effort, rerouting, commodity revenue, domestic controls, and coalition self-cost.","required_evidence_families":"Coalition legal and implementation record; reserve accessibility; fiscal and monetary data; payment and trade flows; evasion; military finance; target policy; partner costs; currency and network adaptation."},{"case_id":"ST-03","case_title":"PRC–Japan rare-earth disruption and subsequent diversification","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_Japan_target","period":"2010-2015","geography":"PRC, Japan, and global rare-earth supply chains","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether processing concentration became usable coercive leverage, how attribution and market forces are separated, and whether Japanese inventory, substitution, recycling, investment, and partner action reduced vulnerability.","international_effect_threshold":"A supported leverage or vulnerability finding requires product-specific denial, target strategic effect, policy sensitivity, and recovery beyond ordinary price movement.","thesis_challenge":"Contested attribution, short duration, demand change, and rapid adaptation may bound claims that concentration created durable coercive power.","required_evidence_families":"Customs and licensing; firm and government records; product and price data; inventories; end use; Japanese policy and investment; WTO and partner action; substitution and recovery; contrary attribution evidence."},{"case_id":"ST-04","case_title":"PRC trade coercion against Australia and market substitution","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_Australia_target","period":"2020-2023","geography":"PRC, Australia, and third-country commodity and goods markets","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test market dependence, product-specific restrictions, target policy sensitivity, third-country trade diversion, coalition signaling, sectoral distribution, and coercion resistance.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires evidence connecting restrictions to Australian state options or policy and measuring whether substitutes preserved national strategic freedom despite sector losses.","thesis_challenge":"Large bilateral trade exposure may not produce policy change when commodities are fungible, firms reroute, and political resistance hardens.","required_evidence_families":"Restriction and attribution record; bilateral and global trade; firm and sector effects; alternative markets; Australian policy; PRC objectives and response; partner support; prices; persistence."},{"case_id":"ST-05","case_title":"European dependence on Russian pipeline gas and strategic substitution","primary_system":"partner_led_Russia_supplier","period":"2021-2026","geography":"European Union, Russia, and global gas markets","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test supplier and infrastructure dependence, Russian revenue and coercion, storage, demand reduction, LNG and pipeline substitution, coalition burden, fiscal cost, and recovered policy freedom.","international_effect_threshold":"The case must distinguish energy service continuity and price from the ability to sustain sanctions, Ukraine support, industrial capacity, and political cohesion.","thesis_challenge":"Europe may regain strategic freedom at high fiscal, industrial, partner, and distributional cost; Russia may lose leverage while retaining revenue or redirecting trade.","required_evidence_families":"Energy balances and flows; storage; prices; contracts; infrastructure; policy timelines; demand and industry; fiscal support; Ukraine policy; Russian revenue and adaptation; partner and household effects."},{"case_id":"ST-06","case_title":"Red Sea attacks, shipping insurance, naval response, and rerouting","primary_system":"transnational_adversarial","period":"2023-2026","geography":"Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Suez, Cape routes, and global trade","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether a nonstate or state-backed actor can exploit a maritime chokepoint, how commercial shipping and insurers adapt, and whether coalition military action restores the strategic flow.","international_effect_threshold":"A strategic-vulnerability finding requires an effect on state options, coalition action, supply or market power beyond freight cost and delay.","thesis_challenge":"Rerouting and inventory may preserve function despite attacks; military presence may protect some traffic without restoring confidence or deterrence.","required_evidence_families":"Attack and attribution data; vessel and route flows; insurance and freight; naval operations; firm decisions; trade and strategic supply effects; coalition authorization; target adaptation; persistence."},{"case_id":"ST-07","case_title":"U.S.–Japan–Netherlands semiconductor controls and PRC adaptation","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_actor_PRC_target","period":"2022-2026","geography":"United States, Japan, Netherlands, PRC, Taiwan, Korea, and global chip stack","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test full-stack chokepoints, allied permission, licensing and enforcement, target capability delay, stockpiling, redesign, domestic substitution, partner and firm costs, and long-run stack fragmentation.","international_effect_threshold":"A supported leverage finding requires a bounded end-capability effect and time gain attributable to controls, not merely reduced shipments or higher target spending.","thesis_challenge":"Controls may accelerate PRC substitution, reduce allied revenue and R&D, create leakage, divide partners, and erode the same ecosystem that provides leverage.","required_evidence_families":"Rules and licenses; firm and partner implementation; node-specific capacity and performance; trade; stockpiles; PRC procurement and innovation; evasion; military and AI end use; costs; market and alliance effects."},{"case_id":"ST-08","case_title":"PRC gallium, germanium, graphite, antimony, and rare-earth controls","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_global_targets","period":"2023-2026","geography":"PRC and global strategic-material supply chains","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test product and processing centrality, licensing, target inventory and substitution, market price and supply response, retaliation, and whether restrictions produce leverage or catalyze de-risking.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires product-specific strategic consequence and state option or target-response evidence, with export administration separated from political coercion.","thesis_challenge":"Concentration may yield short-term disruption but destroy long-run supplier power by accelerating allied investment, recycling, substitution, and stockpiling.","required_evidence_families":"PRC rules and customs; product quality and end use; global production and processing; inventories; prices; firm and government response; new capacity; target policy; attribution and rationale; persistence."},{"case_id":"ST-09","case_title":"Huawei restrictions, 5G vendor substitution, and digital-network alignment","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_actor_PRC-firm_target","period":"2019-2026","geography":"Global telecommunications markets and partner networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test state control over private firms, security and intelligence claims, allied coordination, vendor dependence, switching cost, standards, market effects, PRC response, and network bloc formation.","international_effect_threshold":"A supported finding requires an evidenced security, access, market, partner, or strategic-option effect rather than firm nationality or equipment removal alone.","thesis_challenge":"Restrictions may reduce one exposure while increasing cost and concentration, weakening standards cooperation, or substituting another dependency.","required_evidence_families":"Security and legal record; operator networks; vendor shares and contracts; partner decisions; costs and performance; standards; financing; intelligence evidence within public limits; PRC and firm adaptation; market structure."},{"case_id":"ST-10","case_title":"RMB internationalization, CIPS, swap lines, and alternatives to dollar-centered finance","primary_system":"PRC-centered_builder_U.S.-anchored_incumbent","period":"2015-2026","geography":"Global reserve, payment, trade-finance, and central-bank networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether PRC payment and currency initiatives reduce sanctions exposure or create new financial leverage, and which market, institutional, convertibility, and trust constraints preserve dollar centrality.","international_effect_threshold":"A power finding requires function-specific international use and state access that changes financing, payment, reserves, coercion resistance, or partner choices.","thesis_challenge":"Transaction growth or swap-line count may not overcome capital controls, safe-asset limits, market depth, user trust, or dependence on incumbent networks.","required_evidence_families":"IMF and central-bank data; CIPS and payment data; invoicing and reserves; swap terms and use; market depth; legal and capital controls; sanctions adaptation; user and partner decisions; network interoperability."},{"case_id":"ST-11","case_title":"Ukraine support, munitions production, and allied burden sharing under policy change","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_system","period":"2022-2027","geography":"United States, Europe, Ukraine, and defense-industrial networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test alliance aggregation, partner agency, political authorization, industrial mobilization, fiscal endurance, logistics, battlefield conversion, credibility, and substitution when one contributor changes policy.","international_effect_threshold":"A source or vulnerability finding requires a trace from national and partner capacity through authorized delivery to Ukrainian options, Russian response, and coalition durability.","thesis_challenge":"High aggregate allied capacity may not convert quickly; burden shifts may spur European adaptation; aid delivery may not determine battlefield or negotiation outcomes alone.","required_evidence_families":"Budgets and authorizations; production and deliveries; inventories; logistics; Ukrainian use and outcomes; partner contributions; Russian adaptation; political decisions; fiscal and public burden; credibility evidence."},{"case_id":"ST-12","case_title":"Philippines EDCA access, basing distribution, and political authorization","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_access_system","period":"2014-2026","geography":"Philippines and Western Pacific","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether alliance ties and infrastructure convert into current host permission, distributed access, deterrence and response options under domestic politics, local concerns, disasters, and PRC pressure.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires exercised or credibly available access tied to a bounded mission and partner decision, not a site count or agreement alone.","thesis_challenge":"Domestic political turnover, legal limits, local opposition, escalation fears, infrastructure gaps, and mission caveats may sharply bound nominal access.","required_evidence_families":"Agreement and legal record; Philippine decisions and restrictions; local and public evidence; infrastructure and use; exercises and operations; U.S. planning; PRC response; alternatives; disaster use and mission effect."},{"case_id":"ST-13","case_title":"PRC Djibouti base and overseas infrastructure-to-access conversion","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_host_partner","period":"2008-2026","geography":"Djibouti, Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, and PRC overseas interests","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test when overseas finance, port relationships, diplomacy, and infrastructure become authorized military logistics and what host, commercial, political, geographic, and mission constraints remain.","international_effect_threshold":"A power finding requires demonstrated rights, use, throughput, mission effect, and host authorization; financing or port ownership alone is insufficient.","thesis_challenge":"One support base may provide limited mission utility, depend on host politics and routes, and not validate broad claims that development finance routinely converts into military access.","required_evidence_families":"Project and finance terms; ownership and rights; host and local evidence; base construction and use; port throughput; PLA missions; alternative facilities; partner and competitor response; costs and restrictions."},{"case_id":"ST-14","case_title":"Hambantota port, debt restructuring, and disputed leverage claims","primary_system":"PRC-centered_financier_Sri Lanka_recipient","period":"2007-2026","geography":"Sri Lanka, Indian Ocean, and PRC development-finance networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test debt, recipient agency, project economics, lease and control, domestic political and fiscal crisis, alternative explanations, military-access claims, and whether infrastructure creates usable state leverage.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires evidence of PRC state access or influence over Sri Lankan choices causally linked to the project and distinct from commercial lease, broader fiscal crisis, or recipient decisions.","thesis_challenge":"The case may contradict debt-trap and automatic port-to-base narratives while still revealing narrower financial, relationship, or access effects.","required_evidence_families":"Contracts and financing; project and port operations; Sri Lankan debt and fiscal record; restructuring; recipient and local evidence; PRC entities and state action; military visits or restrictions; alternative lenders; policy outcomes."},{"case_id":"ST-15","case_title":"Finland and Sweden NATO accession, combined capability, and Russian counteraction","primary_system":"partner_accession_and_alliance_system","period":"2022-2026","geography":"Nordic-Baltic and Euro-Atlantic theater","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test alliance aggregation, geographic and access effects, ratification and partner veto, interoperability, force and industrial contribution, deterrence, burden, and adversary adaptation.","international_effect_threshold":"A power finding requires authorized and integrated additional capability or access connected to strategic options or adversary expectations, not membership alone.","thesis_challenge":"Accession may improve coalition geography and capacity while creating new defense obligations, escalation, implementation lag, or uncertain deterrent effect.","required_evidence_families":"Ratification and conditions; force and infrastructure; plans and integration; exercises and deployments; industrial and intelligence contribution; partner burden; Russian posture and behavior; public and political support."},{"case_id":"ST-16","case_title":"PRC and U.S./partner vaccine provision and influence conversion","primary_system":"multi_system_competitive_provision","period":"2020-2023","geography":"Global with selected recipient comparisons","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test production, approval, delivery, quality, recipient need, diplomacy, narrative, trust, partner networks, and whether a valued good converted into durable access, affinity, alignment, or behavior.","international_effect_threshold":"An influence finding requires recipient-level relationship, trust, preference, access, decision, or behavior beyond doses pledged or delivered.","thesis_challenge":"Provision may meet urgent needs without durable influence; efficacy, timing, transparency, commercial terms, local agency, and rival offers may dominate state narrative.","required_evidence_families":"Production and delivery; regulatory and quality evidence; recipient need and alternatives; contract and aid terms; local public and government evidence; diplomacy and media; subsequent decisions and relationship; contrary cases."},{"case_id":"ST-17","case_title":"Confucius Institutes, closures, rebranding, and cultural-network taskability","primary_system":"PRC-centered_supported_network_foreign_hosts","period":"2004-2026","geography":"Universities and education systems across selected countries","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether state-supported language and education networks create attraction, access, relationships, narrative influence, or vulnerability to host restrictions and legitimacy loss while preserving university and participant agency.","international_effect_threshold":"A power or vulnerability finding requires evidence beyond institute count: state access or benefit, recipient trust or choice, relationship effect, host response, and durability.","thesis_challenge":"Closures may reflect domestic politics and security concerns without proving prior influence; rebranding or alternative providers may preserve language demand while eroding PRC state benefit.","required_evidence_families":"Contracts and governance; funding and curricula; participant and university evidence; state direction; host investigations and decisions; closures and successors; public attitudes; relationships and policy effects; comparator programs."},{"case_id":"ST-18","case_title":"Taiwan earthquake exposure and semiconductor strategic recovery","primary_system":"partner_and_global_technology_system","period":"2024","geography":"Taiwan and global semiconductor supply chains","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether geographic concentration plus an exogenous shock materially constrains international technology, military, market, or state options after redundancy, inventories, rapid shutdown, recovery, and global supplier response.","international_effect_threshold":"A strategic-vulnerability finding requires an externally consequential capability or option loss beyond temporary plant interruption, with functional recovery measured at customer and end-use level.","thesis_challenge":"High concentration may coexist with strong engineering, seismic design, inventories, multiple fabs, customer buffers, and rapid recovery, bounding simplistic vulnerability claims.","required_evidence_families":"Hazard and facility data; production and yield; safety shutdown; inventory and customer exposure; recovery; alternate fabs and suppliers; market and end-use effects; government and partner response; future investment."}],"contract_limitation":"Case scope, international-effect thresholds, required evidence and thesis challenges are reproduced from the stress-case plan. Metric contracts are unapplied design rules, not a completed measurement table. Portfolio-context observations may have no assigned stress case; cross-case context is not direct case evidence."},"gaps":{"focus":"Where observed strategy aligns with or diverges from independently supported sources of internationally usable power, conversion requirements, strategic vulnerabilities, and advantages","intent":"Identify alignments, execution gaps, strategic blind spots, unrealized advantages, possible misallocation, leverage opportunities, strategic fratricide, and insufficient basis","unit":"A traceable match between one frozen strategy-demand finding and one independently frozen power-source, conversion, strategic-vulnerability, advantage, or leverage finding","input_rule":"Neither workstream can establish or strengthen the other's finding; the layer operates only after both inputs are independently supported and retain separate evidence identities.","output_rule":"Every gap or alignment remains traceable to both contributing records and cannot be aggregated into a national score or overall winner.","findings":[{"gap_id":"GAP-01","title":"U.S./partner strategy uses its permissioned-network advantage","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"Ukraine coalition mechanisms, EDCA implementation and Nordic accession align strategy with the independently supported U.S./partner advantage in voluntary coalition aggregation and host permission.","directional_mechanism":"Consultation, treaty institutions, funding and exercises convert autonomous partner choices into access, logistics, production and political legitimacy.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P05"],"material_bound":"Alignment does not prove sufficient delivery or deterrence; each role remains permissioned.","counterfactual":"Without partner authorization and institutions, U.S. resources would provide less geography, legitimacy, intelligence and production.","source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057","IS-AS001","IS-AS003","IS-AS012"],"confidence":"high_mechanism_moderate_outcome","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-02","title":"U.S./partner strategies demand physical output faster than the system delivers","finding_state":"Execution gap","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"Ukraine and Indo-Pacific strategies require munitions, ships, repair, lift and qualified components on contested-time schedules that the independently observed U.S./partner industrial chain does not consistently meet.","directional_mechanism":"Budget and allied demand encounter supplier lead times, workforce, tooling, qualification, maintenance and transport bottlenecks before becoming available military effect.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F03","CCV-F04"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P01"],"material_bound":"The gap is mission- and time-specific; aggregate U.S./allied capacity remains large and classified inventories could narrow it.","counterfactual":"Qualified multi-year output, repair and logistics at the required rate would turn existing financial and alliance strength into a larger and more credible option set.","source_ids":["CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS010","CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053","IS-AS002","IS-AS003"],"confidence":"high","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-03","title":"European gas strategy closed a critical coercion-resistance requirement","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","system":"European_partner_system","ruling":"REPowerEU aligned implemented strategy with the independent requirement to preserve external policy freedom under energy disruption and achieved functional substitution within the relevant political window.","directional_mechanism":"Alternative suppliers, infrastructure, demand reduction, storage, regulation and coalition policy reduced the sender's control while preserving support for Ukraine.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F07","CCV-F10"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C04"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P10"],"material_bound":"The strategy imposed high and unequal costs; alignment does not imply optimal allocation or costless resilience.","counterfactual":"Without substitution and demand flexibility, Russian pipeline control would have constrained European choices for longer.","source_ids":["CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"confidence":"high","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-04","title":"U.S. policy can damage the credibility and institutions that make network power usable","finding_state":"Strategic fratricide","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"JCPOA withdrawal after verified implementation and prolonged WTO appellate paralysis damaged diplomatic credibility or rule-based enforcement that the U.S./partner system relies on for future coalition and financial leverage.","directional_mechanism":"A short-run unilateral instrument action weakens partner confidence, off-ramp credibility and common institutions, reducing the future reach and legitimacy of the permissioned network.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F02"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C07","IS-C17"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P14"],"material_bound":"U.S. substantive objections were real; the finding concerns the observed cross-effect, not a claim that every alternative policy was feasible or better.","counterfactual":"A credible compliance-conditioned off-ramp or negotiated institutional reform would preserve more of the network while pursuing the underlying objective.","source_ids":["CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","IS-AS014","IS-AS016","IS-AS035","IS-AS036","IS-AS037"],"confidence":"high_for_cross_effect_moderate_for_net_policy","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-05","title":"Allied semiconductor strategy employs a real chokepoint but risks eroding it","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","secondary_state":"Strategic fratricide","system":"U.S.-partner","ruling":"Coordinated controls align strategy with a genuine allied frontier-technology advantage, yet broad or unstable restrictions can accelerate substitution, reduce allied revenue and weaken partner coverage that makes the advantage usable.","directional_mechanism":"A distributed set of firms and jurisdictions controls specific tools and inputs; coalition law converts that position into denial, while ecosystem exit and target redesign reduce future leverage.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F06","CCV-F08"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C03"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09","IS-P14"],"material_bound":"Current evidence supports delay, not permanent denial or a net military effect.","counterfactual":"Narrow, stable, partner-aligned controls with monitored leakage and ecosystem costs would preserve more option value.","source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022","IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"confidence":"moderate","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-06","title":"PRC mineral strategy converts a critical advantage but accelerates its erosion","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","secondary_state":"Strategic fratricide","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"Export controls employ an independently supported PRC advantage in processing and magnets and have disrupted selected production, while repeated use mobilizes stockpiling, substitution, allied investment and supplier diversification.","directional_mechanism":"Licensing jurisdiction at concentrated midstream nodes delays qualified product; target adaptation reduces duration and may strengthen counter-coalitions.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F05"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C12"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P06","IS-P12","IS-P14"],"material_bound":"Denial is supported; durable policy compellence and net long-run benefit are not.","counterfactual":"Preserving the option or using it narrowly would reveal less dependency information and trigger less diversification.","source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS048","IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"confidence":"high_for_denial_moderate_for_erosion","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-07","title":"PRC overseas strategy overweights infrastructure and underweights sovereign permission","finding_state":"Execution gap","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"PRC strategy possesses exceptional financing and construction means, but its port-to-access pathway is constrained by recipient choice, security agreements, local legitimacy and nonexclusive host relationships.","directional_mechanism":"Commercial assets and relationships create option value; only host-authorized rights, exercised logistics and sustained local consent convert them into strategic access.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C11","IS-C18"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P07"],"material_bound":"Djibouti shows the gap can be closed in a bounded case; the finding does not claim that all PRC projects seek military use.","counterfactual":"Transparent, locally valuable projects paired with explicit consensual security arrangements would improve conversion without relying on debt or ownership assumptions.","source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056","IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS024","IS-AS025"],"confidence":"high_mechanism_moderate_portfolio","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-08","title":"PRC coercive strategy underweights target substitution and counter-coalition response","finding_state":"Strategic blind spot","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"Across minerals, maritime pressure and earlier trade cases, strategies convert concentrated control into tactical cost but insufficiently account for target adaptation, hardened resolve and stronger U.S./partner coordination.","directional_mechanism":"Pressure reveals dependencies and raises threat perception, which changes the target's willingness to pay for alternatives and partner protection.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F05","CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C12","IS-C15"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P06","IS-P12","IS-P14"],"material_bound":"The cases do not reveal internal PRC estimates or prove that tactical gains are never worth the feedback cost.","counterfactual":"A strategy that prices target adaptation and coalition response ex ante would employ coercion more selectively or pair it with credible accommodation.","source_ids":["CCV-AS017","CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045","IS-AS013","IS-AS026","IS-AS027","IS-AS032"],"confidence":"moderate","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-09","title":"PRC provision strategy uses its throughput advantage but lacks reliable influence conversion","finding_state":"Strategy–requirement alignment","secondary_state":"Execution gap","system":"PRC-centered","ruling":"FOCAC and development finance align strategy with PRC construction, manufacturing and financing strengths, but project performance, debt repair, host agency and trust prevent systematic conversion into alignment, access or durable influence.","directional_mechanism":"Provision supplies valued capability and repeated relationships; recipient-side outcomes and sovereign decisions determine the final strategic effect.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F03","CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C09","IS-C18"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P07"],"material_bound":"Many projects may succeed on development terms without producing or seeking geopolitical alignment.","counterfactual":"Outcome measurement, sustainable terms, local ownership and repair before crisis would improve relationship conversion and legitimacy.","source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS055","IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS021","IS-AS038","IS-AS039"],"confidence":"moderate","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-10","title":"Both systems underprotect compound common-mode dependencies","finding_state":"Strategic blind spot","system":"Both systems","ruling":"Strategies address individual chips, minerals, energy, routes, cloud and access nodes, but the independent CCV analysis shows that substitutes often share suppliers, geography, authorities or private platforms and can fail together.","directional_mechanism":"A disruption crossing multiple instruments exhausts buffers faster than single-sector plans predict and may remove both the capability and the partner mechanism used to restore it.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F04","CCV-F05","CCV-F06","CCV-F07","CCV-F08","CCV-F10"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C04","IS-C14","IS-C16"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P09","IS-P10"],"material_bound":"Public data cannot model classified inventories or every compound scenario; this is a requirement gap, not a forecast.","counterfactual":"End-to-end mission-thread stress tests with common authorities, suppliers and recovery deadlines would reveal false diversification before crisis.","source_ids":["CCV-AS020","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048","IS-AS002","IS-AS009","IS-AS010","IS-AS033"],"confidence":"moderate","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-11","title":"BRICS and FOCAC activity does not support a resource-misallocation judgment","finding_state":"Insufficient basis","system":"PRC-centered_and_multilateral","ruling":"The evidence shows extensive commitments and uncertain conversion, but lacks opportunity-cost and alternative-allocation evidence required to call the strategy a misallocation.","directional_mechanism":"None admitted: low taskability or incomplete delivery is not enough to prove that resources should have been used elsewhere.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F09"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C10"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"material_bound":"This preserves a visible nonfinding instead of converting skepticism into a policy judgment.","counterfactual":"A supported misallocation finding would require marginal returns, feasible alternatives, actual cost and a common bounded objective.","source_ids":["IS-AS018","IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"confidence":"insufficient","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"},{"gap_id":"GAP-12","title":"Taiwan strategy–requirement match remains unadjudicable from public outcomes","finding_state":"Insufficient basis","system":"Both systems","ruling":"The CCV work identifies real industrial, access, energy, semiconductor and coalition requirements, but Strategy Evaluation cannot determine from no war whether either side possesses or integrates them at the decision threshold that causes deterrence.","directional_mechanism":"Multiple observed and unobserved actions affect expectations; opponent intent and classified capabilities prevent a causal match.","ccv_input_ids":["CCV-F01","CCV-F03","CCV-F04","CCV-F06","CCV-F07","CCV-F10"],"strategy_case_ids":["IS-C14"],"strategy_pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P10","IS-P13"],"material_bound":"The finding does not imply deterrence is absent; it states that public evidence cannot attribute it.","counterfactual":"A supported match would require observable decision evidence or a close comparison connecting a defined capability change to changed opponent expectations.","source_ids":["CCV-AS007","CCV-AS010","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS030","IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"insufficient","frozen_input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1"}],"excluded_states":{"Unrealized advantage":"No high-confidence case paired a clearly usable, low-cost capability with a strategy omission and supported opportunity counterfactual.","Possible misallocation":"No case met the required opportunity-cost threshold.","Leverage opportunity":"The analysis supports leverage conditions but not a new offensive opportunity whose legality, escalation, partner authorization, target response and net self-harm all pass."},"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0","status":"gap_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Twelve gap, alignment and insufficient-basis records","tests":[{"test_id":"GAP-T01","test":"Independent input freeze","result":"pass","note":"Every gap cites frozen CCV and Strategy Evaluation identifiers."},{"test_id":"GAP-T02","test":"No circular support","result":"pass","note":"No workstream finding was upgraded because the other contained a similar claim."},{"test_id":"GAP-T03","test":"Bounded actor and objective","result":"pass","note":"Each record names a system, strategy cases and a material requirement or option."},{"test_id":"GAP-T04","test":"Directional mechanism","result":"pass","note":"Every supported gap states how strategy protects, requires, omits or damages the capability."},{"test_id":"GAP-T05","test":"Counterfactual","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Each finding includes a bounded counterfactual; no causal magnitude is invented."},{"test_id":"GAP-T06","test":"Partner and private control","result":"pass","note":"Permissioned access, technology firms and recipient choices retain actor-specific control."},{"test_id":"GAP-T07","test":"Substitution and adaptation","result":"pass","note":"Industrial, mineral, semiconductor, energy and infrastructure gaps retain adaptation."},{"test_id":"GAP-T08","test":"Self-harm and second order","result":"pass","note":"Fratricide remains visible and is not netted against short-run alignment."},{"test_id":"GAP-T09","test":"Misallocation opportunity-cost threshold","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"No misallocation finding was issued without a supported alternative and marginal-value comparison."},{"test_id":"GAP-T10","test":"Leverage net-benefit threshold","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"No offensive leverage opportunity survived law, escalation, partner and self-harm requirements."},{"test_id":"GAP-T11","test":"Insufficient findings remain visible","result":"pass","note":"BRICS/FOCAC misallocation and Taiwan deterrence matches remain insufficient."},{"test_id":"GAP-T12","test":"No aggregation","result":"pass","note":"There is no gap count as a score, net national position or overall winner."}],"sensitivity_results":["Removing Afghanistan weakens the general strategy-failure sample but does not change the industrial or permission gaps.","Removing Hambantota weakens the negative port case but does not convert finance into a general access pathway.","Treating semiconductor delay as stronger still does not establish permanent denial or target policy compliance.","Treating Russian sanctions costs as larger still does not establish war termination.","A classified Taiwan comparator could materially change GAP-12; public evidence cannot."]},"input_revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1","frozen_inputs":{"schema_version":"1.0","revision":"2026-09-19-integrity-review-1","recorded_on":"2026-09-19","evidence_cutoff":"2026-08-14","scope":"Current publication snapshot after integrity review; not a claim that these hashes were recorded at the original August 14 adjudication. Hashes detect subsequent drift, not analytical independence or truth.","regeneration_rule":"Review changes and dependent gap findings, then run python -m app.integrated_statecraft --freeze-inputs; commit the reviewed manifest with the changed inputs. A new adjudication needs a new INPUT_REVISION.","files":{"research-baseline.json":"8ee285e54c03bc4e71d0e7f26f277ee954bd4ff4ae788de8cd9ec73c473c6b78","strategy-case-findings.json":"3d5d2822d2b65b86650e3dcdf2c55de5028b13ae1065fe271466ad053f730b38","pathway-findings.json":"aa2a7eff7bdc636fbb40d22456afc054a01800392a1485f5ea48b633104fb0b9","strategy-source-register.csv":"8986bd53280328525159f1516d9b22e1483eadf4532e23ba10141547e1db412e","strategy-observations.csv":"92a4d1e4dec14b226efc396fd3d037fa152827046a88e017333da97bc1cb075e","case-register.csv":"595f39818e19467aa31a5491f3d80a07957efec4de260b8b9b8981e3c9c08587","pathway-register.csv":"99a9460f2351e40c41e32758f2b7cbef6baccfda061a0f2b03187cc708313d4f","metric-contracts.csv":"910b4a004dd97eb799bad5443bccff56c47b377a359b1a667897c66cc08cdfbc","strategy-red-team-review.json":"9c3af65f45b9e240841cfbc02984553d60235db19238e7af2750dfdcd29689ba","gap-findings.json":"96aa3529024e655a5a905ff0ea0358040390b04dd33a2a2c686cccf086980b6f","gap-red-team-review.json":"4616012dd8931f990be4aba20fa96fa91da1c88676cb2950715315d43947cc4f","critical-capabilities/portfolio-synthesis.json":"21db6662872a3182779bf8cb3c5b924d59f32cf635fe4691883da7e0c2e654fe","critical-capabilities/case-findings.json":"f25bd6e9912de2c2b22dafb4c851b89c505ef73f746ad654b6235c4f38ee01c2","critical-capabilities/response-findings.json":"85a23d56a36efd99670a159746f6f245c4499772f884419f3879594e99944076","critical-capabilities/stress-case-plan.csv":"b8a659db425e8b3db16100cbd3f3623e64de057b211ae6855da0e6d70ba92c0c","critical-capabilities/applied-source-register.csv":"d55aea052377e80b7cd27cf0a2398eedb442249e31d2d74f1eb929578efd46c4","critical-capabilities/applied-observations.csv":"2d6ede9f87caf67fac54c517cf26d4b2605527dec8cffd897e28766fc3ce3ca5","critical-capabilities/metric-contracts.csv":"20dee9868c7665bd7fdb7feef098d7c361d16e805eedc46a6840e7de69ce206a","critical-capabilities/red-team-review.json":"fd80f85cb0fcddae1becc6e3a49aa021f791bba2b1e8b111d2214c0a957602e2"},"public_sections":{"strategy":"3382a3bda4ac107373d850f59b08c02349bd533d236b9258eba6aab9224fd8aa","critical_capabilities":"c9376719cdd505ab8a410b95a4b079d0329dec554a8f1460b3f8fd5c2cbc8679"},"source_records_sha256":"7971f13379bd1b6ff5d8af75a5dfb76ec47e08ce9e183d6a00dbb0f4aa741766","gap_findings_sha256":"05ad51c1c67c175aaa550f75732df45311a86e6aa2285337fb063ce095c79acf"}},"method":{"workstream_independence":[{"id":"SE","title":"National Strategy Evaluation","type":"evaluation","focus":"How current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies select, deliver, combine, and adapt the four instruments for declared objectives","intent":"Evaluate strategic coherence, implementation, cross-instrument interaction, response, outcome, cost, durability, and adaptation","question":"Given a predeclared objective, target or recipient, geography, time window, counterfactual, acceptable cost, and persistence threshold, how coherently and effectively did the system combine its available instruments, and what explains the observed result?","unit":"A bounded national strategy, strategic objective, campaign, or phase","imports":"Instrument evidence plus strategy records, authorities, resources, delivered actions, partner and target response, outcomes, cost, and adaptation","outputs":"Objective-bounded strategy, campaign, mechanism, implementation, outcome, and comparative-pathway findings","prohibited_inference":"A strategy-document claim, simultaneous activity, domain position, or capability inventory cannot establish integration or strategic success.","charter_file":"strategy-evaluation.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_fourteen_pathways_and_red_team_complete"},{"id":"CCV","title":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","type":"international_power_and_strategic_risk","focus":"Which resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions can be converted into internationally usable state power or leverage, and which dependencies can external actors or exogenous events exploit to constrain state action, options, or stability","intent":"Identify what must be built, accessed, controlled, protected, substituted, restored, or responsibly employed to preserve freedom of action and produce bounded international effects independently of current strategy","question":"What gives a state usable power or leverage in international affairs; through what authority, delivery, and response mechanism is it converted; where can an adversary or exogenous shock disrupt that chain; and when would the resulting loss materially narrow external options, operational performance, coercion resistance, or state stability?","unit":"A source-of-power and conversion chain under a declared international objective, target or recipient, geography, time horizon, and adversarial or exogenous stress","imports":"Instrument evidence plus resource, authority, taskability, conversion, target and partner response, network position, dependency, external control, adversarial access, shock, substitution, recovery, adaptation, and strategic-effect evidence","outputs":"Power-source, conversion, strategic-dependency, vulnerability, advantage, mitigation, bounded-leverage, self-harm, recovery, and warning-indicator findings","prohibited_inference":"Domestic importance, sector size, resource possession, ownership, concentration, technical sophistication, or current strategy emphasis cannot establish internationally usable power, leverage, or strategic vulnerability. A domestic condition enters only through an evidenced mechanism that constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","charter_file":"critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities.md","analysis_status":"eighteen_cases_ten_focus_findings_twelve_responses_and_red_team_complete","architecture_directory":"critical-capabilities"}],"gap_rule":"Neither workstream can establish or strengthen the other's finding; the layer operates only after both inputs are independently supported and retain separate evidence identities.","objective_contract":["actor","declared_objective","target_or_recipient","geography","observation_window","baseline","counterfactual","success_threshold","failure_threshold","acceptable_cost","persistence_checkpoint"],"power_vulnerability_contract":["international_state_option_or_effect","source_of_power_or_leverage","state_access_authority_and_practical_control","conversion_pathway_scale_quality_place_and_time","external_target_partner_recipient_or_system_response","state_option_gain_or_loss_threshold","dependencies_control_hidden_tiers_and_common_mode","adversarial_exploitability_or_exogenous_shock","substitution_within_required_time_and_cost","strategic_functional_recovery","mobilization_throughput_and_persistence","target_partner_firm_market_and_competitor_adaptation","state_stability_mechanism_when_domestic_conditions_are_invoked","own_partner_network_legal_legitimacy_escalation_market_innovation_and_distributional_effects","evidence_rivals_observability_confidence_and_revision"],"aggregation_prohibitions":["A domain position cannot be copied into a cross-instrument conclusion.","Several simultaneous instrument actions do not establish integration without an observed connection mechanism.","An upstream resource, activity, output, commitment, reach measure, or posture cannot inherit a downstream strategic outcome.","A favorable outcome cannot be attributed to statecraft without testing target agency, partner agency, opponent adaptation, background conditions, and rival causes.","Possession of resources, production, technology, relationships, access, centrality, or audiences does not establish internationally usable power without observed state access, conversion, and external effect.","Domestic importance or disruption does not establish strategic vulnerability unless the consequence materially constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","A deficit on one side cannot establish the other side's advantage.","Missing or classified evidence remains unknown rather than zero.","The absence of war does not by itself establish deterrence, and the end of fighting does not by itself establish conflict termination or durable settlement."],"disclosure":"Independent, internally red-teamed public-source research; not an intelligence assessment, government validation, external peer review, operational target package, or national strategy.","observation_relation_rule":"Every observation link is classified from the preserved case register: direct_case overlaps the citing record's cases; cross_case_context belongs to other cases; portfolio_context has no assigned case. Context does not establish a case-specific outcome. Bibliographic source IDs resolve to URLs and admitted uses; page-level quotation locators were not recorded for every observation and are not fabricated."},"sources":[{"id":"IS-AS001","source_id":"IS-AS001","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"The Secretary General's Annual Report 2025","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C01|IS-C05|IS-C14","primary_use":"Measure allied spending, production, force integration, Ukraine support and current institutional delivery.","primary_uses":"Measure allied spending, production, force integration, Ukraine support and current institutional delivery.","limitation":"NATO-authored inputs and activity do not establish causal deterrence, adequacy or war outcome.","known_limitations":"NATO-authored inputs and activity do not establish causal deterrence, adequacy or war outcome.","url":"https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/publications-and-reports/annual-reports/sgar25-en.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by North Atlantic Treaty Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","document_id":"DOC-aabde923a49053fc","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS002","source_id":"IS-AS002","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DOD Weapon Replacement Efforts","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C01","primary_use":"Measure appropriations-to-contracts, replenishment and physical supplier constraints.","primary_uses":"Measure appropriations-to-contracts, replenishment and physical supplier constraints.","limitation":"U.S. replacement activity is not identical to delivery, Ukrainian availability or battlefield effect.","known_limitations":"U.S. replacement activity is not identical to delivery, Ukrainian availability or battlefield effect.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106649","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-5dfddbb2c7f7a045","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS003","source_id":"IS-AS003","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Ukraine Defense Contact Group National Armaments Directors fact sheet","date":"2025-01","date_or_version":"2025-01","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C01","primary_use":"Trace coalition governance from requirements through production, sustainment and partner contribution.","primary_uses":"Trace coalition governance from requirements through production, sustainment and partner contribution.","limitation":"Actor-authored coordination claims do not prove delivered sufficiency or strategic outcome.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored coordination claims do not prove delivered sufficiency or strategic outcome.","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4026238/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Defense; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Defense","document_id":"DOC-69e87bbe6e64a271","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS004","source_id":"IS-AS004","publisher":"Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction","title":"Why the Afghan Government Collapsed","date":"2022-11","date_or_version":"2022-11","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C02","primary_use":"Trace objectives, political exclusion, messaging, institutional weakness and collapse.","primary_uses":"Trace objectives, political exclusion, messaging, institutional weakness and collapse.","limitation":"Retrospective public oversight has interview and classification limits and cannot allocate all causal weight.","known_limitations":"Retrospective public oversight has interview and classification limits and cannot allocate all causal weight.","url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo220710/pdf/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo220710.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction","document_id":"DOC-573703ff4eee0ec9","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS005","source_id":"IS-AS005","publisher":"Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction","title":"Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed","date":"2023-02","date_or_version":"2023-02","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C02","primary_use":"Trace force-design, sustainment, ownership, corruption, withdrawal and battlefield failure.","primary_uses":"Trace force-design, sustainment, ownership, corruption, withdrawal and battlefield failure.","limitation":"Afghan agency and adversary choices remain important; some operational evidence is unavailable publicly.","known_limitations":"Afghan agency and adversary choices remain important; some operational evidence is unavailable publicly.","url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo220547/pdf/GOVPUB-S-PURL-gpo220547.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction","document_id":"DOC-16504c91bec9ea31","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS006","source_id":"IS-AS006","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Inherent Resolve mission in Iraq and Syria transitioning","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C06","primary_use":"Establish territorial defeat, coalition transition and the continuing ISIS threat.","primary_uses":"Establish territorial defeat, coalition transition and the continuing ISIS threat.","limitation":"Official success framing does not isolate each instrument's causal contribution or measure ideological persistence.","known_limitations":"Official success framing does not isolate each instrument's causal contribution or measure ideological persistence.","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3920032/inherent-resolve-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-transitioning/","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Defense; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Defense","document_id":"DOC-d05f679fd8b07ecc","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS007","source_id":"IS-AS007","publisher":"Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve","title":"Operation Inherent Resolve in Brief, January–March 2024","date":"2024-05","date_or_version":"2024-05","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C06","primary_use":"Cross-check continuing threat, partner forces, detention and mission requirements after territorial defeat.","primary_uses":"Cross-check continuing threat, partner forces, detention and mission requirements after territorial defeat.","limitation":"Quarterly reporting covers a limited period and an ongoing campaign.","known_limitations":"Quarterly reporting covers a limited period and an ongoing campaign.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/16/2003466738/-1/-1/1/OIR_Q2_MAR2024_BRIEF_508.PDF","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve","document_id":"DOC-5d2544b7e5b62d56","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS008","source_id":"IS-AS008","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security","title":"Commerce strengthens controls on advanced semiconductor production","date":"2024-12","date_or_version":"2024-12","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C03","primary_use":"Establish legal coverage, stated objective, controlled nodes and partner-dependent mechanism.","primary_uses":"Establish legal coverage, stated objective, controlled nodes and partner-dependent mechanism.","limitation":"Rule issuance does not establish enforcement, target delay, military effect or durable denial.","known_limitations":"Rule issuance does not establish enforcement, target delay, military effect or durable denial.","url":"https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security","document_id":"DOC-58bf458c4de920d0","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS009","source_id":"IS-AS009","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C03","primary_use":"Map segment-specific concentration, allied nodes and PRC strengths on common denominators.","primary_uses":"Map segment-specific concentration, allied nodes and PRC strengths on common denominators.","limitation":"Data lag and public market shares do not reveal classified end uses or evasion.","known_limitations":"Data lag and public market shares do not reveal classified end uses or evasion.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/mapping-the-semiconductor-value-chain_4154cdbf-en.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","document_id":"DOC-a533d09402b80f12","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS010","source_id":"IS-AS010","publisher":"European Commission","title":"REPowerEU: three years of progress phasing out Russian fossil fuels","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C04|IS-C01","primary_use":"Measure strategy implementation, substitution, demand reduction and preserved policy freedom.","primary_uses":"Measure strategy implementation, substitution, demand reduction and preserved policy freedom.","limitation":"EU aggregates do not isolate weather, recession, prices or every national distributional cost.","known_limitations":"EU aggregates do not isolate weather, recession, prices or every national distributional cost.","url":"https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/repowereu-3-years-commission-takes-stock-progress-phase-out-russian-fossil-fuels-2025-05-16_en","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by European Commission; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"European Commission","document_id":"DOC-c19d5827eded6f6d","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS011","source_id":"IS-AS011","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Gas Market Report Q1 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-01","date_or_version":"2026-01","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C04","primary_use":"Cross-check persistence of Russian pipeline-gas displacement and market adjustment.","primary_uses":"Cross-check persistence of Russian pipeline-gas displacement and market adjustment.","limitation":"Market outcomes alone do not show political causality or acceptable cost for every member.","known_limitations":"Market outcomes alone do not show political causality or acceptable cost for every member.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/gas-market-report-q1-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-ef605d31d8ec5aa9","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS012","source_id":"IS-AS012","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"Fourth U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue joint statement","date":"2024-07","date_or_version":"2024-07","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C05|IS-C15","primary_use":"Trace treaty assurance, EDCA funding, maritime cooperation and host-authorized implementation.","primary_uses":"Trace treaty assurance, EDCA funding, maritime cooperation and host-authorized implementation.","limitation":"A joint statement records commitments, not guaranteed crisis permission or deterrence.","known_limitations":"A joint statement records commitments, not guaranteed crisis permission or deterrence.","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue/","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of State; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","document_id":"DOC-15f65bdf65be682c","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS013","source_id":"IS-AS013","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea","date":"2025-03","date_or_version":"2025-03","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C05|IS-C15","primary_use":"Trace PRC pressure, Philippine response, EDCA, resupply and treaty implications.","primary_uses":"Trace PRC pressure, Philippine response, EDCA, resupply and treaty implications.","limitation":"Public legislative analysis cannot observe classified plans or prove deterrence.","known_limitations":"Public legislative analysis cannot observe classified plans or prove deterrence.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12550","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Congressional Research Service; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Congressional Research Service","document_id":"DOC-aaf121ab7d4e9ff1","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS014","source_id":"IS-AS014","publisher":"International Atomic Energy Agency","title":"IAEA Annual Report 2016 — Nuclear Verification","date":"2017","date_or_version":"2017","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Establish verified Iranian implementation and monitoring delivered by the bargain.","primary_uses":"Establish verified Iranian implementation and monitoring delivered by the bargain.","limitation":"Verification does not assign causal credit to sanctions or determine political durability.","known_limitations":"Verification does not assign causal credit to sanctions or determine political durability.","url":"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2016/gc61-3-nuclear-verification.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Atomic Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Atomic Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-9c5e345c25848351","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS015","source_id":"IS-AS015","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"JCPOA archives","date":"2013-2018","date_or_version":"2013-2018","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Trace reciprocal sanctions relief, licensing and legal implementation.","primary_uses":"Trace reciprocal sanctions relief, licensing and legal implementation.","limitation":"An actor-authored archive does not independently measure Iranian motives or partner credibility.","known_limitations":"An actor-authored archive does not independently measure Iranian motives or partner credibility.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions/joint-plan-of-action-jpoa-archive-and-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-jcpoa-archive","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","document_id":"DOC-8e1fc0aaff799bbc","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS016","source_id":"IS-AS016","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"JCPOA wind-down frequently asked questions","date":"2018-05","date_or_version":"2018-05","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Trace U.S. withdrawal, reimposition and third-party compliance burden.","primary_uses":"Trace U.S. withdrawal, reimposition and third-party compliance burden.","limitation":"Legal instructions do not measure net security effect or every partner response.","known_limitations":"Legal instructions do not measure net security effect or every partner response.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/126/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","document_id":"DOC-c27ef6473114342b","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS017","source_id":"IS-AS017","publisher":"United Nations Security Council","title":"Resolution 2231 background and implementation timeline","date":"2015-2026","date_or_version":"2015-2026","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C07","primary_use":"Cross-check multilateral endorsement, Implementation Day and later reapplication of measures.","primary_uses":"Cross-check multilateral endorsement, Implementation Day and later reapplication of measures.","limitation":"The legal chronology does not allocate responsibility for agreement collapse.","known_limitations":"The legal chronology does not allocate responsibility for agreement collapse.","url":"https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by United Nations Security Council; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations Security Council","document_id":"DOC-8302c297c5fb9462","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS018","source_id":"IS-AS018","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027)","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C08","primary_use":"Define current PRC objectives, commitments, finance, security, infrastructure and people-to-people mechanisms in Africa.","primary_uses":"Define current PRC objectives, commitments, finance, security, infrastructure and people-to-people mechanisms in Africa.","limitation":"Actor-authored commitments and announced finance are not delivery, recipient benefit or influence.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored commitments and announced finance are not delivery, recipient benefit or influence.","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485719.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"PRC official primary","language":"English","provenance":"PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs official English-language publication on mfa.gov.cn; actor-authored statement, not independent verification of effects.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","document_id":"DOC-b068482a0244d636","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS019","source_id":"IS-AS019","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"International Infrastructure Projects: China's Investments Significantly Outpace the U.S.","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C08|IS-C11|IS-C18","primary_use":"Compare financing scale and separate provision from host outcomes and access.","primary_uses":"Compare financing scale and separate provision from host outcomes and access.","limitation":"Selected-sector estimates do not establish strategic intent, recipient agency or military rights.","known_limitations":"Selected-sector estimates do not establish strategic intent, recipient agency or military rights.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106866","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-afc5e1d5a89576af","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS020","source_id":"IS-AS020","publisher":"World Bank","title":"World Bank COVID-19 Response","date":"2020-2022","date_or_version":"2020-2022","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C09","primary_use":"Measure scale, instruments, country coverage and vaccine-deployment support.","primary_uses":"Measure scale, instruments, country coverage and vaccine-deployment support.","limitation":"Bank-authored commitments and approvals do not equal disbursement, outcome or U.S. strategic influence.","known_limitations":"Bank-authored commitments and approvals do not equal disbursement, outcome or U.S. strategic influence.","url":"https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/10/14/world-bank-covid-19-response","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by World Bank; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Bank","document_id":"DOC-fb8c1a95d3d0d9f1","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS021","source_id":"IS-AS021","publisher":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","title":"COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility","date":"2020-2023","date_or_version":"2020-2023","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C09","primary_use":"Measure AIIB facility size, project mix, members and operational response.","primary_uses":"Measure AIIB facility size, project mix, members and operational response.","limitation":"Approvals and cofinance do not establish comparative development effect or PRC control.","known_limitations":"Approvals and cofinance do not establish comparative development effect or PRC control.","url":"https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility/index.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","document_id":"DOC-b86067ac606b0d0f","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS022","source_id":"IS-AS022","publisher":"BRICS Brazil","title":"Rio de Janeiro Declaration","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C10","primary_use":"Define the expanded group's agreed agenda, institutional claims and commitments.","primary_uses":"Define the expanded group's agreed agenda, institutional claims and commitments.","limitation":"Consensus declaration language does not establish implementation, common strategy or member alignment.","known_limitations":"Consensus declaration language does not establish implementation, common strategy or member alignment.","url":"https://brics.br/en/documents/presidency-documents/250705-brics-leaders-declaration-en.pdf/%40%40download/file","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by BRICS Brazil; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"BRICS Brazil","document_id":"DOC-69eef1e92f29bd59","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS023","source_id":"IS-AS023","publisher":"BRICS Brazil","title":"BRICS Summit signs 126 commitments in Rio","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C10","primary_use":"Cross-check the breadth and reader-facing characterization of summit outputs.","primary_uses":"Cross-check the breadth and reader-facing characterization of summit outputs.","limitation":"Host-presidency framing overstates coherence unless delivery and member behavior follow.","known_limitations":"Host-presidency framing overstates coherence unless delivery and member behavior follow.","url":"https://brics.br/en/news/brics-summit-signs-historic-commitment-in-rio-for-more-inclusive-and-sustainable-governance","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by BRICS Brazil; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"BRICS Brazil","document_id":"DOC-508cf1628bdb19f2","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS024","source_id":"IS-AS024","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"China's Engagement in Djibouti","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C11","primary_use":"Trace infrastructure, host incentives, defense agreement, base use and nonexclusive access.","primary_uses":"Trace infrastructure, host incentives, defense agreement, base use and nonexclusive access.","limitation":"One case cannot establish a general port-to-base strategy.","known_limitations":"One case cannot establish a general port-to-base strategy.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11304","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Congressional Research Service; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Congressional Research Service","document_id":"DOC-e54315ff1704416b","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS025","source_id":"IS-AS025","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Sri Lanka 2018 Article IV Consultation and Fourth EFF Review","date":"2018-06","date_or_version":"2018-06","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C11|IS-C18","primary_use":"Separate Hambantota's concession, financing and fiscal purpose from broader debt claims.","primary_uses":"Separate Hambantota's concession, financing and fiscal purpose from broader debt claims.","limitation":"The report predates default and does not expose every contract or political channel.","known_limitations":"The report predates default and does not expose every contract or political channel.","url":"https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2018/175/article-A001-en.xml","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Monetary Fund; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Monetary Fund","document_id":"DOC-773126cba22d14de","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS026","source_id":"IS-AS026","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C12","primary_use":"Measure refining concentration, realized disruptions, controls and diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure refining concentration, realized disruptions, controls and diversification.","limitation":"Energy-sector data are not a complete defense bill of materials and forecasts may slip.","known_limitations":"Energy-sector data are not a complete defense bill of materials and forecasts may slip.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-daa68a890efde72d","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS027","source_id":"IS-AS027","publisher":"Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry","title":"White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2025 — supply-chain resilience","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C12","primary_use":"Trace target adaptation after the 2010 rare-earth shock.","primary_uses":"Trace target adaptation after the 2010 rare-earth shock.","limitation":"A target-government retrospective may understate private cost and contested attribution.","known_limitations":"A target-government retrospective may understate private cost and contested attribution.","url":"https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/wp2025/pdf/2-1-4.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry","document_id":"DOC-d8fbde8dd2d0184f","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS028","source_id":"IS-AS028","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"Joint Trilateral Statement by China, Saudi Arabia and Iran","date":"2023-03","date_or_version":"2023-03","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C13","primary_use":"Define the bounded objective, roadmap, sovereignty terms and China's facilitation role.","primary_uses":"Define the bounded objective, roadmap, sovereignty terms and China's facilitation role.","limitation":"A joint success statement does not establish China's unique causal contribution or wider regional peace.","known_limitations":"A joint success statement does not establish China's unique causal contribution or wider regional peace.","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367487.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"PRC official primary","language":"English","provenance":"PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs official English-language publication on mfa.gov.cn; actor-authored statement, not independent verification of effects.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","document_id":"DOC-7ccb0ef062f10892","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS029","source_id":"IS-AS029","publisher":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","title":"Third China-Iran-Saudi Arabia Trilateral Joint Committee press release","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C13","primary_use":"Test persistence of diplomatic restoration and continued trilateral follow-up.","primary_uses":"Test persistence of diplomatic restoration and continued trilateral follow-up.","limitation":"Actor-authored follow-up does not independently measure trust or effects on regional conflicts.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored follow-up does not independently measure trust or effects on regional conflicts.","url":"https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/xwlb_663592/202512/t20251210_11770309.html","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"PRC official primary","language":"English","provenance":"PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs official English-language publication on mfa.gov.cn; actor-authored statement, not independent verification of effects.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China","document_id":"DOC-2ba1e12f7addf299","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS030","source_id":"IS-AS030","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues","date":"2026-02","date_or_version":"2026-02","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C14","primary_use":"Assess U.S. policy, PRC coercion, military support and the difficulty of deterrence inference.","primary_uses":"Assess U.S. policy, PRC coercion, military support and the difficulty of deterrence inference.","limitation":"Public analysis cannot observe decision thresholds or establish why conflict has not occurred.","known_limitations":"Public analysis cannot observe decision thresholds or establish why conflict has not occurred.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12481","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Congressional Research Service; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Congressional Research Service","document_id":"DOC-83f710478314d2ab","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS031","source_id":"IS-AS031","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2025","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C11|IS-C14|IS-C15","primary_use":"Assess PLA modernization, coercion, overseas access and operational activity.","primary_uses":"Assess PLA modernization, coercion, overseas access and operational activity.","limitation":"Competitor assessment with classified evidence omitted; claims require corroboration where decisive.","known_limitations":"Competitor assessment with classified evidence omitted; claims require corroboration where decisive.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Defense; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Defense","document_id":"DOC-2b99e412278b0093","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS032","source_id":"IS-AS032","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C15","primary_use":"Trace PRC gray-zone gains, U.S. policy, legal positions and alliance response.","primary_uses":"Trace PRC gray-zone gains, U.S. policy, legal positions and alliance response.","limitation":"Public legislative analysis cannot resolve classified plans or causal deterrence.","known_limitations":"Public legislative analysis cannot resolve classified plans or causal deterrence.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42784","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Congressional Research Service; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Congressional Research Service","document_id":"DOC-382b03c8ba9a11e9","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS033","source_id":"IS-AS033","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce","title":"IPEF Supply Chain Agreement entry into force","date":"2024-01","date_or_version":"2024-01","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C16","primary_use":"Establish legal entry into force, participants and planned institutions.","primary_uses":"Establish legal entry into force, participants and planned institutions.","limitation":"Agreement architecture and ratification do not establish crisis performance or supply diversification.","known_limitations":"Agreement architecture and ratification do not establish crisis performance or supply diversification.","url":"https://www.commerce.gov/node/6542","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Commerce; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Commerce","document_id":"DOC-0f632b2e9e2f8e0d","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS034","source_id":"IS-AS034","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce","title":"IPEF Ministerial Meeting in Singapore","date":"2024-06","date_or_version":"2024-06","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C16","primary_use":"Trace operationalization of the Supply Chain Council, Crisis Response Network and Labor Rights Advisory Board.","primary_uses":"Trace operationalization of the Supply Chain Council, Crisis Response Network and Labor Rights Advisory Board.","limitation":"Named officials and bodies do not prove tested response or economic effect.","known_limitations":"Named officials and bodies do not prove tested response or economic effect.","url":"https://www.commerce.gov/node/6774","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Commerce; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Commerce","document_id":"DOC-81b44e5a1e932079","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS035","source_id":"IS-AS035","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"Appellate Body Members","date":"2026-current","date_or_version":"2026-current","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C17","primary_use":"Establish continuing vacancies and inability to hear appeals.","primary_uses":"Establish continuing vacancies and inability to hear appeals.","limitation":"Institutional status does not adjudicate U.S. substantive complaints or reform counterfactuals.","known_limitations":"Institutional status does not adjudicate U.S. substantive complaints or reform counterfactuals.","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by World Trade Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Trade Organization","document_id":"DOC-ab60af0004fcb1db","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS036","source_id":"IS-AS036","publisher":"Office of the United States Trade Representative","title":"Report on the Appellate Body of the WTO","date":"2020-02","date_or_version":"2020-02","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C17","primary_use":"State the U.S. theory of legal overreach and intended reform pressure.","primary_uses":"State the U.S. theory of legal overreach and intended reform pressure.","limitation":"Actor-authored critique is not an independent assessment and does not provide a delivered reform plan.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored critique is not an independent assessment and does not provide a delivered reform plan.","url":"https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Office of the United States Trade Representative; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Office of the United States Trade Representative","document_id":"DOC-ab26a0ec9f33d4be","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS037","source_id":"IS-AS037","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"MPIA award in EU-China intellectual-property dispute","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C17","primary_use":"Establish that alternative appeal arbitration operates for participating members including China and the EU.","primary_uses":"Establish that alternative appeal arbitration operates for participating members including China and the EU.","limitation":"Two awards do not replace universal dispute settlement or prove superior design.","known_limitations":"Two awards do not replace universal dispute settlement or prove superior design.","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/ds611arb25_21jul25_e.htm","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by World Trade Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Trade Organization","document_id":"DOC-2b8b85049f105748","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS038","source_id":"IS-AS038","publisher":"AidData","title":"Belt and Road Reboot","date":"2023-11","date_or_version":"2023-11","kind":"Independent research","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","coverage":"IS-C18|IS-C08","primary_use":"Measure delivery scale, troubled projects, rescue lending and PRC portfolio adaptation.","primary_uses":"Measure delivery scale, troubled projects, rescue lending and PRC portfolio adaptation.","limitation":"Research dataset coverage ends before current commitments; strategic intent and recipient outcomes vary by project.","known_limitations":"Research dataset coverage ends before current commitments; strategic intent and recipient outcomes vary by project.","url":"https://www.aiddata.org/publications/belt-and-road-reboot","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent research","language":"English","provenance":"Published by AidData; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_research","institutional_family":"AidData","document_id":"DOC-26cf810ece81aa00","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS039","source_id":"IS-AS039","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Sovereign debt restructuring process is improving","date":"2024-06","date_or_version":"2024-06","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C18","primary_use":"Trace cooperative restructuring and China's participation with other official creditors.","primary_uses":"Trace cooperative restructuring and China's participation with other official creditors.","limitation":"Process-time improvements do not establish borrower welfare, relationship repair or future lending quality.","known_limitations":"Process-time improvements do not establish borrower welfare, relationship repair or future lending quality.","url":"https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2024/06/26/sovereign-debt-restructuring-process-is-improving-amid-cooperation-and-reform","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Monetary Fund; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Monetary Fund","document_id":"DOC-a6f3c2112885c19c","original_title":""},{"id":"IS-AS040","source_id":"IS-AS040","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"China: With Nearly All U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed","date":"2024-10","date_or_version":"2024-10","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"IS-C08|IS-C10","primary_use":"Test people-to-people network durability and host agency against exposure claims.","primary_uses":"Test people-to-people network durability and host agency against exposure claims.","limitation":"The U.S. host sample cannot represent Africa or the Global South and does not measure prior influence.","known_limitations":"The U.S. host sample cannot represent Africa or the Global South and does not measure prior influence.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105981","workstream":"National Strategy Evaluation","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-836c4ac2d7eb0250","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS001","source_id":"CCV-AS001","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"External Sector Report 2025 — Chapter 2: International Monetary System","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"reserve currencies, cross-border finance, network effects, fragmentation","primary_use":"Measure dollar persistence, renminbi constraints, and network-erosion risks.","primary_uses":"Measure dollar persistence, renminbi constraints, and network-erosion risks.","limitation":"System-level shares do not establish coercive success in a particular case; reserve composition also reflects valuation and market demand.","known_limitations":"System-level shares do not establish coercive success in a particular case; reserve composition also reflects valuation and market demand.","url":"https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/esr/2025/english/ch2.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Monetary Fund; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Monetary Fund","document_id":"DOC-bb91326233c38585","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS002","source_id":"CCV-AS002","publisher":"Bank for International Settlements","title":"Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign exchange turnover in April 2025","date":"2025-09","date_or_version":"2025-09","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"global foreign-exchange market","primary_use":"Measure currency intermediation and compare dollar and renminbi use on a common turnover denominator.","primary_uses":"Measure currency intermediation and compare dollar and renminbi use on a common turnover denominator.","limitation":"A currency appears on both sides of a trade; turnover is not reserves, invoicing, safe-asset supply, or state leverage.","known_limitations":"A currency appears on both sides of a trade; turnover is not reserves, invoicing, safe-asset supply, or state leverage.","url":"https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx25_fx.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Bank for International Settlements; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Bank for International Settlements","document_id":"DOC-91228611fae794b1","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS003","source_id":"CCV-AS003","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves","date":"2026-current","date_or_version":"2026-current","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"allocated official reserves","primary_use":"Measure current reserve shares and diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure current reserve shares and diversification.","limitation":"Reported reserves exclude unallocated holdings and cannot identify political motive or crisis usability.","known_limitations":"Reported reserves exclude unallocated holdings and cannot identify political motive or crisis usability.","url":"https://data.imf.org/en/datasets/IMF.STA%3ACOFER","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Monetary Fund; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Monetary Fund","document_id":"DOC-422ee15c8f4bb48d","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS004","source_id":"CCV-AS004","publisher":"People's Bank of China","title":"2025 RMB Internationalization Report","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"renminbi settlement, CIPS, cross-border use","primary_use":"Measure growth in PRC-centered payment infrastructure and international renminbi activity.","primary_uses":"Measure growth in PRC-centered payment infrastructure and international renminbi activity.","limitation":"Actor-authored activity measures do not establish convertibility, user trust, safe-asset depth, or displacement of dollar networks.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored activity measures do not establish convertibility, user trust, safe-asset depth, or displacement of dollar networks.","url":"https://www.pbc.gov.cn/huobizhengceersi/214481/3871621/5885243/2025122616492523798.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"PRC official primary","language":"Chinese and English","provenance":"People’s Bank of China official bilingual report on pbc.gov.cn; Chinese original and publisher English text. Actor-reported payments and infrastructure measures, not independent verification of monetary trust.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"People's Bank of China","document_id":"DOC-d8b1f31c026a446c","original_title":"人民币国际化报告（2025）"},{"id":"CCV-AS005","source_id":"CCV-AS005","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"The Secretary General's Annual Report 2025","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"allied spending, forces, production, exercises, partnerships","primary_use":"Measure scale and current delivery potential in the U.S.-anchored treaty network.","primary_uses":"Measure scale and current delivery potential in the U.S.-anchored treaty network.","limitation":"NATO-authored aggregate capacity does not establish scenario-specific national authorization, timely delivery, or deterrence.","known_limitations":"NATO-authored aggregate capacity does not establish scenario-specific national authorization, timely delivery, or deterrence.","url":"https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/publications-and-reports/annual-reports/sgar25-en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by North Atlantic Treaty Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","document_id":"DOC-aabde923a49053fc","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS006","source_id":"CCV-AS006","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Defense Logistics Agreements: DOD Should Improve Oversight and Seek Payment from Foreign Partners","date":"2020-03","date_or_version":"2020-03","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with foreign partners","primary_use":"Establish the breadth and practical logistics mechanism of partner exchange while exposing oversight gaps.","primary_uses":"Establish the breadth and practical logistics mechanism of partner exchange while exposing oversight gaps.","limitation":"Agreement eligibility and orders do not establish high-end crisis permission, survivability, or adequate throughput.","known_limitations":"Agreement eligibility and orders do not establish high-end crisis permission, survivability, or adequate throughput.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-309","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-67f1c38050e82d5c","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS007","source_id":"CCV-AS007","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2025","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"PLA capabilities, space, overseas logistics and basing","primary_use":"Assess PRC military conversion, Djibouti use, overseas access, and expanding space capability.","primary_uses":"Assess PRC military conversion, Djibouti use, overseas access, and expanding space capability.","limitation":"U.S. government assessment of a competitor; public evidence is incomplete and claims require corroboration where decisive.","known_limitations":"U.S. government assessment of a competitor; public evidence is incomplete and claims require corroboration where decisive.","url":"https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Defense; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Defense","document_id":"DOC-2b99e412278b0093","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS008","source_id":"CCV-AS008","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Navy and Coast Guard Shipbuilding: A Disciplined, Strategy-Driven Approach Is Needed","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"U.S. naval shipbuilding output, delay, cost, infrastructure and workforce","primary_use":"Measure delivered U.S. shipbuilding throughput against declared production goals.","primary_uses":"Measure delivered U.S. shipbuilding throughput against declared production goals.","limitation":"Program performance does not alone compare combat effectiveness or prove how quickly reforms can change output.","known_limitations":"Program performance does not alone compare combat effectiveness or prove how quickly reforms can change output.","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-109068/index.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-7f0ea4bc27d8d00b","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS009","source_id":"CCV-AS009","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Shipbuilding and Repair: Navy Needs a Strategic Approach for Private Sector Industrial Base Investments","date":"2025-02","date_or_version":"2025-02","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"seven U.S. battle-force shipbuilders and supplier base","primary_use":"Assess capacity, workforce, infrastructure, repair, and commercial-base constraints.","primary_uses":"Assess capacity, workforce, infrastructure, repair, and commercial-base constraints.","limitation":"The report covers the U.S. system and does not provide a matched PRC cost, quality, or wartime conversion comparison.","known_limitations":"The report covers the U.S. system and does not provide a matched PRC cost, quality, or wartime conversion comparison.","url":"https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-106286/index.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-108f33fec579a3f5","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS010","source_id":"CCV-AS010","publisher":"U.S. Military Sealift Command","title":"Military Sealift Command 2025 Handbook","date":"2025-12","date_or_version":"2025-12","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"surge sealift, fleet age, repair and wartime movement","primary_use":"Connect merchant and support shipping to force projection and identify the declared readiness threshold.","primary_uses":"Connect merchant and support shipping to force projection and identify the declared readiness threshold.","limitation":"Actor-authored summary; it does not model attrition, adversary action, mariner availability, or scenario-specific delivery.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored summary; it does not model attrition, adversary action, mariner availability, or scenario-specific delivery.","url":"https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/Portals/43/Publications/Handbook/MSCHandbook2025-12.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Military Sealift Command; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Military Sealift Command","document_id":"DOC-1b19a6e403c84788","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS011","source_id":"CCV-AS011","publisher":"UN Trade and Development","title":"Review of Maritime Transport 2025 — Chapter 2","date":"2025-09","date_or_version":"2025-09","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"fleet ownership, shipbuilding orderbooks, seaborne trade and rerouting","primary_use":"Compare PRC shipbuilding and fleet position on common global denominators.","primary_uses":"Compare PRC shipbuilding and fleet position on common global denominators.","limitation":"Commercial orderbook and ownership do not establish naval quality, state taskability, crew availability, or overseas military access.","known_limitations":"Commercial orderbook and ownership do not establish naval quality, state taskability, crew availability, or overseas military access.","url":"https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025ch2_en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by UN Trade and Development; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"UN Trade and Development","document_id":"DOC-493173419d921923","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS012","source_id":"CCV-AS012","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Energy Technology Perspectives 2026: Energy technology manufacturing and trade","date":"2026-04","date_or_version":"2026-04","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"clean-technology manufacturing and exports","primary_use":"Measure PRC production and trade scale in power, transport, and industrial technologies.","primary_uses":"Measure PRC production and trade scale in power, transport, and industrial technologies.","limitation":"Clean-technology market position does not transfer automatically to military output or coercive leverage.","known_limitations":"Clean-technology market position does not transfer automatically to military output or coercive leverage.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2026/energy-technology-manufacturing-and-trade","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-b0566324c7ebf929","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS013","source_id":"CCV-AS013","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Advancing Clean Technology Manufacturing — Executive Summary","date":"2024-05","date_or_version":"2024-05","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"solar, batteries, wind, electrolysers and heat pumps","primary_use":"Compare manufacturing concentration and facility-cost differences.","primary_uses":"Compare manufacturing concentration and facility-cost differences.","limitation":"Forecasts and announced projects may not become qualified output; product quality and policy support vary.","known_limitations":"Forecasts and announced projects may not become qualified output; product quality and policy support vary.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/advancing-clean-technology-manufacturing/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-aadbab027f8a9052","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS014","source_id":"CCV-AS014","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"strategic mineral mining, refining, controls and diversification","primary_use":"Measure concentration, observed 2025 disruption, and the pace of diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure concentration, observed 2025 disruption, and the pace of diversification.","limitation":"Energy-transition coverage is broader than defense demand; future projects may slip and product-level substitutability varies.","known_limitations":"Energy-transition coverage is broader than defense demand; future projects may slip and product-level substitutability varies.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-daa68a890efde72d","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS015","source_id":"CCV-AS015","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Rare earth elements — Executive Summary","date":"2025-11","date_or_version":"2025-11","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"rare-earth mining, refining and permanent magnets","primary_use":"Measure PRC concentration at successive stages and downstream exposure.","primary_uses":"Measure PRC concentration at successive stages and downstream exposure.","limitation":"Modeled exposure is not a forecast of a complete cutoff, target policy change, or successful coercion.","known_limitations":"Modeled exposure is not a forecast of a complete cutoff, target policy change, or successful coercion.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/rare-earth-elements/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-0f178a13170f2fc0","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS016","source_id":"CCV-AS016","publisher":"U.S. Geological Survey","title":"Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026","date":"2026-01","date_or_version":"2026-01","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"production, processing, import reliance and reserves","primary_use":"Cross-check material-specific concentration and U.S. import exposure.","primary_uses":"Cross-check material-specific concentration and U.S. import exposure.","limitation":"National aggregates can conceal product quality, inventories, ownership, qualification and re-export paths.","known_limitations":"National aggregates can conceal product quality, inventories, ownership, qualification and re-export paths.","url":"https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Geological Survey; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Geological Survey","document_id":"DOC-140c4ad894bf8de2","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS017","source_id":"CCV-AS017","publisher":"Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry","title":"White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2025 — Supply-chain resilience and critical minerals","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Japan's rare-earth response and later import structure","primary_use":"Measure the 2010 shock response, diversification, substitution and persistence.","primary_uses":"Measure the 2010 shock response, diversification, substitution and persistence.","limitation":"Japan-authored retrospective may understate private adaptation costs and does not prove the exact cause of every 2010 shipment interruption.","known_limitations":"Japan-authored retrospective may understate private adaptation costs and does not prove the exact cause of every 2010 shipment interruption.","url":"https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/wp2025/pdf/2-1-4.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry","document_id":"DOC-d8fbde8dd2d0184f","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS018","source_id":"CCV-AS018","publisher":"World Trade Organization","title":"DS432: China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum","date":"2012-2015","date_or_version":"2012-2015","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"challenged measures, findings and implementation","primary_use":"Establish the legal measures, multilateral response and removal of disputed restrictions.","primary_uses":"Establish the legal measures, multilateral response and removal of disputed restrictions.","limitation":"The dispute concerns formal export restrictions and does not adjudicate the separate claim of an informal Japan-specific embargo.","known_limitations":"The dispute concerns formal export restrictions and does not adjudicate the separate claim of an informal Japan-specific embargo.","url":"https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds432_e.htm","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by World Trade Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Trade Organization","document_id":"DOC-0dc246ef998c8136","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS019","source_id":"CCV-AS019","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"semiconductor segments, trade links, concentration and dependencies","primary_use":"Map the full stack and prevent fabrication share from standing in for control of tools, materials, design or end use.","primary_uses":"Map the full stack and prevent fabrication share from standing in for control of tools, materials, design or end use.","limitation":"Some input-output data lag fast-moving capacity and do not reveal classified end uses, inventories or evasion.","known_limitations":"Some input-output data lag fast-moving capacity and do not reveal classified end uses, inventories or evasion.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/mapping-the-semiconductor-value-chain_4154cdbf-en.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","document_id":"DOC-a533d09402b80f12","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS020","source_id":"CCV-AS020","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Economic Security in a Changing World — Special Focus: Semiconductor Value Chains","date":"2025-10","date_or_version":"2025-10","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"specialized tools, EDA, lithography and geographic concentration","primary_use":"Identify high-control niche layers and common-mode dependencies.","primary_uses":"Identify high-control niche layers and common-mode dependencies.","limitation":"Several market-share inputs originate in industry studies; share does not establish state control or durable denial.","known_limitations":"Several market-share inputs originate in industry studies; share does not establish state control or durable denial.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/economic-security-in-a-changing-world_4eac89c7-en/full-report/special-focus-semiconductor-value-chains_dc772986.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","document_id":"DOC-3ad7b8218c91ac2a","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS021","source_id":"CCV-AS021","publisher":"U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security","title":"Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China's Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors","date":"2024-12","date_or_version":"2024-12","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"advanced-node equipment, software, HBM and foreign-direct-product controls","primary_use":"Establish the controlled nodes, legal reach and stated security mechanism.","primary_uses":"Establish the controlled nodes, legal reach and stated security mechanism.","limitation":"Rule scope and actor theory do not establish enforcement, net delay, military effect, partner cost or target response.","known_limitations":"Rule scope and actor theory do not establish enforcement, net delay, military effect, partner cost or target response.","url":"https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced-semiconductors-military","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security","document_id":"DOC-58bf458c4de920d0","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS022","source_id":"CCV-AS022","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"U.S. Export Controls and China's Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Industries","date":"2025-11","date_or_version":"2025-11","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"controls, gaps, partner rules, workarounds and PRC adaptation","primary_use":"Assess implementation, leakage, modified products and indigenous substitution.","primary_uses":"Assess implementation, leakage, modified products and indigenous substitution.","limitation":"Public information cannot resolve classified end uses or construct a precise no-controls counterfactual.","known_limitations":"Public information cannot resolve classified end uses or construct a precise no-controls counterfactual.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48642/R48642.1.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Congressional Research Service; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Congressional Research Service","document_id":"DOC-919ca04fccc09ab3","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS023","source_id":"CCV-AS023","publisher":"National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics","title":"The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 2026","date":"2026-03","date_or_version":"2026-03","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"R&D, publications, talent, venture capital, KTI manufacturing and services","primary_use":"Compare innovation inputs, high-impact outputs, manufacturing absorption, services and talent dependence.","primary_uses":"Compare innovation inputs, high-impact outputs, manufacturing absorption, services and talent dependence.","limitation":"National aggregates mix public and private actors and cannot establish government taskability or a single innovation leader.","known_limitations":"National aggregates mix public and private actors and cannot establish government taskability or a single innovation leader.","url":"https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsbsep20261/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics","document_id":"DOC-68284c7b4fbe5efb","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS024","source_id":"CCV-AS024","publisher":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","title":"Competition in the Provision of Cloud Computing Services","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"hyperscaler concentration, switching, egress and competition","primary_use":"Assess the privately controlled digital layer and common-provider exposure.","primary_uses":"Assess the privately controlled digital layer and common-provider exposure.","limitation":"Jurisdictional market estimates differ by year and method; commercial leadership is not automatic state capability.","known_limitations":"Jurisdictional market estimates differ by year and method; commercial leadership is not automatic state capability.","url":"https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/05/competition-in-the-provision-of-cloud-computing-services_f42582ad/595859c5-en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development","document_id":"DOC-cd199b1d46ae7a90","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS025","source_id":"CCV-AS025","publisher":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","title":"The United States remained the world's largest liquefied natural gas exporter in 2024","date":"2025-03","date_or_version":"2025-03","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"U.S. LNG production, exports and destinations","primary_use":"Assess energy supply as a source of partner support and external flexibility.","primary_uses":"Assess energy supply as a source of partner support and external flexibility.","limitation":"Export volume does not establish discretionary state control, spare capacity, affordability or recipient policy change.","known_limitations":"Export volume does not establish discretionary state control, spare capacity, affordability or recipient policy change.","url":"https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64844","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Energy Information Administration; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","document_id":"DOC-44846918f05760cd","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS026","source_id":"CCV-AS026","publisher":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","title":"China's crude oil imports decreased from a record as refinery activity slowed","date":"2025-02","date_or_version":"2025-02","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"PRC oil consumption, domestic production, imports and suppliers","primary_use":"Measure the scale and diversity of PRC crude import dependence.","primary_uses":"Measure the scale and diversity of PRC crude import dependence.","limitation":"Trade data do not establish wartime stockpiles, demand reduction, pipeline availability or exploitable denial.","known_limitations":"Trade data do not establish wartime stockpiles, demand reduction, pipeline availability or exploitable denial.","url":"https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=64544","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Energy Information Administration; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","document_id":"DOC-2825896586ba1dd8","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS027","source_id":"CCV-AS027","publisher":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","title":"World Oil Transit Chokepoints","date":"2026-03","date_or_version":"2026-03","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"oil and LNG flows through Malacca and other chokepoints","primary_use":"Measure route concentration and alternative-route constraints.","primary_uses":"Measure route concentration and alternative-route constraints.","limitation":"Flow exposure is not adversary control; rerouting, pipelines, stocks and escalation can bound vulnerability and exploitability.","known_limitations":"Flow exposure is not adversary control; rerouting, pipelines, stocks and escalation can bound vulnerability and exploitability.","url":"https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Energy Information Administration; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Energy Information Administration","document_id":"DOC-707e48468fd1fad3","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS028","source_id":"CCV-AS028","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"International Infrastructure Projects: China's Investments Significantly Outpace the U.S.","date":"2024-09","date_or_version":"2024-09","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"BRI and U.S. overseas infrastructure finance, delivery and host effects","primary_use":"Compare upstream provision scale while retaining recipient benefit, debt and strategic-conversion tests.","primary_uses":"Compare upstream provision scale while retaining recipient benefit, debt and strategic-conversion tests.","limitation":"Funding estimates do not establish ownership, military rights, political compliance, durability or exclusivity.","known_limitations":"Funding estimates do not establish ownership, military rights, political compliance, durability or exclusivity.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106866","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-afc5e1d5a89576af","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS029","source_id":"CCV-AS029","publisher":"Congressional Research Service","title":"China's Engagement in Djibouti","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"PRC finance, port relationships and first overseas base","primary_use":"Trace the Djibouti conversion sequence and host incentives.","primary_uses":"Trace the Djibouti conversion sequence and host incentives.","limitation":"A single small host and base cannot establish a general infrastructure-to-access pathway.","known_limitations":"A single small host and base cannot establish a general infrastructure-to-access pathway.","url":"https://www.congress.gov/crs-products/product/pdf/IF/IF11304/1","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Congressional Research Service; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Congressional Research Service","document_id":"DOC-e54315ff1704416b","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS030","source_id":"CCV-AS030","publisher":"Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","title":"TSMC 2024 Annual Report","date":"2025-04","date_or_version":"2025-04","kind":"Corporate primary disclosure","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"foundry scale, geographic concentration, continuity and overseas expansion","primary_use":"Measure strategic production position, dependencies, earthquake loss and diversification.","primary_uses":"Measure strategic production position, dependencies, earthquake loss and diversification.","limitation":"Company-authored risk and performance disclosure cannot fully reveal customer inventories, defense use or systemic counterfactuals.","known_limitations":"Company-authored risk and performance disclosure cannot fully reveal customer inventories, defense use or systemic counterfactuals.","url":"https://investor.tsmc.com/static/annualReports/2024/english/index.html","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Corporate primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","document_id":"DOC-bc89030129d5a028","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS031","source_id":"CCV-AS031","publisher":"U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","title":"TSMC Statement on April 3rd Earthquake, Form 6-K","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"Corporate primary disclosure","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"event response and tool recovery","primary_use":"Measure actual degradation and early functional recovery after a large exogenous shock.","primary_uses":"Measure actual degradation and early functional recovery after a large exogenous shock.","limitation":"Early company statement is not independent and does not measure every customer or downstream effect.","known_limitations":"Early company statement is not independent and does not measure every customer or downstream effect.","url":"https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1046179/000104617924000034/a20240403.htm","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Corporate primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","document_id":"DOC-e5d8f3353ec550cd","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS032","source_id":"CCV-AS032","publisher":"U.S. Space Force","title":"International Partnership Strategy","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"allied, partner and commercial space integration","primary_use":"Identify exercised cooperative mechanisms and the role of international geography in space power.","primary_uses":"Identify exercised cooperative mechanisms and the role of international geography in space power.","limitation":"Strategy and selected examples are actor theory and inputs; they do not establish wartime survivability or comparative effect.","known_limitations":"Strategy and selected examples are actor theory and inputs; they do not establish wartime survivability or comparative effect.","url":"https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/2/Documents/SAF_2025/USSF%20International%20Partnership%20Strategy.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Space Force; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Space Force","document_id":"DOC-31abcdc9195311ea","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS033","source_id":"CCV-AS033","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Space Operations: DOD Is Pursuing Collaboration with Allies and Partners but Needs to Address Key Challenges","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"implementation of allied space collaboration","primary_use":"Test conversion limits in staffing, authority, coordination and information sharing.","primary_uses":"Test conversion limits in staffing, authority, coordination and information sharing.","limitation":"Public oversight cannot observe classified integration, adversary counterspace or operational outcomes.","known_limitations":"Public oversight cannot observe classified integration, adversary counterspace or operational outcomes.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108043","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-fa8d6007aa0f5b0f","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS034","source_id":"CCV-AS034","publisher":"National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics","title":"Translation to Impact: U.S. and Global Science, Technology, and Innovation Output","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"KTI value added, semiconductor production and services","primary_use":"Compare sector-specific output and distinguish services from manufacturing.","primary_uses":"Compare sector-specific output and distinguish services from manufacturing.","limitation":"Value added does not establish physical units, quality, state control or strategic availability.","known_limitations":"Value added does not establish physical units, quality, state control or strategic availability.","url":"https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20262/production-patterns-of-knowledge-and-technology-intensive-industries","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics","document_id":"DOC-89a915f85daad05d","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS035","source_id":"CCV-AS035","publisher":"Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","title":"TSMC Arizona and U.S. Department of Commerce Announce Proposed CHIPS Funding and Third Fab","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"Corporate primary disclosure","evidence_tier":"Tier 2","coverage":"planned geographic diversification of leading-edge production","primary_use":"Document the scale, timing and node of a major diversification pathway.","primary_uses":"Document the scale, timing and node of a major diversification pathway.","limitation":"A company and government announcement is not completed capacity; construction, qualification, workforce and cost remain execution risks.","known_limitations":"A company and government announcement is not completed capacity; construction, qualification, workforce and cost remain execution risks.","url":"https://pr.tsmc.com/english/news/3122","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Corporate primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company","document_id":"DOC-0442527644c8c664","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS036","source_id":"CCV-AS036","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Designing an Effective Strategic Stockpiling System for Critical Minerals","date":"2025-07","date_or_version":"2025-07","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"stockpile design, release, coordination and market effects","primary_use":"Test whether inventories can bridge a disruption without assuming that gross tonnage is usable resilience.","primary_uses":"Test whether inventories can bridge a disruption without assuming that gross tonnage is usable resilience.","limitation":"General design guidance does not establish actual inventory, quality, release authority or sufficiency for a named state option.","known_limitations":"General design guidance does not establish actual inventory, quality, release authority or sufficiency for a named state option.","url":"https://www.iea.org/commentaries/designing-an-effective-strategic-stockpiling-system-for-critical-minerals","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-ef5e1777b882017e","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS037","source_id":"CCV-AS037","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"Joint Plan of Action and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action archives","date":"2013-2018","date_or_version":"2013-2018","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Iran sanctions relief, implementation, licensing and reimposition","primary_use":"Trace the legal and operational connection between negotiated nuclear steps and U.S. financial sanctions relief.","primary_uses":"Trace the legal and operational connection between negotiated nuclear steps and U.S. financial sanctions relief.","limitation":"An actor-authored sanctions archive does not independently establish why Iran negotiated or the agreement's net security effect.","known_limitations":"An actor-authored sanctions archive does not independently establish why Iran negotiated or the agreement's net security effect.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions/joint-plan-of-action-jpoa-archive-and-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-jcpoa-archive","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","document_id":"DOC-8e1fc0aaff799bbc","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS038","source_id":"CCV-AS038","publisher":"International Atomic Energy Agency","title":"IAEA Annual Report 2016 — Nuclear Verification","date":"2017","date_or_version":"2017","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"verified Iranian nuclear steps and continuing JCPOA monitoring","primary_use":"Establish Implementation Day and the observable nuclear restrictions delivered through the bargain.","primary_uses":"Establish Implementation Day and the observable nuclear restrictions delivered through the bargain.","limitation":"IAEA verification addresses nuclear commitments, not the independent effect of sanctions or the political durability of U.S. participation.","known_limitations":"IAEA verification addresses nuclear commitments, not the independent effect of sanctions or the political durability of U.S. participation.","url":"https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2016/gc61-3-nuclear-verification.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Atomic Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Atomic Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-9c5e345c25848351","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS039","source_id":"CCV-AS039","publisher":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","title":"JCPOA wind-down frequently asked questions","date":"2018-05","date_or_version":"2018-05","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"U.S. withdrawal, sanctions reimposition and commercial wind-down","primary_use":"Trace the reversal of relief and the new compliance burden placed on partners and firms.","primary_uses":"Trace the reversal of relief and the new compliance burden placed on partners and firms.","limitation":"The document states U.S. legal requirements but does not measure target behavior, partner trust or humanitarian effects.","known_limitations":"The document states U.S. legal requirements but does not measure target behavior, partner trust or humanitarian effects.","url":"https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/126/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control","document_id":"DOC-c27ef6473114342b","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS040","source_id":"CCV-AS040","publisher":"United Nations Security Council","title":"Resolution 2231 background and implementation timeline","date":"2015-2026","date_or_version":"2015-2026","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"JCPOA endorsement, Implementation Day and sanctions reapplication","primary_use":"Cross-check the multilateral bargain, verified implementation and later reapplication of prior Security Council measures.","primary_uses":"Cross-check the multilateral bargain, verified implementation and later reapplication of prior Security Council measures.","limitation":"The timeline records legal events but cannot allocate causal credit or determine whether pressure produced durable compliance.","known_limitations":"The timeline records legal events but cannot allocate causal credit or determine whether pressure produced durable compliance.","url":"https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by United Nations Security Council; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"United Nations Security Council","document_id":"DOC-8302c297c5fb9462","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS041","source_id":"CCV-AS041","publisher":"Council of the European Union","title":"EU sanctions against Russia explained","date":"2022-2026","date_or_version":"2022-2026","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"asset immobilization, financial restrictions and use of extraordinary revenues","primary_use":"Measure reachable coalition jurisdiction and the scale of Russian central-bank assets immobilized in the EU.","primary_uses":"Measure reachable coalition jurisdiction and the scale of Russian central-bank assets immobilized in the EU.","limitation":"Blocked assets and legal measures do not establish war termination, lost military output or a clean sanctions counterfactual.","known_limitations":"Blocked assets and legal measures do not establish war termination, lost military output or a clean sanctions counterfactual.","url":"https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Council of the European Union; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Council of the European Union","document_id":"DOC-312881af784b788a","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS042","source_id":"CCV-AS042","publisher":"European Commission","title":"REPowerEU: three years of reducing Russian fossil-fuel dependence","date":"2025-05","date_or_version":"2025-05","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Russian gas, oil and coal substitution, demand reduction and diversification","primary_use":"Measure observed European strategic recovery after a major external energy shock.","primary_uses":"Measure observed European strategic recovery after a major external energy shock.","limitation":"EU-authored aggregates do not isolate the effects of prices, weather, conservation, recession or national policy.","known_limitations":"EU-authored aggregates do not isolate the effects of prices, weather, conservation, recession or national policy.","url":"https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/repowereu-3-years-commission-takes-stock-progress-phase-out-russian-fossil-fuels-2025-05-16_en","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by European Commission; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"European Commission","document_id":"DOC-c19d5827eded6f6d","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS043","source_id":"CCV-AS043","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Gas Market Report Q1 2026 — Executive Summary","date":"2026-01","date_or_version":"2026-01","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Russian pipeline deliveries, European gas demand and market adjustment","primary_use":"Cross-check the magnitude and persistence of Europe's reduction in Russian pipeline gas.","primary_uses":"Cross-check the magnitude and persistence of Europe's reduction in Russian pipeline gas.","limitation":"Regional market outcomes do not prove that every state or industry recovered at acceptable cost.","known_limitations":"Regional market outcomes do not prove that every state or industry recovered at acceptable cost.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/gas-market-report-q1-2026/executive-summary","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-ef605d31d8ec5aa9","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS044","source_id":"CCV-AS044","publisher":"Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade","title":"Address to the ABARES Outlook 2023 Conference","date":"2023-03","date_or_version":"2023-03","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Australian export diversification after PRC trade barriers","primary_use":"Establish the Australian government's account of market substitution and policy continuity during economic pressure.","primary_uses":"Establish the Australian government's account of market substitution and policy continuity during economic pressure.","limitation":"An actor-authored retrospective can overstate resilience and understate concentrated losses to affected firms and regions.","known_limitations":"An actor-authored retrospective can overstate resilience and understate concentrated losses to affected firms and regions.","url":"https://ministers.dfat.gov.au/minister/tim-ayres/speech/address-abares-outlook-2023-conference","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade","document_id":"DOC-db5df12f588443ec","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS045","source_id":"CCV-AS045","publisher":"Australian Productivity Commission","title":"Trade and Assistance Review 2021-22","date":"2023","date_or_version":"2023","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"trade restrictions, coal diversion and economy-wide adjustment","primary_use":"Test whether PRC restrictions created national strategic constraint or mostly sector-specific redistribution and rerouting.","primary_uses":"Test whether PRC restrictions created national strategic constraint or mostly sector-specific redistribution and rerouting.","limitation":"Aggregate trade performance can conceal severe firm-level losses and does not reveal confidential policy deliberations.","known_limitations":"Aggregate trade performance can conceal severe firm-level losses and does not reveal confidential policy deliberations.","url":"https://www.pc.gov.au/ongoing/trade-assistance/2021-22/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Australian Productivity Commission; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Australian Productivity Commission","document_id":"DOC-eea9b1edfe991e5a","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS046","source_id":"CCV-AS046","publisher":"UN Trade and Development","title":"Review of Maritime Transport 2025","date":"2025-09","date_or_version":"2025-09","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Red Sea rerouting, freight rates, ton-miles and network adjustment","primary_use":"Measure realized cost and substitution after persistent route disruption.","primary_uses":"Measure realized cost and substitution after persistent route disruption.","limitation":"Industry-wide aggregates do not assign precise causal responsibility or measure every military and political objective.","known_limitations":"Industry-wide aggregates do not assign precise causal responsibility or measure every military and political objective.","url":"https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2025_en.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by UN Trade and Development; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"UN Trade and Development","document_id":"DOC-a115a5dec715328d","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS047","source_id":"CCV-AS047","publisher":"International Maritime Organization","title":"Red Sea area: attacks on international shipping","date":"2024-2026","date_or_version":"2024-2026","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"ship attacks, safety, crew effects and international response","primary_use":"Establish the continuing security disruption and the limits of normal maritime operation.","primary_uses":"Establish the continuing security disruption and the limits of normal maritime operation.","limitation":"The IMO record does not compare military campaign effectiveness or quantify all commercial adaptation.","known_limitations":"The IMO record does not compare military campaign effectiveness or quantify all commercial adaptation.","url":"https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/red-sea.aspx","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Maritime Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Maritime Organization","document_id":"DOC-c80ae4684423c4cf","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS048","source_id":"CCV-AS048","publisher":"International Energy Agency","title":"Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — Outlook","date":"2026-05","date_or_version":"2026-05","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"2025 export controls, refining concentration, downstream disruption and diversification","primary_use":"Measure product-specific control and the observed consequences of new restrictions.","primary_uses":"Measure product-specific control and the observed consequences of new restrictions.","limitation":"Energy-sector coverage is not a complete defense bill of materials; announced diversification may not become qualified supply.","known_limitations":"Energy-sector coverage is not a complete defense bill of materials; announced diversification may not become qualified supply.","url":"https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/outlook","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Energy Agency; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Energy Agency","document_id":"DOC-cbdf58a7ff38f6e1","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS049","source_id":"CCV-AS049","publisher":"European Commission","title":"Communication on implementation of the EU 5G cybersecurity toolbox","date":"2023-06","date_or_version":"2023-06","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"high-risk supplier restrictions, implementation gaps and persistent dependencies","primary_use":"Trace how security judgments became host-country vendor restrictions while retaining uneven implementation.","primary_uses":"Trace how security judgments became host-country vendor restrictions while retaining uneven implementation.","limitation":"EU member states retain authority; designation and restriction do not establish technical inferiority or a PRC policy response.","known_limitations":"EU member states retain authority; designation and restriction do not establish technical inferiority or a PRC policy response.","url":"https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/communication-commission-implementation-5g-cybersecurity-toolbox","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by European Commission; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"European Commission","document_id":"DOC-012bccd6e3a3db7e","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS050","source_id":"CCV-AS050","publisher":"European Commission","title":"Commission proposes three-year phase-out of high-risk suppliers in 5G networks","date":"2026","date_or_version":"2026","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"proposed EU-wide phase-out and switching period","primary_use":"Test the continuing cost and time required to unwind installed digital-network dependence.","primary_uses":"Test the continuing cost and time required to unwind installed digital-network dependence.","limitation":"A proposal is not final law, completed replacement or proof that every network faces equal risk.","known_limitations":"A proposal is not final law, completed replacement or proof that every network faces equal risk.","url":"https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/miscellaneous/european-union-commission-proposes-3-year-phase-out-high-risk-suppliers-5g-networks","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by European Commission; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"European Commission","document_id":"DOC-aa1fada0eda81400","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS051","source_id":"CCV-AS051","publisher":"Bank for International Settlements","title":"Renminbi internationalisation: the role of financial links","date":"2026","date_or_version":"2026","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"currency use, financial links and constraints on renminbi internationalization","primary_use":"Assess whether growing trade and payment activity is becoming a broadly trusted monetary network.","primary_uses":"Assess whether growing trade and payment activity is becoming a broadly trusted monetary network.","limitation":"Empirical associations do not identify state intent or forecast the pace of convertibility and market reform.","known_limitations":"Empirical associations do not identify state intent or forecast the pace of convertibility and market reform.","url":"https://www.bis.org/publ/work1345.htm","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Bank for International Settlements; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"Bank for International Settlements","document_id":"DOC-2e4322199a2e5e4b","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS052","source_id":"CCV-AS052","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"Ukraine: Status and Challenges of DOD Weapon Replacement Efforts","date":"2024-04","date_or_version":"2024-04","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"stockpile replacement, industrial capacity, raw materials and lead times","primary_use":"Measure the physical-production bottlenecks beneath coalition resource commitments.","primary_uses":"Measure the physical-production bottlenecks beneath coalition resource commitments.","limitation":"U.S. replacement performance is not the same as deliveries to Ukraine or battlefield effect.","known_limitations":"U.S. replacement performance is not the same as deliveries to Ukraine or battlefield effect.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106649","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-5dfddbb2c7f7a045","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS053","source_id":"CCV-AS053","publisher":"U.S. Department of Defense","title":"Fact Sheet on Ukraine Defense Contact Group National Armaments Directors","date":"2025-01","date_or_version":"2025-01","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"multinational production, sustainment and capability-coalition coordination","primary_use":"Trace how partner commitments are organized into procurement, production and sustainment mechanisms.","primary_uses":"Trace how partner commitments are organized into procurement, production and sustainment mechanisms.","limitation":"Actor-authored commitments and capacity targets do not establish delivered quantities, sufficiency or war outcome.","known_limitations":"Actor-authored commitments and capacity targets do not establish delivered quantities, sufficiency or war outcome.","url":"https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4026238/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of Defense; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of Defense","document_id":"DOC-69e87bbe6e64a271","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS054","source_id":"CCV-AS054","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"Joint Statement on the Fourth U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue","date":"2024-07","date_or_version":"2024-07","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"EDCA sites, bilateral funding, maritime security and alliance implementation","primary_use":"Establish agreed access preparation, funded infrastructure and sovereign bilateral decision mechanisms.","primary_uses":"Establish agreed access preparation, funded infrastructure and sovereign bilateral decision mechanisms.","limitation":"Joint statements describe intent and inputs; they do not guarantee mission-specific wartime authorization or survivable throughput.","known_limitations":"Joint statements describe intent and inputs; they do not guarantee mission-specific wartime authorization or survivable throughput.","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-fourth-22-ministerial-dialogue/","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of State; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","document_id":"DOC-15f65bdf65be682c","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS055","source_id":"CCV-AS055","publisher":"Sri Lanka Ports Authority","title":"Hambantota concession and ownership chronology","date":"2017-2018","date_or_version":"2017-2018","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"lease, equity structure, payments and port operation","primary_use":"Establish host-authorized commercial control and the transaction sequence from the recipient side.","primary_uses":"Establish host-authorized commercial control and the transaction sequence from the recipient side.","limitation":"The port-authority record does not independently evaluate debt sustainability, PRC strategic intent or military access.","known_limitations":"The port-authority record does not independently evaluate debt sustainability, PRC strategic intent or military access.","url":"https://www.slpa.lk/port-colombo/slpa","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by Sri Lanka Ports Authority; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"Sri Lanka Ports Authority","document_id":"DOC-dfb588894d8a1b4b","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS056","source_id":"CCV-AS056","publisher":"International Monetary Fund","title":"Sri Lanka 2018 Article IV Consultation and Fourth EFF Review","date":"2018-06","date_or_version":"2018-06","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Hambantota financing, lease proceeds and Sri Lankan public debt","primary_use":"Separate the port concession from Sri Lanka's broader debt stock and identify the fiscal purpose of proceeds.","primary_uses":"Separate the port concession from Sri Lanka's broader debt stock and identify the fiscal purpose of proceeds.","limitation":"Contemporaneous staff analysis predates Sri Lanka's later default and does not resolve every contractual or political claim.","known_limitations":"Contemporaneous staff analysis predates Sri Lanka's later default and does not resolve every contractual or political claim.","url":"https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2018/175/article-A001-en.xml","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by International Monetary Fund; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"International Monetary Fund","document_id":"DOC-773126cba22d14de","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS057","source_id":"CCV-AS057","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Relations with Finland and accession timeline","date":"2023-2026","date_or_version":"2023-2026","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"application, unanimous ratification and alliance integration","primary_use":"Trace partner choice and the consensus permissions required to add capability and geography to the alliance.","primary_uses":"Trace partner choice and the consensus permissions required to add capability and geography to the alliance.","limitation":"Membership and official assessments do not prove deterrence or the speed of operational integration.","known_limitations":"Membership and official assessments do not prove deterrence or the speed of operational integration.","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-finland","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by North Atlantic Treaty Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","document_id":"DOC-ca3c249b3f5f17c7","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS058","source_id":"CCV-AS058","publisher":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","title":"Swedish flag raised at NATO Headquarters","date":"2024-03","date_or_version":"2024-03","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Swedish accession, Article 5 and new allied capabilities","primary_use":"Establish the completed accession and stated capability contribution.","primary_uses":"Establish the completed accession and stated capability contribution.","limitation":"Ceremonial and actor-authored claims do not quantify net force contribution, new obligations or deterrent effect.","known_limitations":"Ceremonial and actor-authored claims do not quantify net force contribution, new obligations or deterrent effect.","url":"https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2024/03/11/swedish-flag-raised-at-nato-headquarters","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by North Atlantic Treaty Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"North Atlantic Treaty Organization","document_id":"DOC-a882f1cca40ea920","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS059","source_id":"CCV-AS059","publisher":"U.S. Department of State","title":"COVID-19 vaccine deliveries","date":"2024-02","date_or_version":"2024-02","kind":"Official primary record","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"U.S. donated doses and recipient coverage","primary_use":"Measure delivered U.S. vaccine provision rather than pledges alone.","primary_uses":"Measure delivered U.S. vaccine provision rather than pledges alone.","limitation":"Delivery totals do not establish uptake, health effect, recipient attribution, gratitude or durable influence.","known_limitations":"Delivery totals do not establish uptake, health effect, recipient attribution, gratitude or durable influence.","url":"https://2021-2025.state.gov/covid-19-vaccine-deliveries","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Official primary","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Department of State; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"official_primary_or_output","institutional_family":"U.S. Department of State","document_id":"DOC-0541c5e9db5ea884","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS060","source_id":"CCV-AS060","publisher":"World Health Organization","title":"WHO lists Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine for emergency use","date":"2021-05","date_or_version":"2021-05","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"PRC vaccine authorization, efficacy evidence and deployment option","primary_use":"Establish that PRC provision included a WHO-listed product available to global recipients.","primary_uses":"Establish that PRC provision included a WHO-listed product available to global recipients.","limitation":"Emergency-use listing is not a comparative effectiveness judgment or evidence of diplomatic conversion.","known_limitations":"Emergency-use listing is not a comparative effectiveness judgment or evidence of diplomatic conversion.","url":"https://www.who.int/news/item/07-05-2021-who-lists-additional-covid-19-vaccine-for-emergency-use-and-issues-interim-policy-recommendations","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by World Health Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Health Organization","document_id":"DOC-b6eba0f0df67f0cd","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS061","source_id":"CCV-AS061","publisher":"World Health Organization","title":"COVID-19 vaccine implementation analysis insights","date":"2022-09","date_or_version":"2022-09","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"delivery capacity, uptake and country implementation constraints","primary_use":"Test why dose provision alone is an incomplete measure of delivered public value and influence.","primary_uses":"Test why dose provision alone is an incomplete measure of delivered public value and influence.","limitation":"Cross-country implementation findings do not isolate U.S. or PRC diplomatic effect.","known_limitations":"Cross-country implementation findings do not isolate U.S. or PRC diplomatic effect.","url":"https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/covid-19-vaccine-implementation-analysis-insights-2-september-2022","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by World Health Organization; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Health Organization","document_id":"DOC-5fc083391f31634a","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS062","source_id":"CCV-AS062","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"China: With Nearly All U.S. Confucius Institutes Closed, Some Schools Sought Alternative Language Support","date":"2024-10","date_or_version":"2024-10","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"closures, successor arrangements, federal incentives and language capacity","primary_use":"Measure host control over a PRC-supported cultural network and the consequences of withdrawal.","primary_uses":"Measure host control over a PRC-supported cultural network and the consequences of withdrawal.","limitation":"U.S. institutions are not a representative global sample, and closure does not reveal prior attitudinal or policy effect.","known_limitations":"U.S. institutions are not a representative global sample, and closure does not reveal prior attitudinal or policy effect.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-105981","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-836c4ac2d7eb0250","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS063","source_id":"CCV-AS063","publisher":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","title":"China: Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities Are Similar, but Institute Operations Vary","date":"2019-02","date_or_version":"2019-02","kind":"Independent oversight","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"contracts, university control, programming and reported benefits or concerns","primary_use":"Assess state support, host discretion and variation before the later closure wave.","primary_uses":"Assess state support, host discretion and variation before the later closure wave.","limitation":"University self-report and contract review cannot establish covert influence, participant attitudes or national policy effects.","known_limitations":"University self-report and contract review cannot establish covert influence, participant attitudes or national policy effects.","url":"https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-278","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Independent oversight","language":"English","provenance":"Published by U.S. Government Accountability Office; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"independent_oversight","institutional_family":"U.S. Government Accountability Office","document_id":"DOC-fff94fd65c6a6e05","original_title":""},{"id":"CCV-AS064","source_id":"CCV-AS064","publisher":"World Bank","title":"Global Economic Prospects, June 2025 — Europe and Central Asia","date":"2025-06","date_or_version":"2025-06","kind":"Intergovernmental data or analysis","evidence_tier":"Tier 1","coverage":"Russian growth, sanctions, payment constraints and adaptation","primary_use":"Cross-check whether financial restrictions constrained the target while leaving war finance and policy response as separate questions.","primary_uses":"Cross-check whether financial restrictions constrained the target while leaving war finance and policy response as separate questions.","limitation":"Macroeconomic forecasts are revised and cannot isolate sanctions from war, labor, commodity and domestic-policy effects.","known_limitations":"Macroeconomic forecasts are revised and cannot isolate sanctions from war, labor, commodity and domestic-policy effects.","url":"https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/8bf0b62ec6bcb886d97295ad930059e9-0050012025/related/GEP-June-2025-Chapter-2.pdf","workstream":"Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities","domain":"Integrated Statecraft","source_origin":"Intergovernmental","language":"English","provenance":"Published by World Bank; original publisher or official archival host. Evidence admitted only for the stated use, not automatic outcome verification.","evidence_role":"intergovernmental_data_or_analysis","institutional_family":"World Bank","document_id":"DOC-63823099c2c9ca66","original_title":""}],"counts":{"peer_instruments":4,"analytical_workstreams":2,"governed_match_layers":1,"strategy_cases":18,"strategy_pathways":14,"critical_capability_candidates_screened":48,"critical_capability_findings":10,"critical_capability_cases":18,"bounded_responses":12,"gap_findings":12,"sources":104},"overall_composite":null,"overall_winner":null,"routes":{"landing":"/integrated-statecraft","strategy":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-evaluation","critical_capabilities":"/integrated-statecraft/critical-capabilities-vulnerabilities","gaps":"/integrated-statecraft/strategy-requirement-gaps","methodology":"/integrated-statecraft/methodology","sources":"/integrated-statecraft/sources","data":"/integrated-statecraft/data","api":"/api/v1/statecrafts/integrated-statecraft"}}