{"focus":"Which resources, capabilities, relationships, and network positions can be converted into internationally usable state power or leverage, and which dependencies can external actors or exogenous events exploit to constrain state action, options, or stability","intent":"Identify what must be built, accessed, controlled, protected, substituted, restored, or responsibly employed to preserve freedom of action and produce bounded international effects independently of current strategy","question":"What gives a state usable power or leverage in international affairs; through what authority, delivery, and response mechanism is it converted; where can an adversary or exogenous shock disrupt that chain; and when would the resulting loss materially narrow external options, operational performance, coercion resistance, or state stability?","unit":"A source-of-power and conversion chain under a declared international objective, target or recipient, geography, time horizon, and adversarial or exogenous stress","prohibited_inference":"Domestic importance, sector size, resource possession, ownership, concentration, technical sophistication, or current strategy emphasis cannot establish internationally usable power, leverage, or strategic vulnerability. A domestic condition enters only through an evidenced mechanism that constrains external action, strategic choice, coercion resistance, or state stability.","central_finding":"The two systems derive power from different conversion architectures. PRC-centered power is strongest where concentrated physical throughput, processing, construction and industrial absorption can be directed. U.S./partner power is strongest where autonomous states and firms consent to combine finance, technology, access, intelligence, legitimacy and specialized production. Each system is weakest when it must borrow the other's conversion model.","findings":[{"finding_id":"CCV-F01","title":"Permissioned alliance, access, and coalition networks","updated_ruling":"The U.S./partner system retains an extreme structural advantage. Ukraine, EDCA and Nordic accession show real conversion, while consent delays, industrial delivery and mission caveats prevent automatic credit. The PRC's Djibouti success remains real but exceptional rather than representative.","case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-13","ST-15"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO006","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO054","CCV-AO056","CCV-AO058","CCV-AO059"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS006","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"warning_indicators":["Host restrictions on mission use","Repeated delivery shortfalls","Alliance ratification or budget delays","Multiple PRC facilities with exercised crisis throughput"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_comparative","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO006","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO058","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO059","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F02","title":"Dollar-centered financial commanding layer","updated_ruling":"The U.S.-anchored system holds an extreme advantage in trusted financial centrality and reachable jurisdiction. Iran shows bounded bargaining conversion; Russia shows that even massive denial may not compel a high-resolve target; JCPOA reversal shows that credibility and off-ramps are part of the power base.","case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO002","CCV-AO003","CCV-AO004","CCV-AO039","CCV-AO040","CCV-AO041","CCV-AO042","CCV-AO053"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS051"],"warning_indicators":["Loss of partner sanctions participation","Sustained decline across reserves, invoicing and debt rather than one function","Expansion of liquid non-dollar safe assets","Controls without credible relief terms"],"confidence":"high","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO003","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO039","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F03","title":"Industrial throughput and physical conversion","updated_ruling":"PRC manufacturing breadth and scale are an extreme power source; U.S./partner innovation, capital and aggregate allied output remain formidable but are bottlenecked by qualified production, maintenance, supplier lead times and transport. Ukraine confirms that monetary resources and alliance commitments are not time-equivalent to fielded output.","case_ids":["ST-08","ST-11"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO008","CCV-AO009","CCV-AO010","CCV-AO011","CCV-AO012","CCV-AO029","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS011","CCV-AS012","CCV-AS013","CCV-AS014","CCV-AS023","CCV-AS034","CCV-AS048","CCV-AS052"],"warning_indicators":["Qualified output below replenishment demand","Single-source energetic or component tiers","Repair backlogs","PRC production growth without matching overseas permission"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_conversion","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO008","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO009","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO010","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO012","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO029","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F04","title":"Maritime power's mirror-image bottleneck","updated_ruling":"The PRC has extreme commercial shipbuilding and regional fleet scale but limited distant permissions and support; the U.S./partner system has global access and operational relationships but an aging, capacity-constrained shipbuilding, repair and sealift base. Red Sea disruption shows that presence alone may not normalize private routes.","case_ids":["ST-06","ST-11","ST-12","ST-13"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO010","CCV-AO011","CCV-AO012","CCV-AO013","CCV-AO014","CCV-AO034","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO047","CCV-AO048"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS007","CCV-AS008","CCV-AS009","CCV-AS010","CCV-AS011","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"warning_indicators":["Surge sealift below readiness threshold","Repair and mariner shortages","Overseas replenishment rights exercised by the PRC","Insurance or rerouting costs persist despite protection"],"confidence":"moderate_comparative","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO010","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO012","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO013","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO014","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO048","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F05","title":"Critical-mineral processing, magnets, and controllable denial","updated_ruling":"PRC control is extreme at selected midstream stages and has produced real short-run denial. Japan and current controls show severe product-specific target vulnerability and slow qualification, but also that use accelerates substitution, stockpiling, recycling, partner investment and supplier-reputation loss. Strategic compellence remains unproven.","case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO016","CCV-AO018","CCV-AO019","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS016","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS018","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"warning_indicators":["Product-level inventory below qualification time","Controls expand from licensing delay to sustained cutoff","Non-PRC projects fail commissioning","Targets reach qualified substitute scale"],"confidence":"high","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO018","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F06","title":"Advanced-semiconductor allied control stack","updated_ruling":"U.S./allied control is extreme at selected frontier nodes and can impose delay, but China retains enormous mature-node, electronics, demand and manufacturing absorption capacity. Durable denial, military effect and policy compellence remain unproven; coalition coverage and ecosystem health are the binding conditions.","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-18"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO020","CCV-AO021","CCV-AO022","CCV-AO023","CCV-AO025","CCV-AO051","CCV-AO052"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022","CCV-AS030","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"warning_indicators":["Partner rule divergence","Frontier-equivalent indigenous PRC tools","Control-induced allied revenue or innovation loss","Taiwan or supplier common-mode outage"],"confidence":"high_fact_moderate_persistence","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO052","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F07","title":"Energy abundance versus seaborne import exposure","updated_ruling":"U.S. supply and allied producer diversity create meaningful partner options; PRC maritime oil dependence is severe. Europe shows that energy networks can be reconfigured at high cost, while the Malacca exposure is not a feasible peacetime lever absent supplier, shipping, route and escalation control.","case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO032","CCV-AO033","CCV-AO034","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO046","CCV-AO047"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS025","CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","CCV-AS046"],"warning_indicators":["Stock or pipeline buffers fall below disruption duration","Supplier coalition changes","Demand flexibility declines","Route threat and insurance failures become correlated"],"confidence":"moderate","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO033","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F08","title":"Innovation, talent, cloud, and absorption ecosystems","updated_ruling":"The U.S. leads in frontier quality, services, global talent attraction, software and privately coordinated networks; China leads in manufacturing absorption, deployment and scale. Neither ecosystem is wholly state-taskable. U.S. talent-policy and prototype-to-production fragility mirror PRC openness, trust and selected frontier dependencies.","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-11"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO028","CCV-AO029","CCV-AO030","CCV-AO031","CCV-AO051","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS034","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS052"],"warning_indicators":["Sustained international-talent decline","Cloud common-mode or forced fragmentation","PRC frontier substitution at controlled nodes","Failure to qualify prototypes for scale"],"confidence":"moderate_comparative","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO028","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO029","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO030","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO031","scope":"portfolio_context","observation_case_ids":[]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F09","title":"Infrastructure provision does not equal strategic access","updated_ruling":"PRC provision scale is extreme, but access conversion depends on recipient demand and sovereign authorization. Djibouti supports one bounded conversion; Hambantota rejects automatic debt seizure and military access. U.S./partner provision is smaller but often connects to established security permissions.","case_ids":["ST-12","ST-13","ST-14"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO036","CCV-AO056","CCV-AO057"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"warning_indicators":["Multiple ports provide repeated military throughput","Host law or politics restricts access","Debt restructuring changes ownership or security rights","Commercial utilization remains below maintenance cost"],"confidence":"high_mechanism_moderate_generalization","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO057","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-14"]}]},{"finding_id":"CCV-F10","title":"Strategic concentration requires a recovery test","updated_ruling":"Taiwan's 2024 earthquake showed extreme concentration and measurable disruption but rapid functional recovery below the strategic threshold. Red Sea, European gas and mineral cases show the converse: systems can avoid collapse yet remain strategically degraded for months or years. Recovery—not exposure—is the decisive variable.","case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06","ST-08","ST-18"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO025","CCV-AO026","CCV-AO027","CCV-AO038","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO047","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS030","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS035","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048"],"warning_indicators":["Recovery exceeds state-option deadline","Simultaneous supplier, power and transport failure","Customer buffers exhaust before qualification","Nominal substitute lacks equivalent quality or authority"],"confidence":"high_methodological","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO026","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO038","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]}]}],"cases":[{"case_id":"ST-01","title":"U.S. dollar, SWIFT, and secondary-sanctions leverage against Iran","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Dollar and banking centrality plus partner implementation imposed reachable financial pressure; diplomacy offered a verifiable off-ramp; Iran completed the required nuclear steps; U.S. withdrawal then reversed relief and the bargain lost durability.","rulings":{"US_power_source":"supported_extreme","Iran_vulnerability":"supported","conversion_to_bargain":"supported_bounded","durable_usable_leverage":"not_supported","self_harm_risk":"supported"},"threshold_result":"Financial centrality produced bargaining leverage and a temporarily implemented agreement, but not durable compliance independent of diplomatic credibility and continued reciprocal performance.","principal_lesson":"Permissioned financial networks are most effective when a coalition controls reachable nodes, states a bounded demand, and preserves an off-ramp; unilateral reversal can destroy the achieved result and weaken future credibility.","rivals_surviving":["Diplomacy and Iranian preferences, not sanctions alone, produced the bargain","Regional security developments and Iranian nonperformance also contributed to collapse"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO039","CCV-AO040"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS040"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO039","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-02","title":"Freeze of Russian reserves, bank restrictions, and financial adaptation","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Coalition jurisdiction immobilized central-bank assets and restricted payments; Russia absorbed substantial cost through controls, rerouting and commodity revenue while continuing the war.","rulings":{"US_partner_power_source":"supported_extreme","reachable_denial":"supported","Russia_vulnerability":"supported_bounded","conversion_to_war_termination":"not_supported","network_erosion":"plausible_not_yet_decisive"},"threshold_result":"The case demonstrates exceptional denial and cost-imposition capacity but does not establish compellence, war termination, or a decisive reduction in Russian military options.","principal_lesson":"The commanding financial layer can deny access faster than it can change a high-resolve state's strategy; adaptation and long-run network response must remain separate judgments.","rivals_surviving":["Commodity prices and domestic controls explain part of Russia's endurance","Battlefield and political variables dominate policy choice"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO001","CCV-AO041","CCV-AO042"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS064"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-02"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-03","title":"PRC–Japan rare-earth disruption and subsequent diversification","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Exceptional PRC processing concentration and Japanese dependence permitted abrupt supply disruption and price pressure; Japan used inventories, thrift, recycling, alternative investment, qualification, diplomacy and WTO action to reduce exposure.","rulings":{"PRC_power_source":"supported_extreme","Japan_vulnerability_2010":"supported","PRC_usable_leverage":"supported_bounded_short_run","Japan_recovery":"supported_multiyear"},"threshold_result":"The case supports short-run denial and material vulnerability, but not durable PRC control over Japanese policy; the exact attribution of the bilateral interruption remains contested.","principal_lesson":"Control is strongest before the target pays the fixed cost of adaptation; use activates substitution, legal action and coalition investment.","rivals_surviving":["Market and licensing changes explain part of the disruption","Demand change and price response aided recovery"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO016","CCV-AO018","CCV-AO019"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS017","CCV-AS018"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","scope":"cross_case_context","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO018","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-03"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-04","title":"PRC trade coercion against Australia and market substitution","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC restrictions concentrated losses in exposed sectors; fungible commodity flows and alternative markets preserved aggregate exports and Australian policy autonomy.","rulings":{"PRC_market_power":"supported","sector_vulnerability":"supported","national_strategic_vulnerability":"not_supported","policy_compellence":"not_supported","supplier_reputation_cost":"supported_bounded"},"threshold_result":"The pressure was economically real but failed the state-option threshold: Australia did not reverse the central policies associated with the campaign.","principal_lesson":"A large market is weak leverage when products can reroute and political pressure hardens target resolve; sector pain cannot stand in for national compellence.","rivals_surviving":["PRC measures had mixed legal and commercial rationales","Australian resilience was uneven across firms and regions"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO043","CCV-AO044"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T06","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO043","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-04"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-04"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-05","title":"European dependence on Russian pipeline gas and strategic substitution","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Pipeline concentration created severe exposure; supply manipulation and war accelerated LNG, alternative suppliers, demand reduction, storage and regulation; European Russian-gas dependence then collapsed.","rulings":{"Russia_initial_power_source":"supported_extreme_regional","Europe_initial_vulnerability":"supported","Russian_durable_leverage":"not_supported","Europe_strategic_recovery":"supported","power_base_self_erosion":"supported"},"threshold_result":"Europe absorbed high cost yet preserved its Ukraine policy and removed most of Russia's durable pipeline position, so short-run vulnerability did not become lasting strategic leverage.","principal_lesson":"Weaponizing a relationship-specific network can liquidate the installed base that creates leverage when targets can coordinate costly substitution.","rivals_surviving":["Weather, recession and conservation reduced demand","Russian revenues and exports partly shifted elsewhere"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO032","CCV-AO045","CCV-AO046"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS025","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T11","CCV-T12","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-05"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-06","title":"Red Sea attacks, shipping insurance, naval response, and rerouting","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Persistent attacks shifted shipping around Africa, raising ton-miles, insurance, time and freight cost; naval protection bounded loss but did not restore normal commercial routing.","rulings":{"route_vulnerability":"supported","commercial_substitution":"supported_costly","nonstate_disruption_power":"supported_bounded","coalition_normalization":"not_supported","state_option_loss":"bounded"},"threshold_result":"The network remained functional through rerouting but below its prior cost and reliability threshold; no state or coalition demonstrated full control over restoration.","principal_lesson":"Redundancy can prevent collapse while still allowing a low-cost attacker to impose large system costs; military presence does not automatically task private routing decisions.","rivals_surviving":["Commercial fleet conditions and demand also moved freight rates","Naval action may have prevented a worse counterfactual"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO047","CCV-AO048"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T06","CCV-T07","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO048","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-06"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-07","title":"U.S.–Japan–Netherlands semiconductor controls and PRC adaptation","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Allied control of EDA, advanced lithography, specialized tools, materials and fabrication enabled targeted denial; rules and partner measures changed repeatedly as PRC firms adapted.","rulings":{"US_partner_power_source":"supported_extreme_at_selected_nodes","PRC_frontier_vulnerability":"supported","conversion_to_delay":"supported","durable_denial":"insufficient","policy_compellence":"not_supported"},"threshold_result":"The case supports friction and delay at selected frontier nodes, not broad Chinese semiconductor weakness, military effect, permanent denial or policy compliance.","principal_lesson":"A permissioned control stack can deny a narrow technology frontier, but coalition coverage, enforcement, target redesign and ecosystem self-harm determine persistence.","rivals_surviving":["Commercial cycles and management choices affect firm outcomes","Controls can accelerate indigenous substitution"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO020","CCV-AO021","CCV-AO022","CCV-AO023"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS021","CCV-AS022"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T08","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-07"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-08","title":"PRC critical-mineral and magnet export controls","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Extreme refining and magnet concentration became licensing delay and production curtailment; target stockpiles and new projects could not immediately replace qualified product.","rulings":{"PRC_power_source":"supported_extreme","target_vulnerability":"supported_product_specific","denial_conversion":"supported","policy_compellence":"insufficient","long_run_leverage":"bounded_by_adaptation"},"threshold_result":"The controls crossed the production-disruption threshold for selected products but have not established durable policy leverage across target states.","principal_lesson":"Midstream processing and qualification—not ore possession—create the sharpest chokepoints; their use reveals dependencies and mobilizes costly diversification.","rivals_surviving":["Licensing administration and market cycles explain part of delay","Defense-specific inventories and end uses remain opaque"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO015","CCV-AO049","CCV-AO050"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T05","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T16","CCV-T17"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-08"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-09","title":"Huawei restrictions, 5G substitution, and digital-network alignment","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC vendors achieved large installed positions; host governments converted security and trust judgments into restrictions; operators faced multi-year switching and qualification costs.","rulings":{"PRC_commercial_power_source":"supported","PRC_state_taskability":"not_supported","host_regulatory_power":"supported","installed_dependency":"supported_bounded","substitution":"supported_slow"},"threshold_result":"Installed scale created switching leverage and exposure but remained subordinate to host law, operator choice and alternative-vendor availability.","principal_lesson":"Digital infrastructure power is jointly produced by vendor scale, standards, trust and host permission; market share alone is neither state control nor permanent lock-in.","rivals_surviving":["Security designations are policy judgments, not controlled technical experiments","Restrictions may also serve industrial-policy goals"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO051","CCV-AO052"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T07","CCV-T09","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"low"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO052","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-09"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-10","title":"RMB internationalization, CIPS, swap lines, and alternatives to dollar finance","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC institutions expanded settlement and bypass options, but capital controls, asset depth, convertibility and trust kept the renminbi far below the dollar across reserves and foreign-exchange intermediation.","rulings":{"PRC_alternative_option":"supported_growing","PRC_global_financial_power":"weak_relative","US_dollar_power":"supported_extreme","rapid_displacement":"not_supported","long_run_erosion":"plausible"},"threshold_result":"CIPS and renminbi use improve resilience at the margin but do not yet replace the dollar-centered commanding layer.","principal_lesson":"Monetary power depends on a bundle of trusted assets, convertibility, markets and institutions; payment rails alone cannot manufacture it.","rivals_surviving":["Currency use differs by trade, reserves, debt and turnover","Sanctions and financial fragmentation could accelerate nonlinear change"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO002","CCV-AO003","CCV-AO004","CCV-AO053"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T09","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T17","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"moderate"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO003","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-10"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-11","title":"Ukraine support, munitions production, and allied burden sharing","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"A broad permissioned coalition aligned requirements, donations, procurement and sustainment, but component lead times, production capacity and political authorization repeatedly bounded timely physical delivery.","rulings":{"US_partner_network_power":"supported_extreme","conversion_to_delivery":"supported_partial","industrial_vulnerability":"supported_severe","partner_additionality":"supported","sufficiency_for_outcome":"not_supported"},"threshold_result":"The system demonstrated exceptional aggregation and real delivery, while exposing a binding inability to convert financial and allied potential into all required contested-time output.","principal_lesson":"Permissioned networks multiply power only through a physical chain of contracts, inputs, production, maintenance, transport and political continuity.","rivals_surviving":["Ukraine's domestic production and adaptation are major independent causes","Classified deliveries and requirements limit sufficiency judgments"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO054","CCV-AO055"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-12","title":"Philippines EDCA access, distribution, and political authorization","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Shared threat perception and alliance diplomacy expanded EDCA to nine sites; both states funded preparation and exercised cooperation while the Philippines retained sovereign control over use.","rulings":{"US_partner_access_power":"supported","host_authorization":"supported_peacetime","wartime_taskability":"insufficient","distribution_benefit":"supported","political_vulnerability":"supported_bounded"},"threshold_result":"EDCA created a real strategic option, not an unconditional base right; mission-specific permission, throughput and survivability remain untested.","principal_lesson":"Access is a diplomatic product renewed through local benefit, consultation and credible assurance; concrete and agreements do not eliminate host agency.","rivals_surviving":["Philippine policy reflects its own maritime interests","Funding and exercises may not translate to high-end conflict use"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO006","CCV-AO056"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS006","CCV-AS054"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T11","CCV-T13","CCV-T17","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO006","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-12"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-13","title":"PRC Djibouti base and infrastructure-to-access conversion","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC finance, trade, port relationships and diplomacy preceded a defense agreement and first overseas base; Djibouti retained leverage by hosting multiple foreign forces.","rulings":{"PRC_infrastructure_power":"supported","PRC_access_conversion":"supported_single_case","host_agency":"supported","general_port_to_base_pathway":"not_supported","global_sustainment":"bounded"},"threshold_result":"The case proves that conversion can occur, not that finance automatically purchases access or that the resulting facility supplies unrestricted global military reach.","principal_lesson":"Recipient incentives and sovereign permission are the indispensable bridge between infrastructure and military access.","rivals_surviving":["Security and evacuation requirements independently motivated the base","A rent-maximizing host can preserve nonexclusive relationships"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO036"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-14","title":"Hambantota port, debt restructuring, and disputed leverage claims","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Chinese loans financed an underused port; Sri Lanka later invited a cash-generating commercial concession; a PRC operator gained long-duration operational equity without loan cancellation or demonstrated military basing rights.","rulings":{"PRC_finance_and_operating_power":"supported","Sri_Lanka_fiscal_vulnerability":"supported_broader","debt_for_asset_seizure":"rejected","military_access_conversion":"not_supported","political_leverage":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The transaction created commercial control and relationship presence but fails the automatic debt-trap-to-base causal claim.","principal_lesson":"Infrastructure can produce option value without exclusive strategic control; contract, debt purpose, host security authority and subsequent use must be traced separately.","rivals_surviving":["Sri Lanka's broader fiscal crisis drove the lease","Incomplete disclosure leaves narrower influence channels uncertain"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO035","CCV-AO057"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T06","CCV-T08","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO057","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-14"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-15","title":"Finland and Sweden NATO accession, capability, and counteraction","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Russia's invasion changed partner preferences; two capable nonaligned states applied; unanimous allied ratification added geography, forces and industry to NATO while also extending collective obligations.","rulings":{"US_partner_aggregation_power":"supported_extreme","permission_conversion":"supported","Russian_counteraction_backfire":"supported_bounded","net_capability_gain":"supported","deterrent_effect":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The alliance converted voluntary political choice into additional capability and geography; deterrence cannot be inferred solely from accession or the absence of attack.","principal_lesson":"Autonomous partner choice is both the source of alliance legitimacy and a consent bottleneck; adversary coercion can strengthen the network it seeks to constrain.","rivals_surviving":["Longstanding partnership made integration unusually easy","New territory and commitments can increase defense burden and escalation exposure"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO005","CCV-AO058","CCV-AO059"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T04","CCV-T08","CCV-T13","CCV-T17","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO058","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO059","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-15"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-16","title":"PRC and U.S./partner vaccine provision and influence conversion","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"Both systems delivered valued health goods through different networks; recipient capacity, product timing, uptake, trust and alternatives mediated public value; the admitted evidence does not connect doses to durable foreign-policy behavior.","rulings":{"US_provision_power":"supported","PRC_provision_power":"supported","recipient_agency":"decisive","durable_influence_conversion":"insufficient_both","delivery_as_influence_proxy":"rejected"},"threshold_result":"Provision crossed an exposure and delivery threshold, not the required affinity, access, alignment or behavior threshold.","principal_lesson":"A scarce public good can open diplomatic opportunity, but last-mile performance and recipient attribution determine whether any relationship effect persists.","rivals_surviving":["Humanitarian and commercial motives coexist","Pandemic urgency and product availability dominate many recipient choices"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO060","CCV-AO061"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS059","CCV-AS060","CCV-AS061"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T04","CCV-T05","CCV-T07","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO060","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-16"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO061","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-16"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-17","title":"Confucius Institutes, closures, rebranding, and cultural-network taskability","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"PRC support expanded language programs, but agreements and operations varied by host; U.S. funding restrictions and university decisions then collapsed the network while demand for language education persisted through alternatives.","rulings":{"PRC_cultural_network_source":"supported","central_state_taskability":"not_supported","host_control":"supported","network_vulnerability":"supported_extreme_in_US","policy_influence":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The case demonstrates exposure, educational value and host revocability, not durable PRC influence over university or national decisions.","principal_lesson":"Cultural networks gain reach by relying on autonomous hosts; legitimacy loss or funding rules can remove state access while leaving the underlying cultural demand intact.","rivals_surviving":["Closures reflect U.S. domestic politics and security policy","Successor programs can preserve some relationships under new labels"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO062","CCV-AO063"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS062","CCV-AS063"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T03","CCV-T05","CCV-T07","CCV-T08","CCV-T16","CCV-T18","CCV-T19"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"moderate","usable_leverage":"insufficient"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO062","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-17"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO063","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-17"]}]},{"case_id":"ST-18","title":"Taiwan earthquake exposure and semiconductor strategic recovery","status":"applied_frozen","observed_chain":"A major earthquake triggered safety shutdowns and measurable loss at highly concentrated fabs; engineering, trained personnel and restart procedures restored output before an international state option crossed its threshold.","rulings":{"concentration":"supported_extreme","event_degradation":"supported","strategic_vulnerability_realized":"not_supported","functional_recovery":"supported","larger_compound_scenario":"insufficient"},"threshold_result":"The event falsifies the inference that geographic concentration automatically equals realized strategic vulnerability; it does not test blockade, prolonged energy loss or simultaneous supplier failure.","principal_lesson":"Vulnerability must be measured as loss of function after recovery, not exposure or asset interruption alone.","rivals_surviving":["Customer buffers can hide short disruptions","A longer or compound event could exceed demonstrated recovery"],"observation_ids":["CCV-AO025","CCV-AO026","CCV-AO027","CCV-AO038"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS030","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS035"],"red_team_tests":["CCV-T06","CCV-T10","CCV-T11","CCV-T12","CCV-T14","CCV-T18"],"confidence":{"fact":"high","mechanism":"high","usable_leverage":"not_applicable"},"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO026","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO038","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["ST-18"]}]}],"responses":[{"response_id":"CCV-R01","title":"Protect the permissioned network as a capability","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Consultation, credible commitments, local benefit, burden sharing and mission-specific exercises are productive capacity because autonomous partner consent creates the network's advantage.","conditions":["Host sovereignty retained","Costs and risks shared","Alternatives prepared","Political commitments matched by delivery"],"disqualifiers":["Treating access as unconditional","Unfunded assurance","Partner exclusion from decisions"],"case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS005","CCV-AS053","CCV-AS054","CCV-AS057"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R02","title":"Convert demand signals into qualified contested-time output","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Multi-year procurement, interoperable requirements, supplier-tier visibility, repair capacity and allied co-production are necessary to turn financial and coalition strength into timely physical effect.","conditions":["Mission-thread requirements","Qualified inputs and workforce","Sustainment and transport included","Actual output measured"],"disqualifiers":["Counting announcements as capacity","Ignoring maintenance or supplier lead time","Crowding out more critical allied needs"],"case_ids":["ST-11"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R03","title":"Diversify the narrowest mineral and magnet products, not every input","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Prioritize product-specific exposures whose qualified inventory and substitution time fall below mission deadlines; combine stockpiles, offtake, processing, recycling and design substitution.","conditions":["Bill-of-material visibility","Equivalent quality qualification","Release authority","Partner coordination"],"disqualifiers":["Ore-share proxies","Universal autarky","Unqualified projects","Stockpiles without usable form or release plan"],"case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R04","title":"Use financial and technology leverage with coalition coverage and credible off-ramps","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation_and_bounded_leverage","finding":"Concentrated finance or technology control is most durable when objectives are narrow, partners cover substitutes, relief terms are credible and ecosystem damage is monitored.","conditions":["Defined demand","Reachable jurisdiction","Partner implementation","Target adaptation monitoring","Reversible relief"],"disqualifiers":["Pain as the outcome","No off-ramp","Unilateral reversal after compliance","Material erosion of the network that creates leverage"],"case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-07","ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS039","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS051"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R05","title":"Preserve openness where attraction and innovation are the power source","primary_system":"U.S.-partner","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Talent attraction, private research, cloud and cultural reach generate national advantage precisely because independent actors choose the ecosystem; security controls should be narrow enough not to destroy that selection effect.","conditions":["Risk-specific safeguards","Research and talent pathways","Private actor autonomy","Trusted legal environment"],"disqualifiers":["Nationality as a risk proxy","Automatic state taskability","Controls that shift users and talent without reducing threat"],"case_ids":["ST-07","ST-09","ST-17"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS049","CCV-AS062"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R06","title":"Build energy and maritime resilience around time, not nominal diversity","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Supplier diversity, route alternatives, storage, demand flexibility, insurance and repair matter only if they preserve the state option for the full disruption window.","conditions":["Scenario-specific duration","Qualified route and supplier capacity","Commercial incentives","Exercise under compound failure"],"disqualifiers":["Counting pipelines, ports or stocks without throughput","Assuming naval presence restores commercial routing","Ignoring price and partner burden"],"case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS027","CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R07","title":"Convert PRC infrastructure through recipient value and explicit permission","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_conversion","finding":"Commercial delivery can create relationships and options, but trusted host consent, transparent terms, local benefit and security agreements—not debt exposure—determine strategic access.","conditions":["Recipient demand","Sustainable operation","Host-authorized rights","Nonexclusive relationships tolerated"],"disqualifiers":["Assuming ownership equals sovereign control","Debt distress as a basing mechanism","Visits as proof of sustained throughput"],"case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS028","CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R08","title":"Avoid exhausting PRC material and market leverage through indiscriminate use","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_preservation","finding":"Mineral and market concentration has greatest option value before targets pay for alternatives; broad or repeated pressure accelerates substitution, coalition alignment and supplier-reputation loss.","conditions":["Narrow product and objective","Target alternatives assessed","Sender revenue and reputation protected","Off-ramp available"],"disqualifiers":["Fungible products","No plausible target behavior","Pressure that strengthens counter-coalitions"],"case_ids":["ST-03","ST-04","ST-05","ST-08"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS017","CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045","CCV-AS048"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R09","title":"Reduce PRC frontier-chip and maritime-energy exposure without assuming rapid autonomy","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Indigenous substitution, efficiency, stocks, pipelines, supplier diversity and mature-node strengths reduce exposure, but frontier tools and seaborne oil remain time- and quality-specific dependencies.","conditions":["Equivalent performance","Qualified production","Inventory and route endurance","Cost and innovation trade-offs disclosed"],"disqualifiers":["Announced capacity","Gross domestic production","Pipelines or stockpiles without scenario sufficiency"],"case_ids":["ST-06","ST-07","ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS019","CCV-AS020","CCV-AS022","CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R10","title":"Treat financial internationalization as an institutional bundle","primary_system":"PRC-centered","type":"power_conversion","finding":"Payment rails and trade settlement provide resilience, but global monetary power also requires trusted assets, convertibility, legal predictability and deep markets whose expansion can conflict with domestic capital control.","conditions":["Market depth","Asset safety","Convertibility","Predictable governance"],"disqualifiers":["CIPS volume as a dollar-equivalence proxy","Trade share as reserve demand","Ignoring the control-openness trade-off"],"case_ids":["ST-10"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R11","title":"Measure provision-to-influence conversion at the recipient","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"measurement_and_power_conversion","finding":"Vaccines, infrastructure, education and media should be credited only when recipient-side evidence shows durable trust, access, preference or behavior beyond delivery and exposure.","conditions":["Recipient baseline","Alternative providers","Longitudinal relationship measure","Observed consequential choice"],"disqualifiers":["Doses, dollars, institutes or audience as influence","Provider-authored attribution","Ignoring host agency"],"case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14","ST-16","ST-17"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS029","CCV-AS055","CCV-AS059","CCV-AS061","CCV-AS062","CCV-AS063"]},{"response_id":"CCV-R12","title":"Stress common modes across instruments","primary_system":"Both systems","type":"vulnerability_reduction","finding":"Taiwan fabrication, specialized chip tools, cloud providers, maritime routes, mineral processing, energy and host permissions can fail together; nominal diversification is invalid when substitutes share the same supplier, authority, geography or network.","conditions":["End-to-end dependency map","Compound scenarios","Functional recovery deadline","Private and partner authorization modeled"],"disqualifiers":["Asset counts","Geographic labels without supplier tiers","Recovery of equipment without recovery of state option"],"case_ids":["ST-05","ST-06","ST-07","ST-08","ST-09","ST-12","ST-18"],"source_ids":["CCV-AS020","CCV-AS024","CCV-AS027","CCV-AS031","CCV-AS046","CCV-AS048","CCV-AS054"]}],"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0","status":"full_portfolio_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Forty-eight broad-screen records, ten frozen focus findings, eighteen case dispositions, and twelve bounded response findings","review_type":"precommitted internal adversarial review; not external peer review","rival_hypothesis_results":[{"id":"CCV-H01","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Commercial hulls, infrastructure finance, R&D spending, platform reach and broad semiconductor output were not counted as power without a conversion path."},{"id":"CCV-H02","result":"pass","effect":"No domestic-only service or welfare finding entered the focus set."},{"id":"CCV-H03","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Private cloud, semiconductor firms, commercial ships, universities and host-owned facilities retain separate taskability and permission judgments."},{"id":"CCV-H04","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Dollar, semiconductor, mineral, market and infrastructure centrality were separated from policy leverage."},{"id":"CCV-H05","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Rare-earth and semiconductor cases retain target adaptation and do not infer compellence from cost or denial."},{"id":"CCV-H06","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Alliance and access findings require authorization and delivery; aggregate allied spending is treated as an input."},{"id":"CCV-H07","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Taiwan, advanced lithography, cloud, mineral processing, shipping and energy routes remain common-mode dependencies despite nominal diversification."},{"id":"CCV-H08","result":"decisive_in_ST_18","effect":"The 2024 earthquake exposure recovered within threshold and was not labeled a demonstrated strategic vulnerability."},{"id":"CCV-H09","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"PRC energy-route exposure and U.S. access dependence are not treated as easily exploitable outside a specified high-escalation scenario."},{"id":"CCV-H10","result":"decisive_in_ST_18","effect":"Company loss and fab interruption were kept below scope absent an international state-option loss."},{"id":"CCV-H11","result":"pass_no_stability_ruling","effect":"No protest, election, hardship or regime-type claim became a state-stability finding."},{"id":"CCV-H12","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"U.S. innovation, culture, media, cloud and university advantages remain ecosystem benefits rather than wholly taskable state instruments."},{"id":"CCV-H13","result":"decisive_in_ST_03_and_ST_07","effect":"Japanese diversification and PRC semiconductor adaptation bound the duration and net effect of leverage."},{"id":"CCV-H14","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Financial, mineral and semiconductor leverage findings retain network fragmentation, substitution and supplier-reputation costs."},{"id":"CCV-H15","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Twelve protective and conversion responses survived as conditional findings only after partner, substitute, market, legal, escalation, and self-harm bounds; no blockade, operational target package, or general compellence recommendation was admitted."},{"id":"CCV-H16","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Intelligence, state endurance, deterrence, cyber and standards comparisons remain withheld or scenario-specific where public observability is asymmetric."}],"mandatory_test_results":[{"id":"CCV-T01","result":"pass","note":"All ten focus findings, eighteen cases, and twelve response findings specify an international option, external effect, coercion-resistance function, or cross-border network."},{"id":"CCV-T02","result":"pass","note":"Each focus finding identifies the exact source and rejects overall domain aggregation."},{"id":"CCV-T03","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Host, partner and private discretion are explicit; ownership and domicile are not control."},{"id":"CCV-T04","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Conversion is supported or bounded separately for both systems in every finding."},{"id":"CCV-T05","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Denial and pain are not promoted to target policy response where behavior evidence is absent."},{"id":"CCV-T06","result":"pass","note":"ST-18 remained below threshold; other vulnerability findings name the state option and response window."},{"id":"CCV-T07","result":"pass","note":"Independent ecosystems remain separately attributed throughout."},{"id":"CCV-T08","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Alliance, access, space and semiconductor findings count partners only through authorization, compliance or delivered mechanisms."},{"id":"CCV-T09","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Finance, minerals, semiconductors and infrastructure retain reachable-node, alternatives and response tests."},{"id":"CCV-T10","result":"pass_first_order","note":"Visible common modes are mapped; hidden supplier tiers remain a declared limit rather than a resilience credit."},{"id":"CCV-T11","result":"pass_with_dynamic_results","note":"Japan and Taiwan show real substitution or recovery; semiconductor and maritime substitutes remain incomplete."},{"id":"CCV-T12","result":"pass","note":"ST-18 measured restoration of production and lack of downstream state-option loss rather than asset repair alone."},{"id":"CCV-T13","result":"pass_with_scenario_bounds","note":"Energy and alliance vulnerabilities remain scenario-bound; material and semiconductor controls have observed access but bounded target effect."},{"id":"CCV-T14","result":"pass","note":"The earthquake was admitted, adjudicated, and kept below strategic threshold on observed evidence."},{"id":"CCV-T15","result":"pass_no_ruling","note":"No state-stability conclusion was attempted."},{"id":"CCV-T16","result":"pass","note":"Adaptation is central to rare-earth, semiconductor, finance, energy and infrastructure findings."},{"id":"CCV-T17","result":"pass_with_bounded_responses","note":"Self-harm bounds all leverage findings; twelve responses survived only as conditional power-preservation, vulnerability-reduction, measurement, or conversion findings."},{"id":"CCV-T18","result":"pass_with_surviving_rivals","note":"Every portfolio case retains material rival causes and actor-theory limits."},{"id":"CCV-T19","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Only stage-matched comparative calls were made; innovation and maritime findings remain split and several candidates are withheld."},{"id":"CCV-T20","result":"pass","note":"There is no score, edge count, composite or overall national winner; negative and insufficient results remain visible."}],"finding_dispositions":{"survived_as_extreme_stage_specific_asymmetry":["CCV-F01","CCV-F02","CCV-F03","CCV-F05","CCV-F06"],"survived_as_split_or_bounded_asymmetry":["CCV-F04","CCV-F07","CCV-F08","CCV-F09"],"survived_as_falsifying_recovery_case":["CCV-F10"],"rejected_inference_examples":["Infrastructure finance automatically produces a base","Financial or material pain automatically compels policy","Commercial shipbuilding share automatically produces global military sustainment","Semiconductor fabrication share equals full-stack control","Geographic concentration automatically equals realized strategic vulnerability"]},"continuing_limits_not_release_blockers":["The product is internally red-teamed public-source analysis and not external peer review or an intelligence assessment.","Product-level bills of material, inventories, and classified logistics remain necessary before operational implementation decisions.","Recipient and target-side evidence remains thin in several influence and compellence cases, which stay bounded or insufficient.","The purposive portfolio is explanatory rather than statistically representative."]},"observations":[{"observation_id":"CCV-AO001","case_ids":["ST-01","ST-02","ST-10"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"The dollar remained dominant across reserves, international debt and loans, foreign-exchange turnover and cross-border payments because deep markets and network effects reinforce one another.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple functions retain dollar plurality or majority","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_structural","source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_global_denominators","limitation":"Position does not show that a particular sanction changes target policy.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_us_financial_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO002","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"The dollar was on one side of 89.2% of global foreign-exchange trades while the renminbi was on 8.5%, a function-specific gap that cannot be explained by PRC trade scale alone.","quantitative_anchor":"USD 89.2%; RMB 8.5%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS002"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_common_denominator","limitation":"Turnover double-counts currency sides and is not reserve share or coercive reach.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_extreme_and_prc_relative_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO003","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2026-Q1","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"Disclosed official reserves remained concentrated in the dollar while the renminbi share stayed near 2%.","quantitative_anchor":"USD 57.13%; EUR 20.03%; RMB 1.99%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS003"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_common_denominator","limitation":"Valuation and unallocated reserves affect shares, and reserves are only one monetary function.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_extreme_and_prc_relative_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO004","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024-2025","causal_stage":"network_building","observation":"CIPS and renminbi settlement expanded materially, providing a real sanctions-resistance and bilateral-payment pathway even though they did not displace incumbent global functions.","quantitative_anchor":"CIPS processed roughly RMB175 trillion in 2024","evidentiary_role":"countertrend","source_ids":["CCV-AS004"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"actor_report_unmatched","limitation":"Gross transaction value can include repeated flows and does not establish independent clearing, convertibility or user preference.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_prc_extreme_weakness_to_global_substitution_function","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO005","case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12","ST-15"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"aggregated_capacity","observation":"NATO combined 32 members, shared plans and institutions, and more than $1.4 trillion in estimated defense expenditure; all allies met the prior 2% guideline in 2025.","quantitative_anchor":"32 allies; over USD1.4 trillion; all allies at least 2%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS005"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_common_accounting","limitation":"Expenditure, membership and plans do not establish crisis authorization or delivered combat power.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_permissioned_network_input","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO006","case_ids":["ST-11","ST-12"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2020-current","causal_stage":"conversion_mechanism","observation":"DOD acquisition and cross-servicing arrangements created a standardized mechanism for exchanging logistics with a very broad partner set.","quantitative_anchor":"104 countries documented as eligible in GAO review","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_mechanism","source_ids":["CCV-AS006"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_mechanism","limitation":"Eligibility, records and peacetime orders do not prove usable high-end crisis throughput.","adjudication_effect":"supports_access_conversion_but_preserves_permission_gate","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO007","case_ids":["ST-13"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2017-2024","causal_stage":"external_effect","observation":"The Djibouti base provided persistent regional presence and military diplomacy, but as of 2024 had not supported a noncombatant evacuation or the Red Sea shipping crisis and had minimal participation in protecting citizens or investments.","quantitative_anchor":"one acknowledged support base; zero cited evacuations or Red Sea support through 2024","evidentiary_role":"mixed_direct_case","source_ids":["CCV-AS007"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_case_unmatched","limitation":"U.S. assessment may not observe classified uses and nonparticipation can reflect policy choice rather than physical inability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_bounded_djibouti_conversion_not_generic_access","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO008","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024","causal_stage":"capacity_growth","observation":"The PRC had more than 500 ISR-capable satellites after launching 67 in 2024 and began proliferated communications constellations, materially improving sensing and long-range kill-chain support.","quantitative_anchor":">500 ISR-capable satellites; 67 launched in 2024","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS007"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_inventory_plus_assessment","limitation":"Inventory does not establish availability, data quality, survivability or comparative mission effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_space_strength_not_overall_edge","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO009","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"qualified_output","observation":"Virginia-class production was running at about one submarine per year in June 2025, half the Navy goal; two 2025 deliveries were each more than three years late.","quantitative_anchor":"1 per year versus 2 goal; two deliveries more than 3 years late","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS008"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"declared_goal_denominator","limitation":"Submarine output is only one ship class and does not compare platform quality or existing fleet capacity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_us_shipbuilding_conversion_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO010","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2024-2025","causal_stage":"mobilization_capacity","observation":"None of the seven U.S. shipbuilders constructing Navy battle-force ships was positioned to meet delivery goals despite major industrial-base investment.","quantitative_anchor":"0 of 7 positioned to meet goals","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS009"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"complete_named_us_universe","limitation":"The assessment does not quantify how much capacity can improve or compare PRC naval quality and design complexity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_systemic_not_program_specific_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO011","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"strategic_dependency","observation":"Military Sealift Command identifies sealift as the path for 90% of decisive wartime force movement and reports an average government surge-sealift fleet age of about 40 years.","quantitative_anchor":"90% of decisive force by sealift; average age 40 years","evidentiary_role":"dependency_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS010"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"actor_declared_requirement","limitation":"The statement does not measure readiness under a named conflict or the contribution of commercial and allied vessels.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategic_sealift_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO012","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2025","causal_stage":"industrial_scale","observation":"At the start of 2025 China held about 64% of the global shipbuilding orderbook by gross tonnage, owned 14.4% of fleet capacity, and Chinese-built ships represented 23% of the fleet by number.","quantitative_anchor":"64% orderbook; 14.4% owned capacity; 23% of fleet by ship count","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS011"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_global_denominators","limitation":"Commercial orders and ownership do not establish military suitability, taskability, crews, protection or overseas sustainment.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_physical_source_with_conversion_boundary","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO013","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2025","causal_stage":"industrial_scale","observation":"PRC clean-technology exports exceeded $165 billion and represented about half of global exports when intra-EU trade is excluded.","quantitative_anchor":">USD165 billion; about 50% of ex-intra-EU global exports","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS012"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_trade_denominator","limitation":"Product categories are civilian and market share does not establish coercive control or military conversion.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_industrial_and_trade_power","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO014","case_ids":[],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"cost_and_scale","observation":"IEA found facilities in the United States and Europe for selected solar, wind and battery technologies cost roughly 70% to 130% more to build than equivalent facilities in China.","quantitative_anchor":"70%-130% higher facility cost in U.S./Europe for selected technologies","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS013"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"selected_technology_comparison","limitation":"Subsidies, financing, utilization, quality, transport and future learning can change total delivered cost.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_scale_and_us_physical_conversion_gap","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO015","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"China was the leading refiner for nearly all assessed strategic minerals, and concentration continued to rise at processing and component stages even where mining diversified.","quantitative_anchor":"leading refiner in 19 of 20 assessed strategic minerals; average share around 70%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS014"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_material_set","limitation":"Average share hides product quality, inventories, recycling and strategic end-use sensitivity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_processing_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO016","case_ids":["ST-03","ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"Rare-earth concentration intensified down the chain: China held about 60% of mining, 91% of refining and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet production.","quantitative_anchor":"60% mining; 91% refining; 94% magnets","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS015"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_stage_denominators","limitation":"Shares do not identify product grades, inventories, alternative motor designs or a target's policy sensitivity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_magnet_stack_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO017","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_targets","period":"2025","causal_stage":"delivered_disruption","observation":"PRC controls on seven heavy rare earths produced observable shortages and temporary automotive production curtailments or halts outside China.","quantitative_anchor":"seven heavy rare-earth controls; multiple reported auto interruptions","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS014"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"product_specific_but_not_full_portfolio","limitation":"The evidence establishes disruption, not a bounded political demand, target policy change or durable leverage.","adjudication_effect":"supports_conversion_to_denial_not_compellence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO018","case_ids":["ST-03"],"system":"Japan_target","period":"2009-2020","causal_stage":"adaptation","observation":"After the 2010 shock Japan combined alternative upstream projects, material thrift, recycling and multilateral legal action; China's share of Japan's rare-earth imports fell from 85% to 58%.","quantitative_anchor":"85% in 2009 to 58% in 2020","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_recovery","source_ids":["CCV-AS017"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"same_country_common_denominator","limitation":"The aggregate masks heavy-rare-earth and magnet-stage dependence and cannot isolate each policy's contribution.","adjudication_effect":"supports_adaptation_and_leverage_decay","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO019","case_ids":["ST-03"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_complainants","period":"2012-2015","causal_stage":"counteraction","observation":"The United States, EU and Japan challenged PRC rare-earth restrictions; the WTO found key duties, quotas and trading-right restrictions inconsistent, and China removed the disputed measures by May 2015.","quantitative_anchor":"three complainants; measures removed by May 2015","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_counteraction","source_ids":["CCV-AS018"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"legal_measure_trace","limitation":"The case does not adjudicate an informal 2010 Japan-specific embargo and later controls use different legal designs.","adjudication_effect":"supports_multilateral_constraint_and_sender_adaptation","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO020","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2025","causal_stage":"dependency_mapping","observation":"The semiconductor chain is both globally distributed and highly concentrated by segment; national fabrication share alone fails to identify control of design, tools, materials, packaging or end use.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple concentrated segments; no single national full stack","evidentiary_role":"boundary","source_ids":["CCV-AS019"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_stack_taxonomy","limitation":"Input-output data lag current capacity and public sources cannot map every supplier tier.","adjudication_effect":"requires_node_specific_not_national_chip_call","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO021","case_ids":["ST-07"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2020-2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"U.S.-headquartered firms held about 68% of EDA and semiconductor-IP revenue in 2022, while advanced lithography machines were almost exclusively produced by one Dutch firm with critical German optics.","quantitative_anchor":"68% EDA/IP revenue; near-single-source advanced lithography","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative","source_ids":["CCV-AS020"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"segment_specific_common_denominator","limitation":"Corporate location does not prove government access; market shares and technical alternatives change.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_allied_control_stack_and_common_mode","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO022","case_ids":["ST-07"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2022-2025","causal_stage":"state_access_and_control","observation":"U.S. rules reached advanced computing, HBM, software and 24 equipment categories and used foreign-direct-product authorities, making allied and corporate compliance part of the control mechanism.","quantitative_anchor":"24 equipment categories plus software and HBM controls","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_mechanism","source_ids":["CCV-AS021"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"rule_specific","limitation":"Legal reach and item coverage do not establish enforcement, partner equivalence or target capability delay.","adjudication_effect":"supports_real_permissioned_chokepoint_mechanism","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO023","case_ids":["ST-07"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"adaptation","observation":"PRC firms and state programs responded through stockpiling, modified designs, indigenous equipment, evasion and substitution, while rule gaps and differing partner coverage required repeated revisions.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple rule revisions and documented adaptation pathways","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS022"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"case_specific_no_clean_counterfactual","limitation":"Public evidence cannot quantify the net time gained or military and AI capabilities foregone.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_usable_leverage_and_durability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO024","case_ids":["ST-07","ST-18"],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"industrial_output","observation":"On a broad value-added definition China accounted for 30% of global semiconductor manufacturing, Taiwan 22%, the United States 19%, and South Korea 11%.","quantitative_anchor":"China 30%; Taiwan 22%; U.S. 19%; Korea 11%","evidentiary_role":"comparative_context","source_ids":["CCV-AS034"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_value_added_denominator","limitation":"The category includes mature and advanced components and does not reveal state access, node quality or chokepoints.","adjudication_effect":"prevents_false_prc_weakness_from_advanced_node_controls","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO025","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"Taiwan_partner_ecosystem","period":"2024","causal_stage":"concentrated_capability","observation":"TSMC reported 34% of its Foundry 2.0 industry definition and 69% of wafer revenue from 7-nanometer-and-beyond technologies, confirming exceptional firm-level strategic concentration.","quantitative_anchor":"34% Foundry 2.0 share; 69% advanced-technology wafer revenue","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_concentration","source_ids":["CCV-AS030"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"company_defined_denominator","limitation":"Company definitions and revenue shares do not directly equal global leading-edge physical capacity or military end use.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_common_mode_exposure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO026","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"Taiwan_partner_ecosystem","period":"2024-04-03","causal_stage":"strategic_recovery","observation":"After Taiwan's largest earthquake in 25 years, TSMC restored more than 70% of fab tools within 10 hours, exceeded 80% at newer fabs, and reported no damage to critical EUV tools.","quantitative_anchor":">70% tool recovery in 10 hours; >80% at new fabs; zero critical EUV tool damage","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_recovery","source_ids":["CCV-AS031"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"direct_event","limitation":"Company-reported tool recovery does not measure yields, customer inventory or a larger and more geographically direct shock.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_strategic_loss_from_observed_earthquake","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO027","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"Taiwan_partner_ecosystem","period":"2024","causal_stage":"exogenous_shock_effect","observation":"TSMC later recognized about NT$3 billion in net earthquake losses but continued record 2024 output and revenue growth, with no evidenced international state-option loss from the April event.","quantitative_anchor":"about NT$3 billion net loss; record annual performance","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS030"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"event_to_company_outcome","limitation":"Annual performance can hide short customer delays and does not test blockade, prolonged power loss or simultaneous supplier failure.","adjudication_effect":"classifies_event_below_strategic_vulnerability_threshold","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO028","case_ids":[],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"innovation_input","observation":"PPP-adjusted R&D expenditure was approximately $1.028 trillion for China and $1.009 trillion for the United States, eliminating any defensible claim of overwhelming U.S. scale superiority.","quantitative_anchor":"China USD1.028T; U.S. USD1.009T PPP-adjusted","evidentiary_role":"comparative_context","source_ids":["CCV-AS023"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_ppp_denominator","limitation":"Spending does not measure quality, spillovers, duplication, mission relevance or state taskability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_split_innovation_model_not_overall_lead","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO029","case_ids":[],"system":"Both systems","period":"2024","causal_stage":"knowledge_to_output","observation":"China led KTI manufacturing with $2.4 trillion in value added, while the United States produced 43% of global KTI services—more than the EU-27 and China combined.","quantitative_anchor":"China KTI manufacturing USD2.4T; U.S. KTI services 43%","evidentiary_role":"comparative_asymmetry","source_ids":["CCV-AS023","CCV-AS034"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_sector_denominators","limitation":"Value added combines heterogeneous industries and private output is not automatically available to the state.","adjudication_effect":"supports_physical_vs_control_layer_thesis","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO030","case_ids":[],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2023-2025","causal_stage":"talent_dependency","observation":"Foreign-born workers were 46% of the U.S. science-and-engineering doctoral workforce in 2023, while temporary visa holders earned 42% of S&E master's and 38% of S&E doctorates in 2024; international S&E enrollment then fell 9% in 2024-25.","quantitative_anchor":"46% workforce; 42% master's; 38% doctorates; enrollment -9%","evidentiary_role":"mixed_dependency","source_ids":["CCV-AS023"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_common_education_data","limitation":"Foreign birth and temporary status do not imply foreign control, and most doctorate recipients remain in the United States.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_attraction_power_and_talent_pipeline_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO031","case_ids":[],"system":"U.S.-anchored_private_ecosystem","period":"2020-2022 estimates published 2025","causal_stage":"network_position","observation":"AWS, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud dominated examined cloud markets, creating global digital reach but also provider concentration and switching-cost exposure.","quantitative_anchor":"top two often held a large majority in examined jurisdictions","evidentiary_role":"mixed_network_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS024"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"jurisdiction_specific_mixed_years","limitation":"Market estimates differ by country and private firms retain commercial and legal discretion.","adjudication_effect":"supports_private_control_layer_not_direct_state_power","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO032","case_ids":["ST-05"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2024","causal_stage":"delivered_supply","observation":"The United States exported 11.9 billion cubic feet per day of LNG in 2024, remaining the world's largest LNG exporter, with Europe receiving 53%.","quantitative_anchor":"11.9 Bcf/d; Europe 53%","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_conversion_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS025"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_energy_flow","limitation":"Exports were commercial, capacity was highly utilized, and volume does not establish policy leverage or spare crisis supply.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_energy_source_and_partner_option","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO033","case_ids":[],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2024","causal_stage":"strategic_dependency","observation":"China consumed about 16.3 million barrels per day of liquids, produced 4.3 million domestically and imported 11.1 million barrels per day of crude; roughly 92% of crude imports arrived by sea.","quantitative_anchor":"16.3 consumed; 4.3 produced; 11.1 imported; 92% seaborne","evidentiary_role":"dependency_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS026","CCV-AS027"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_energy_balance","limitation":"Gross import dependence does not account for strategic stocks, refined exports, pipelines, demand control or supplier diversity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_energy_and_route_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO034","case_ids":["ST-06"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_region","period":"2025-H1","causal_stage":"route_concentration","observation":"China received about 48% of crude and condensate import volumes passing through the Strait of Malacca in the first half of 2025.","quantitative_anchor":"China 48% of Malacca crude and condensate import flows","evidentiary_role":"dependency_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS027"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_route_flow","limitation":"Neither the United States nor a partner automatically controls the strait; alternate routes, pipelines and escalation dominate exploitability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_exposure_but_bounded_exploitability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO035","case_ids":["ST-13","ST-14"],"system":"PRC-centered","period":"2013-2021","causal_stage":"upstream_provision","observation":"GAO estimated PRC infrastructure financing at $679 billion versus $76 billion from the United States across selected sectors in 2013-2021, demonstrating an order-of-magnitude provision gap.","quantitative_anchor":"PRC USD679B; U.S. USD76B","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_comparative_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS028"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_selected_sector_estimate","limitation":"Finance is not delivered quality, ownership, recipient alignment, exclusive access or military rights.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_upstream_infrastructure_source","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO036","case_ids":["ST-13"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_Djibouti","period":"2013-2025","causal_stage":"conversion_chain","observation":"PRC investment and port relationships preceded a 2014 defense agreement and the 2017 base, but Djibouti also hosts other foreign forces and derives rent from preserving host bargaining options.","quantitative_anchor":"one PRC base within a multi-base host economy","evidentiary_role":"mixed_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS029"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"single_case","limitation":"Sequence does not prove the investment purchased the permission, that rights are exclusive, or that other financed ports will convert.","adjudication_effect":"supports_real_but_non_generalizable_access_pathway","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO037","case_ids":[],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2025","causal_stage":"partner_conversion","observation":"The Space Force documented operational partnerships spanning SATCOM, hosted payloads, PNT, radar and commercial space-domain awareness, while GAO found staffing and coordination gaps that prevent full conversion.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple mission areas and partners; implementation milestones incomplete","evidentiary_role":"mixed_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS032","CCV-AS033"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"one_system_process","limitation":"Strategy examples and oversight do not establish wartime contribution or matched PRC performance.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strong_allied_space_source_with_conversion_gap","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO038","case_ids":["ST-18"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_Taiwan","period":"2024 onward","causal_stage":"mitigation_pipeline","observation":"TSMC announced three Arizona fabs and more than $65 billion in planned investment, but the later fabs and most advanced nodes remained future capacity during the calibration event.","quantitative_anchor":">USD65 billion planned; three-fab program","evidentiary_role":"future_mitigation_input","source_ids":["CCV-AS035"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"project_specific","limitation":"Announced investment is not completed, qualified, cost-competitive or crisis-available output.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_current_diversification_credit","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO039","case_ids":["ST-01"],"system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Iran_target","period":"2013-2016","causal_stage":"leverage_to_bargain","observation":"Coalition-accessible financial restrictions and negotiated relief were connected to a bargain that Iran implemented sufficiently for the IAEA to verify the required nuclear steps on Implementation Day.","quantitative_anchor":"Implementation Day 16 January 2016","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bounded_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS037","CCV-AS038","CCV-AS040"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"single_case_process_trace","limitation":"The evidence supports bargaining and implementation, not a claim that sanctions alone caused Iran's decision or permanently changed preferences.","adjudication_effect":"supports_financial_leverage_for_bounded_bargain","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO040","case_ids":["ST-01"],"system":"U.S.-anchored_and_partners","period":"2018-2026","causal_stage":"reversal_and_persistence","observation":"U.S. withdrawal reimposed financial restrictions after verified implementation, while the multilateral arrangement subsequently unraveled and prior Security Council measures were reapplied in 2025.","quantitative_anchor":"relief reversed in 2018; prior UN measures reapplied in 2025","evidentiary_role":"negative_durability_and_self_harm","source_ids":["CCV-AS039","CCV-AS040"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"same_case_reversal","limitation":"Iranian nonperformance and wider regional developments also shaped collapse; the record does not assign sole responsibility.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_durable_compliance_and_flags_credibility_cost","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO041","case_ids":["ST-02"],"system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Russia_target","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"reachable_financial_denial","observation":"Coalition jurisdiction immobilized a very large share of accessible Russian central-bank assets and restricted banks and payment channels, demonstrating practical control over permissioned financial nodes.","quantitative_anchor":"about EUR210 billion of Russian central-bank assets blocked in the EU","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_denial","source_ids":["CCV-AS041"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"coalition_legal_and_asset_record","limitation":"Blocked assets are not the same as confiscated funds, reduced weapons output or a target policy change.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strong_financial_denial_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO042","case_ids":["ST-02"],"system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Russia_target","period":"2022-2026","causal_stage":"target_adaptation_and_outcome","observation":"Financial restrictions constrained accessibility, payments and growth, but capital controls, rerouted trade and continuing commodity revenue allowed adaptation; the admitted record does not show that financial pressure compelled war termination.","quantitative_anchor":"continued macroeconomic operation under tighter payment constraints","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence_to_compellence","source_ids":["CCV-AS001","CCV-AS041","CCV-AS064"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"multi_source_target_response","limitation":"War finance, battlefield developments, fiscal data and counterfactual growth remain only partly observable in public evidence.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_usable_leverage_to_cost_and_resource_denial","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO043","case_ids":["ST-04"],"system":"PRC-centered_actor_Australia_target","period":"2020-2023","causal_stage":"market_pressure","observation":"PRC barriers imposed concentrated losses on selected Australian exporters and demonstrated access to a large destination market as a source of pressure.","quantitative_anchor":"multiple targeted commodity and goods categories","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_sector_pressure","source_ids":["CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"target_government_and_economy_record","limitation":"Formal, informal, sanitary and commercial measures differ, and exact PRC demands were not consistently public.","adjudication_effect":"supports_product_specific_exposure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO044","case_ids":["ST-04"],"system":"Australia_target_and_third_markets","period":"2020-2023","causal_stage":"substitution_and_policy_response","observation":"Australian firms redirected major commodity flows and aggregate exports remained resilient while the government did not reverse the principal policies commonly associated with the pressure campaign.","quantitative_anchor":"large coal and commodity diversion to alternative buyers","evidentiary_role":"counterevidence_to_national_compellence","source_ids":["CCV-AS044","CCV-AS045"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"same_case_sector_and_aggregate","limitation":"Some firms and sectors bore severe costs, and policy continuity may also reflect domestic politics or security preferences.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_durable_prc_policy_leverage_in_case","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO045","case_ids":["ST-05"],"system":"European_partner_system_Russia_supplier","period":"2021-2025","causal_stage":"strategic_recovery","observation":"Europe reduced Russian gas imports from roughly 150 bcm in 2021 to 52 bcm in 2024, cut the Russian share from about 45% to 19%, reduced demand and diversified supply without abandoning support for Ukraine.","quantitative_anchor":"150 bcm to 52 bcm; 45% to 19%; gas demand down 17% over the reported period","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_substitution_and_coercion_resistance","source_ids":["CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"regional_common_flow","limitation":"The adjustment imposed high prices and unequal sectoral costs, and mild weather, demand destruction and macroeconomic weakness contributed.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategic_recovery_and_partner_option_preservation","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO046","case_ids":["ST-05"],"system":"Russia_supplier_Europe_target","period":"2021-2026","causal_stage":"power_base_erosion","observation":"Russia's initial pipeline position created severe short-run exposure, but supply coercion accelerated infrastructure, regulatory and demand changes that removed most of the enduring European market position.","quantitative_anchor":"Russian piped deliveries to the EU down about 90% from 2021 to 2025","evidentiary_role":"negative_feedback","source_ids":["CCV-AS042","CCV-AS043"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"before_after_market_position","limitation":"Revenue was partly redirected and causality includes sanctions, war damage, policy choice and market response.","adjudication_effect":"supports_leverage_self_liquidation_risk","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO047","case_ids":["ST-06"],"system":"global_shipping_network","period":"2023-2025","causal_stage":"exogenous_and_adversarial_disruption","observation":"Red Sea attacks induced large-scale rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, higher insurance and freight costs, longer voyages and a 17% rise in global ton-miles in 2024.","quantitative_anchor":"global ton-miles up 17% in 2024","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_network_disruption","source_ids":["CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"observed_global_shipping_response","limitation":"Freight rates also reflect fleet supply, demand and other disruptions; ton-miles are not a direct measure of state-option loss.","adjudication_effect":"supports_route_common_mode_and_costly_substitution","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO048","case_ids":["ST-06"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_global_shipping","period":"2023-2026","causal_stage":"protection_conversion_limit","observation":"International naval and diplomatic responses reduced some risks but did not restore normal routing across the observation window; commercial networks substituted geographically while accepting higher cost and delay.","quantitative_anchor":"persistent rerouting through 2025","evidentiary_role":"mixed_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS046","CCV-AS047"],"fact_confidence":"moderate","comparability":"campaign_to_commercial_outcome","limitation":"The counterfactual without naval protection is unavailable and force protection may have prevented worse losses.","adjudication_effect":"shows_defense_cannot_automatically_normalize_private_network","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO049","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"PRC-centered_actor_global_targets","period":"2025-2026","causal_stage":"material_denial_effect","observation":"New PRC mineral and magnet controls produced licensing delays and documented downstream production curtailments, converting refining concentration into immediate product-specific denial capacity.","quantitative_anchor":"China exceeded 90% refining share for several controlled materials","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS048"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"product_specific_supply_chain","limitation":"Controls varied by product and destination, inventories delayed effects, and military end-use impact is not fully public.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_prc_material_control_and_target_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO050","case_ids":["ST-08"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_other_targets","period":"2025-2035 outlook","causal_stage":"adaptation_and_recovery","observation":"Substitution, recycling, stockpiling and non-PRC projects can reduce exposure, but qualification, by-product economics and long project lead times prevent rapid replacement for several products.","quantitative_anchor":"diversification remains slow for the most concentrated refining stages","evidentiary_role":"mixed_recovery","source_ids":["CCV-AS014","CCV-AS015","CCV-AS036","CCV-AS048"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"cross_material_outlook","limitation":"Projects and forecasts may slip; actual inventories and classified defense demand remain opaque.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_residual_vulnerability_but_bounded_long_run_leverage","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO051","case_ids":["ST-09"],"system":"European_hosts_PRC_vendors","period":"2020-2026","causal_stage":"host_regulatory_control","observation":"EU institutions and member governments designated Huawei and ZTE as high-risk suppliers and moved toward restrictions or phase-out, showing that host regulation and trust can override installed commercial scale.","quantitative_anchor":"EU-wide toolbox plus proposed three-year phase-out","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_host_control","source_ids":["CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"multi_host_policy","limitation":"Implementation remains uneven and policy designation does not quantify comparative technical performance or security risk.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_network_position_but_strategic_taskability_vulnerability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO052","case_ids":["ST-09"],"system":"European_hosts_and_operators","period":"2023-2026","causal_stage":"switching_cost_and_recovery","observation":"Persistent high-risk supplier presence and a proposed multi-year transition show that vendor substitution is feasible but costly, slow and dependent on qualified alternatives.","quantitative_anchor":"three-year proposed phase-out window","evidentiary_role":"mixed_substitution","source_ids":["CCV-AS049","CCV-AS050"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"policy_to_transition_window","limitation":"A common statutory deadline does not reveal operator-specific cost, coverage or service degradation.","adjudication_effect":"supports_digital_dependency_without_permanent_lock_in","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO053","case_ids":["ST-10"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_global_finance","period":"2010-2026","causal_stage":"alternative_network_growth","observation":"Renminbi trade settlement, swap lines and CIPS provide real bypass and liquidity options, but financial links, convertibility, asset depth and trust—not trade scale alone—remain binding constraints on system-wide monetary power.","quantitative_anchor":"RMB 8.5% of FX turnover and about 2% of disclosed reserves versus dollar 89.2% and 57.13%","evidentiary_role":"mixed_network_growth","source_ids":["CCV-AS002","CCV-AS003","CCV-AS004","CCV-AS051"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"common_global_denominators","limitation":"Currency roles differ by function and rapid policy or market change could alter shares.","adjudication_effect":"supports_growing_prc_option_but_extreme_relative_financial_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO054","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_Ukraine","period":"2022-2025","causal_stage":"coalition_conversion","observation":"A coalition of roughly 50 states built capability coalitions and armaments-director mechanisms linking battlefield requirements to donations, procurement, sustainment and production investments.","quantitative_anchor":"about 50 participating states; eight capability coalitions","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_permissioned_network_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS053"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"documented_governance_mechanism","limitation":"Governance and commitments do not establish that delivered quantities met every Ukrainian requirement or caused battlefield outcomes.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_us_partner_aggregation_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO055","case_ids":["ST-11"],"system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2022-2025","causal_stage":"physical_delivery_constraint","observation":"Replacement programs encountered long raw-material and component lead times; DOD invested nearly USD2 billion toward a sevenfold increase in 155 mm production while acknowledging delays across weapon programs.","quantitative_anchor":"nearly USD2 billion for 155 mm capacity; selected electronic lead time rose 19 to 34 months","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bottleneck","source_ids":["CCV-AS052","CCV-AS053"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"audited_us_programs","limitation":"Replacement capacity is not identical to allied aggregate supply, and announced expansion may not arrive within the operational window.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_us_physical_conversion_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO056","case_ids":["ST-12"],"system":"U.S.-Philippines_alliance","period":"2023-2025","causal_stage":"access_preparation","observation":"The allies expanded EDCA to nine sites and paired access with bilateral infrastructure funding, exercises and maritime cooperation, creating a more distributed option set under Philippine sovereignty.","quantitative_anchor":"nine EDCA sites; U.S. FY2025 request of USD128 million across seven sites plus Philippine investment","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_access_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS054"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"bilateral_agreement_and_funding","limitation":"Prepared sites and peacetime exercise do not guarantee authorization for a specific conflict, adequate throughput or survivability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_usable_but_permissioned_access_option","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO057","case_ids":["ST-14"],"system":"PRC-centered_and_Sri_Lanka_host","period":"2017-2018","causal_stage":"commercial_control_and_fiscal_context","observation":"A PRC state-owned operator acquired 85% of the port operating company under a 99-year concession for about USD1.1 billion; proceeds strengthened Sri Lanka's cash position, while the transaction was not a cancellation of the port loans.","quantitative_anchor":"85% operating-company share; 99 years; about USD1.1 billion","evidentiary_role":"mixed_commercial_conversion","source_ids":["CCV-AS055","CCV-AS056"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"recipient_and_imf_records","limitation":"The arrangement still created long-duration commercial control and relationship access; incomplete contract disclosure limits full assessment.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_automatic_debt_seizure_and_military_access_inference","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO058","case_ids":["ST-15"],"system":"NATO_partner_system","period":"2022-2024","causal_stage":"alliance_aggregation","observation":"Finland and Sweden chose membership after Russia's full-scale invasion, completed unanimous accession, and brought geography, forces and industrial capabilities into a 32-member treaty and planning system.","quantitative_anchor":"Finland joined 4 April 2023; Sweden joined 7 March 2024; 32 allies","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_network_expansion","source_ids":["CCV-AS057","CCV-AS058"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"completed_legal_and_institutional_change","limitation":"Added membership creates obligations as well as capability; official claims do not prove deterrence or net military effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_permissioned_aggregation_and_adversary_backfire","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO059","case_ids":["ST-15"],"system":"NATO_partner_system","period":"2022-2024","causal_stage":"permission_constraint","observation":"The accession process required each ally's ratification, demonstrating that the same sovereign-consensus architecture that legitimizes expansion can delay it through national bargaining.","quantitative_anchor":"unanimous ratification by 30 existing allies","evidentiary_role":"mixed_permission_evidence","source_ids":["CCV-AS057"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"institutional_process","limitation":"Delay can be a governance safeguard rather than only a weakness, and private bargaining motives are not fully observable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strength_and_vulnerability_of_permissioned_network","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO060","case_ids":["ST-16"],"system":"U.S.-partner_and_PRC-centered","period":"2020-2024","causal_stage":"valued_good_delivery","observation":"The United States reported delivery of 693.65 million donated doses to 117 countries, while WHO emergency listing made a major PRC vaccine available for global procurement; both systems converted production and diplomacy into real provision.","quantitative_anchor":"U.S. 693.65 million doses to 117 countries; Sinopharm WHO-listed","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_delivery_not_influence","source_ids":["CCV-AS059","CCV-AS060"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"nonmatched_provider_measures","limitation":"The provider measures are not directly comparable and do not include all PRC deliveries, recipient need, uptake or health effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_provision_capacity_but_not_durable_influence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO061","case_ids":["ST-16"],"system":"multi_system_recipients","period":"2021-2023","causal_stage":"recipient_absorption","observation":"Cold chain, staffing, data, risk communication, uptake and local health capacity materially mediated whether delivered doses became vaccinations and public value.","quantitative_anchor":"implementation constraints varied widely by recipient","evidentiary_role":"recipient_agency_and_conversion_constraint","source_ids":["CCV-AS061"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"cross_recipient_process","limitation":"WHO implementation evidence does not isolate provider reputation or subsequent foreign-policy decisions.","adjudication_effect":"blocks_dose_count_to_influence_inference","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO062","case_ids":["ST-17"],"system":"PRC-supported_network_US_hosts","period":"2019-2024","causal_stage":"host_revocation","observation":"U.S. Confucius Institutes fell from roughly 100 in 2019 to fewer than five after federal funding restrictions and host decisions, demonstrating extreme vulnerability of the state-supported network to legitimacy and host authorization.","quantitative_anchor":"about 100 to fewer than five","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_network_vulnerability","source_ids":["CCV-AS062"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"national_host_sample","limitation":"The U.S. is not representative globally; closure does not establish prior strategic influence or PRC direction of every activity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_host_control_and_prc_cultural_taskability_weakness","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"CCV-AO063","case_ids":["ST-17"],"system":"PRC-supported_network_US_hosts","period":"2014-2019","causal_stage":"host_and_program_control","observation":"University directors reported varied operations, locally negotiated agreements, educational benefits and concerns, making institute count an invalid proxy for centralized strategic taskability.","quantitative_anchor":"operations varied across reviewed institutions","evidentiary_role":"mixed_network_governance","source_ids":["CCV-AS063"],"fact_confidence":"high","comparability":"audited_contract_and_interview_sample","limitation":"Self-report can miss informal pressure and the review did not measure longitudinal attitudes or policy behavior.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_exposure_to_influence_inference","status":"applied"}],"metric_contracts":[{"metric_id":"CCV-M01","causal_stage":"scope_gate","title":"International strategic relevance","decision_question":"Does the candidate materially affect a state's international action, feasible options, coercion resistance, external reliability, or stability of the state?","definition_or_measure":"Record the exact state option or international effect, target or partner, theater or system, time horizon, and causal link; for domestic foundations record the threshold crossing into strategic effect.","unit":"structured_scope_contract","required_denominator":"All candidate benefits and disruptions, including domestic effects that do not cross the international gate","threshold_rule":"No CCV ruling when the asserted effect is solely domestic welfare, routine service continuity, sector importance, or political salience.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same international-effect gate to U.S./partner and PRC-centered candidates and to favorable and adverse evidence.","admissible_evidence":"Delivered state actions; foreign, partner, target, institution, market or network responses; mission effects; state-continuity evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Strategy emphasis; domestic loss alone; sector label; aggregate economic harm; public concern; unbounded national-security assertion.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M02","causal_stage":"power_source","title":"Power-source proposition","decision_question":"What resource, capability, relationship, institution, network position, legitimacy, or adaptive property is claimed as a source of power or leverage?","definition_or_measure":"Define the candidate, owner or provider, relevant state access, scarcity or advantage, international use case, and the effect it could plausibly enable.","unit":"candidate_specific_proposition","required_denominator":"All components required for the claimed use, not the most visible upstream asset","threshold_rule":"No supported power-source finding without a bounded use case and a noncircular mechanism connecting the source to a state option or external effect.","comparison_requirement":"Compare like use cases and functions; different objectives, theaters, targets, or time horizons remain separate findings.","admissible_evidence":"Capability records; institutional and network data; partner and operator evidence; observed uses; independent method and contrary evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Inventory; spending; GDP; market share; patent or publication count; alliance membership; audience size as automatic power.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M03","causal_stage":"access_and_control","title":"State access and practical control","decision_question":"Can the state lawfully, politically, commercially, technically, and operationally access or mobilize the candidate when needed?","definition_or_measure":"Map ownership, operation, authority, contracts, jurisdiction, private and partner discretion, crisis behavior, conditions, and revocation risk.","unit":"node_and_authority_map","required_denominator":"Every decisive node and actor from source to delivered effect","threshold_rule":"A candidate is bounded or withheld when nominal ownership, domicile, treaty, or contract cannot establish timely practical access.","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical control distinctions: ownership, jurisdiction, access, direction, denial, and reliable availability are not interchangeable.","admissible_evidence":"Law and agreements; contracts; operator decisions; crisis delivery; partner authorization; exercised access; restrictions and revocation.","mandatory_exclusions":"Company nationality; asset location; formal title; political alignment; membership; public commitment; state taskability inferred without evidence.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M04","causal_stage":"conversion","title":"Conversion capability","decision_question":"Can the state convert the source into a delivered instrument action or internationally consequential option at required scale, quality, place, and time?","definition_or_measure":"Trace source → authority and mobilization → instrument delivery → partner or target exposure → response or option effect, with conversion losses and delays.","unit":"causal_chain_with_time_and_scale","required_denominator":"Total available resource and total delivered usable effect under the declared case","threshold_rule":"No power finding when the chain stops at potential, announcement, funding, inventory, access, or output without usable state action.","comparison_requirement":"Use equivalent stages and time windows for both systems; do not compensate for an unobserved stage with strength elsewhere.","admissible_evidence":"Decision and delivery records; operational and market data; partner and recipient evidence; timing; quality; integration; observed use.","mandatory_exclusions":"Potential capacity; budget; commitment; co-occurring actions; resource abundance; modeling result without observed conversion.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M05","causal_stage":"external_response","title":"Target, partner, and system sensitivity","decision_question":"Does the external actor or system depend on, value, fear, trust, or respond to the source in the way required by the mechanism?","definition_or_measure":"Measure exposure, alternatives, preference, interpretation, authority, decision process, response, adaptation, and persistence for each target, recipient, partner, audience, or institution.","unit":"actor_or_system_response_record","required_denominator":"All relevant external actors, including nonresponders, substitutes, third countries, firms, and affected communities","threshold_rule":"No influence or leverage finding from exposure or dependence without evidence of sensitivity and response; target pain is not policy change.","comparison_requirement":"Match comparable actor roles and preserve agency; sender output cannot substitute for recipient evidence.","admissible_evidence":"Target and partner records; decisions; trade and network flows; surveys with methods; interviews; behavior; institution votes and implementation.","mandatory_exclusions":"Reach; contact; dependence share; price; audience size; signed statement; actor claim; correlation without response mechanism.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M06","causal_stage":"strategic_effect","title":"State-option gain or loss threshold","decision_question":"How much does the source or disruption expand, remove, delay, condition, or raise the cost of a meaningful state option?","definition_or_measure":"Predeclare the option, baseline, minimum usable effect, latest decision time, acceptable cost, alternatives, failure threshold, and persistence checkpoint.","unit":"option_set_and_threshold","required_denominator":"Complete feasible option set, including cheaper, partner, substitute, delayed, and non-action alternatives","threshold_rule":"Criticality requires that loss crosses the declared option or stability threshold and that adequate substitutes cannot arrive within time and cost.","comparison_requirement":"Use equivalent option definitions and avoid comparing different objectives or risk tolerances as one scale.","admissible_evidence":"Decision records; operational planning; cost and time; alternative options; partner availability; outcomes; counterfactual and sensitivity evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Generic importance; inconvenience; price increase; capacity loss; degraded domestic service; actor assertion that an option is vital.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M07","causal_stage":"network_position","title":"Network centrality, jurisdiction, and chokepoint potential","decision_question":"Does the state occupy and control a central node whose use can provide information, access, inducement, denial, or rule-setting advantage?","definition_or_measure":"Map topology, node centrality, flow share by function, jurisdiction, operator, switching and fragmentation, state institutions, target path, and alternatives.","unit":"network_node_and_flow_map","required_denominator":"All relevant flows, nodes, parallel systems, third countries, off-network activity, and affected partners","threshold_rule":"Centrality establishes potential only; leverage requires state access, target dependence, delivered action, response, and bounded erosion risk.","comparison_requirement":"Use the same functional network and denominator for both systems; reserve, payment, trade, data, and platform roles remain separate.","admissible_evidence":"Transaction and topology data; jurisdiction; operator and partner actions; target flows; denial or monitoring records; adaptation and alternatives.","mandatory_exclusions":"Market share; reserve share; traffic; company domicile; node count; network model without jurisdiction, target path, or state action.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M08","causal_stage":"partner_conversion","title":"Partner authorization and additionality","decision_question":"Does a partner contribution create an option or effect that the focal state could not deliver equivalently alone?","definition_or_measure":"Record commitment, decision authority, conditions, timing, delivered contribution, interoperability, burden, additionality, durability, and withdrawal risk.","unit":"partner_contribution_record","required_denominator":"Every partner counted in the claim and the focal state's unilateral alternative","threshold_rule":"No alliance or coalition credit without observed authorization and delivery connected to the declared effect.","comparison_requirement":"Attribute contributions to the partner and compare like partner roles; combined totals cannot obscure unavailable capacity.","admissible_evidence":"Partner law and decisions; operational and financial delivery; access use; interoperability; partner and local evidence; target response.","mandatory_exclusions":"Membership; treaty text; alignment; combined GDP or inventory; communiqué; exercise; affinity; assumed automatic support.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M09","causal_stage":"actor_control","title":"Private and independent actor taskability","decision_question":"Can the state direct, compel, incentivize, purchase, regulate, or merely benefit from the private, cultural, educational, scientific, media, or civil-society source?","definition_or_measure":"Classify actor independence, legal authority, contract, incentive, actual state request, response, refusal capacity, credibility effect, and attribution.","unit":"actor_control_class_and_event","required_denominator":"All material nonstate actors and the counterfactual without state direction","threshold_rule":"Independent effects may contribute to national advantage but cannot be counted as state capability or instrument delivery without control evidence.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same attribution rule to U.S./partner and PRC-centered firms, universities, media, platforms, and cultural actors.","admissible_evidence":"Governance and ownership; law; contracts; communications; operator choices; state requests; refusals; funding; recipient perceptions.","mandatory_exclusions":"Nationality; funding alone; regulation; beneficial effect; ideological affinity; state presence; assumption that authoritarian systems control every actor.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M10","causal_stage":"dependency","title":"Strategic dependency and common-mode exposure","decision_question":"Which suppliers, inputs, permissions, networks, partners, institutions, routes, and hidden tiers are necessary for access and conversion, and are apparently diverse paths truly independent?","definition_or_measure":"Build a node-edge map with control, concentration, geography, tier visibility, correlation, inventory, slack, qualification, switching, and unknown coverage.","unit":"dependency_graph_with_coverage","required_denominator":"Full source-to-effect chain, including private, partner, foreign, and shared upstream nodes","threshold_rule":"Vulnerability remains unscored when decisive tiers, control, substitute, or consequence are unknown; concentration alone is insufficient.","comparison_requirement":"Use equivalent mapping depth and report unknown shares rather than favoring the more transparent system.","admissible_evidence":"Bills of material; supplier and ownership records; contracts; network topology; operator and partner evidence; incidents; audits; qualification data.","mandatory_exclusions":"Sector import share; foreign supplier count; nominal diversification; ownership as control; missing data treated as resilience.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M11","causal_stage":"exploitability","title":"Adversary access and exploitability","decision_question":"Can another state identify, reach, time, and manipulate or disrupt the vulnerability at sufficient scale while managing attribution, counteraction, partner response, and escalation?","definition_or_measure":"Record adversary awareness, access, authority, delivery means, target sensitivity, timing, scale, denial or manipulation mechanism, detectability, countermeasures, and cost.","unit":"actor_mechanism_and_threshold","required_denominator":"All required adversary steps, failed attempts, alternative pathways, and defender controls","threshold_rule":"A vulnerability does not imply exploitability; exploitability does not imply acceptable or successful leverage.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same actor-capability and evidence threshold to both sides; capability estimates do not establish intent or use.","admissible_evidence":"Observed access and operations; doctrine and procurement; technical tests; target and partner response; attribution; costs; countermeasures.","mandatory_exclusions":"Adversary interest; public vulnerability; proximity; market position; theoretical cyber access; opaque capability; one past success generalized.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M12","causal_stage":"exogenous_shock","title":"Exogenous shock relevance","decision_question":"Can a non-adversarial event degrade the source or dependency enough to alter state action, options, coercion resistance, external reliability, or state stability?","definition_or_measure":"Predeclare hazard, exposure, warning, duration, direct loss, cascade, strategic threshold, foreign exploitation if any, substitution, recovery, and uncertainty.","unit":"scenario_specific_stress_record","required_denominator":"All affected power-source nodes and the strategic option set, not aggregate domestic damage","threshold_rule":"No CCV finding when a disaster or service loss lacks a material international-effect or state-stability trace.","comparison_requirement":"Use comparable shock severity and strategic function; do not rank states by disaster transparency or casualty reporting.","admissible_evidence":"Hazard and operational records; output and service loss; mission and policy effects; partner and market response; recovery; independent review.","mandatory_exclusions":"Casualties; economic loss; outage duration; emergency declaration; domestic disruption alone; assumed foreign exploitation.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M13","causal_stage":"substitution","title":"Functional substitution under strategic constraints","decision_question":"Can another source, provider, partner, route, technology, instrument, policy, or smaller objective deliver an equivalent state option within time, scale, quality, authority, and cost?","definition_or_measure":"Measure functional equivalence, spare capacity, qualification, switching time, political and legal availability, security, partner consent, distribution, and side effects.","unit":"substitute_option_record","required_denominator":"All plausible substitutes and the complete required function","threshold_rule":"A concentrated or disrupted node is not a critical vulnerability when an adequate substitute preserves the option within tolerance.","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical functional equivalence and switching assumptions to both systems; domestic substitution is not presumed superior.","admissible_evidence":"Qualification and exercises; real switching; capacity and inventory; contracts; partner permission; technical performance; price; delivery; side effects.","mandatory_exclusions":"Supplier count; announced project; nominal alternate; theoretical technology; domestic label; capacity lacking qualification or political access.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M14","causal_stage":"recovery","title":"Strategic functional recovery","decision_question":"How long does it take to restore the state option or international effect—not merely the asset or domestic service—to the required level?","definition_or_measure":"Separate detection, decision, mobilization, repair, restart, resupply, reauthorization, requalification, partner confidence, and full or partial functional recovery.","unit":"time_to_declared_strategic_function","required_denominator":"Required option or effect level, including degraded alternatives and recurrence","threshold_rule":"Critical vulnerability requires recovery beyond the declared decision or mission window after all credible temporary substitutes.","comparison_requirement":"Use functional rather than asset-restoration endpoints and comparable starting points.","admissible_evidence":"Incident and recovery timelines; output and mission data; exercises; partner and operator evidence; quality validation; recurrence; costs.","mandatory_exclusions":"Repair completion; reopened facility; restored average service; announcement; asset count; recovery assumed from plan.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M15","causal_stage":"sustainment","title":"Mobilization, throughput, and strategic endurance","decision_question":"Can the state and partners scale and sustain the source through the required campaign or structural horizon after consumption, losses, maintenance, learning, and competing demand?","definition_or_measure":"Measure initial availability, mobilization time, throughput, yield, consumption, attrition, maintenance, replenishment, fiscal cost, partner delivery, and adaptation.","unit":"usable_effect_per_time_against_demand","required_denominator":"Total declared strategic demand, including surge, losses, competing theaters, maintenance, and partner commitments","threshold_rule":"Initial inventory or capacity is insufficient when delivered net flow falls below demand before the persistence checkpoint.","comparison_requirement":"Match missions, intensity, time, and partner assumptions; do not compare peacetime output to wartime demand.","admissible_evidence":"Production and delivery; consumption and loss; maintenance; funding; labor; supplier tiers; partner contribution; operational availability.","mandatory_exclusions":"Spending; capacity announcement; gross production; inventory; employment; one delivery; theoretical surge.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M16","causal_stage":"adaptation","title":"Target, competitor, partner, and market adaptation","decision_question":"How do other actors reroute, substitute, innovate, retaliate, hedge, defect, cooperate, or change behavior after the source is used or disrupted?","definition_or_measure":"Record expected and observed adaptation, start time, cost, scale, effectiveness, spillover, policy response, and effect on persistence.","unit":"actor_specific_adaptation_timeline","required_denominator":"All material targets, partners, firms, markets, and third countries over the declared horizon","threshold_rule":"No durable advantage or leverage finding when adaptation erodes the mechanism before the required outcome or creates a stronger rival position.","comparison_requirement":"Apply the same adaptation window and evidence rule to both systems.","admissible_evidence":"Trade, technology, finance and operational data; policy changes; firm behavior; partner actions; market entry; alternative networks; interviews and audits.","mandatory_exclusions":"Initial shock; announced response; isolated workaround; no observed adaptation treated as impossible; static market or alliance assumptions.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M17","causal_stage":"state_stability","title":"State-stability and strategic-continuity threshold","decision_question":"Does domestic political, fiscal, institutional, informational, or social stress materially threaten state authority, implementation, external commitment, coercion resistance, or continuity?","definition_or_measure":"Predeclare the institution, external action, burden, threshold, mechanism, warning indicator, time horizon, affected partner, and distinction among policy change, regime change, and state instability.","unit":"bounded_stability_mechanism","required_denominator":"Complete state-action chain and plausible lawful or political alternatives","threshold_rule":"Domestic conditions are admitted only when evidence supports a strategic-action or state-stability effect; disagreement or distress alone is insufficient.","comparison_requirement":"Do not equate open dissent with weakness or repression with stability; apply equivalent functional tests across regime types.","admissible_evidence":"Authority and implementation; fiscal and institutional function; public and elite behavior; external policy; partner and opponent response; historic and comparative cases.","mandatory_exclusions":"Approval; protest; election; censorship; inequality; repression; polarization; elite rumor; hardship; regime preference; unbounded collapse forecast.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M18","causal_stage":"net_effect","title":"Self-harm, fratricide, and power-base erosion","decision_question":"Would using or protecting the source damage the same network, alliance, market, legitimacy, innovation ecosystem, prosperity, or state stability that makes it valuable?","definition_or_measure":"Record direct benefit and costs to own system, partners, third parties, firms, communities, rights, law, markets, innovation, escalation, legitimacy, network migration, and long-run position.","unit":"multi_party_net_strategic_effect","required_denominator":"All material benefits and harms over short, medium, and structural horizons","threshold_rule":"No mitigation or leverage option advances without delivered additionality and a bounded net strategic benefit after self-harm and erosion.","comparison_requirement":"Apply symmetric own-system and partner-harm tests to U.S./partner and PRC-centered options.","admissible_evidence":"Implementation and outcome data; partner and target response; market and technology adaptation; legal review; distribution; network and legitimacy trends.","mandatory_exclusions":"Gross target cost; domestic spending; symbolic action; assumed acceptable partner harm; short-term gain; unpriced legal or escalation risk.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M19","causal_stage":"comparative","title":"Matched comparative power or vulnerability","decision_question":"Are both systems being compared for the same strategic function, target or theater, scenario, time, partner availability, evidence stage, and outcome?","definition_or_measure":"Create a match record for scope, unit, denominator, date, control, conversion, target response, substitutes, recovery, costs, observability, and uncertainty.","unit":"matched_pair_or_explicit_noncomparison","required_denominator":"Complete claim universe for both systems and participating partners","threshold_rule":"One-sided evidence, different functions, unmatched scenarios, or unequal causal stages remain insufficient comparative basis.","comparison_requirement":"No opacity bonus or transparency penalty; lower confidence where evidence is asymmetric.","admissible_evidence":"Parallel primary and independent records; matched data; cases; partner and target evidence; methods; uncertainty and sensitivity.","mandatory_exclusions":"Deficit-on-one-side inference; ranking by source count; separate case anecdotes; domain positions; gross-resource or composite comparison.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"CCV-M20","causal_stage":"evidence_and_revision","title":"Evidence completeness, rivals, sensitivity, and confidence","decision_question":"How robust is each fact, access, conversion, external-effect, criticality, vulnerability, exploitability, leverage, mitigation, comparative, and observability judgment?","definition_or_measure":"Record source families, directness, coverage, denominators, uncertainty, opacity, contrary evidence, rivals, sensitivity, missing evidence, revision trigger, and separate confidence.","unit":"structured_confidence_and_gap_record","required_denominator":"Complete positive, negative, failed, adapted, partner, target, private-actor, and affected-party evidence universe","threshold_rule":"Missing decisive access, conversion, external-effect, substitution, recovery, target-response, or self-harm evidence forces insufficient basis.","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical admission and unknown rules; confidence cannot substitute for evidence or be averaged across judgment types.","admissible_evidence":"Primary, official and operator; independent audit and research; partner, target, recipient and affected-party; contrary and adaptation; dated data and methods.","mandatory_exclusions":"Source count; repeated citation of one data lineage; actor claim as validation; composite confidence; silence as zero; opacity as strength.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"}],"case_contracts":[{"case_id":"ST-01","case_title":"U.S. dollar, SWIFT, and secondary-sanctions leverage against Iran","primary_system":"U.S.-anchored_actor_Iran_target","period":"2010-2018","geography":"Global financial networks and Iran","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test currency and financial-network centrality, jurisdiction, partner compliance, target sensitivity, coercive conversion, negotiation effects, reimposition, and network costs.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires a trace from accessible financial nodes through partner implementation to Iranian economic and policy response, with the JCPOA and reversal phases separated.","thesis_challenge":"Severe financial pain may not produce durable policy compliance; unilateral overuse may damage alliances and encourage alternatives.","required_evidence_families":"Legal and sanctions record; SWIFT and banking participation; trade and finance; partner implementation; Iranian policy and adaptation; JCPOA record; humanitarian and third-party effects; network trends."},{"case_id":"ST-02","case_title":"Freeze of Russian reserves, bank restrictions, and financial adaptation after the invasion of Ukraine","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_actor_Russia_target","period":"2022-2026","geography":"Global financial system, Russia, Europe, and coalition jurisdictions","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test accessible versus gross reserves, coalition jurisdiction, payment and capital restrictions, sanctions absorption, target adaptation, war-finance effects, and long-run currency or network erosion.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires evidence that measures changed Russian strategic options, war financing, or policy—not merely assets, trade routes, prices, or welfare.","thesis_challenge":"Large frozen assets and initial shock may coexist with continued war effort, rerouting, commodity revenue, domestic controls, and coalition self-cost.","required_evidence_families":"Coalition legal and implementation record; reserve accessibility; fiscal and monetary data; payment and trade flows; evasion; military finance; target policy; partner costs; currency and network adaptation."},{"case_id":"ST-03","case_title":"PRC–Japan rare-earth disruption and subsequent diversification","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_Japan_target","period":"2010-2015","geography":"PRC, Japan, and global rare-earth supply chains","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether processing concentration became usable coercive leverage, how attribution and market forces are separated, and whether Japanese inventory, substitution, recycling, investment, and partner action reduced vulnerability.","international_effect_threshold":"A supported leverage or vulnerability finding requires product-specific denial, target strategic effect, policy sensitivity, and recovery beyond ordinary price movement.","thesis_challenge":"Contested attribution, short duration, demand change, and rapid adaptation may bound claims that concentration created durable coercive power.","required_evidence_families":"Customs and licensing; firm and government records; product and price data; inventories; end use; Japanese policy and investment; WTO and partner action; substitution and recovery; contrary attribution evidence."},{"case_id":"ST-04","case_title":"PRC trade coercion against Australia and market substitution","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_Australia_target","period":"2020-2023","geography":"PRC, Australia, and third-country commodity and goods markets","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test market dependence, product-specific restrictions, target policy sensitivity, third-country trade diversion, coalition signaling, sectoral distribution, and coercion resistance.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires evidence connecting restrictions to Australian state options or policy and measuring whether substitutes preserved national strategic freedom despite sector losses.","thesis_challenge":"Large bilateral trade exposure may not produce policy change when commodities are fungible, firms reroute, and political resistance hardens.","required_evidence_families":"Restriction and attribution record; bilateral and global trade; firm and sector effects; alternative markets; Australian policy; PRC objectives and response; partner support; prices; persistence."},{"case_id":"ST-05","case_title":"European dependence on Russian pipeline gas and strategic substitution","primary_system":"partner_led_Russia_supplier","period":"2021-2026","geography":"European Union, Russia, and global gas markets","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test supplier and infrastructure dependence, Russian revenue and coercion, storage, demand reduction, LNG and pipeline substitution, coalition burden, fiscal cost, and recovered policy freedom.","international_effect_threshold":"The case must distinguish energy service continuity and price from the ability to sustain sanctions, Ukraine support, industrial capacity, and political cohesion.","thesis_challenge":"Europe may regain strategic freedom at high fiscal, industrial, partner, and distributional cost; Russia may lose leverage while retaining revenue or redirecting trade.","required_evidence_families":"Energy balances and flows; storage; prices; contracts; infrastructure; policy timelines; demand and industry; fiscal support; Ukraine policy; Russian revenue and adaptation; partner and household effects."},{"case_id":"ST-06","case_title":"Red Sea attacks, shipping insurance, naval response, and rerouting","primary_system":"transnational_adversarial","period":"2023-2026","geography":"Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Suez, Cape routes, and global trade","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether a nonstate or state-backed actor can exploit a maritime chokepoint, how commercial shipping and insurers adapt, and whether coalition military action restores the strategic flow.","international_effect_threshold":"A strategic-vulnerability finding requires an effect on state options, coalition action, supply or market power beyond freight cost and delay.","thesis_challenge":"Rerouting and inventory may preserve function despite attacks; military presence may protect some traffic without restoring confidence or deterrence.","required_evidence_families":"Attack and attribution data; vessel and route flows; insurance and freight; naval operations; firm decisions; trade and strategic supply effects; coalition authorization; target adaptation; persistence."},{"case_id":"ST-07","case_title":"U.S.–Japan–Netherlands semiconductor controls and PRC adaptation","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_actor_PRC_target","period":"2022-2026","geography":"United States, Japan, Netherlands, PRC, Taiwan, Korea, and global chip stack","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test full-stack chokepoints, allied permission, licensing and enforcement, target capability delay, stockpiling, redesign, domestic substitution, partner and firm costs, and long-run stack fragmentation.","international_effect_threshold":"A supported leverage finding requires a bounded end-capability effect and time gain attributable to controls, not merely reduced shipments or higher target spending.","thesis_challenge":"Controls may accelerate PRC substitution, reduce allied revenue and R&D, create leakage, divide partners, and erode the same ecosystem that provides leverage.","required_evidence_families":"Rules and licenses; firm and partner implementation; node-specific capacity and performance; trade; stockpiles; PRC procurement and innovation; evasion; military and AI end use; costs; market and alliance effects."},{"case_id":"ST-08","case_title":"PRC gallium, germanium, graphite, antimony, and rare-earth controls","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_global_targets","period":"2023-2026","geography":"PRC and global strategic-material supply chains","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test product and processing centrality, licensing, target inventory and substitution, market price and supply response, retaliation, and whether restrictions produce leverage or catalyze de-risking.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires product-specific strategic consequence and state option or target-response evidence, with export administration separated from political coercion.","thesis_challenge":"Concentration may yield short-term disruption but destroy long-run supplier power by accelerating allied investment, recycling, substitution, and stockpiling.","required_evidence_families":"PRC rules and customs; product quality and end use; global production and processing; inventories; prices; firm and government response; new capacity; target policy; attribution and rationale; persistence."},{"case_id":"ST-09","case_title":"Huawei restrictions, 5G vendor substitution, and digital-network alignment","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_actor_PRC-firm_target","period":"2019-2026","geography":"Global telecommunications markets and partner networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test state control over private firms, security and intelligence claims, allied coordination, vendor dependence, switching cost, standards, market effects, PRC response, and network bloc formation.","international_effect_threshold":"A supported finding requires an evidenced security, access, market, partner, or strategic-option effect rather than firm nationality or equipment removal alone.","thesis_challenge":"Restrictions may reduce one exposure while increasing cost and concentration, weakening standards cooperation, or substituting another dependency.","required_evidence_families":"Security and legal record; operator networks; vendor shares and contracts; partner decisions; costs and performance; standards; financing; intelligence evidence within public limits; PRC and firm adaptation; market structure."},{"case_id":"ST-10","case_title":"RMB internationalization, CIPS, swap lines, and alternatives to dollar-centered finance","primary_system":"PRC-centered_builder_U.S.-anchored_incumbent","period":"2015-2026","geography":"Global reserve, payment, trade-finance, and central-bank networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether PRC payment and currency initiatives reduce sanctions exposure or create new financial leverage, and which market, institutional, convertibility, and trust constraints preserve dollar centrality.","international_effect_threshold":"A power finding requires function-specific international use and state access that changes financing, payment, reserves, coercion resistance, or partner choices.","thesis_challenge":"Transaction growth or swap-line count may not overcome capital controls, safe-asset limits, market depth, user trust, or dependence on incumbent networks.","required_evidence_families":"IMF and central-bank data; CIPS and payment data; invoicing and reserves; swap terms and use; market depth; legal and capital controls; sanctions adaptation; user and partner decisions; network interoperability."},{"case_id":"ST-11","case_title":"Ukraine support, munitions production, and allied burden sharing under policy change","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_system","period":"2022-2027","geography":"United States, Europe, Ukraine, and defense-industrial networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test alliance aggregation, partner agency, political authorization, industrial mobilization, fiscal endurance, logistics, battlefield conversion, credibility, and substitution when one contributor changes policy.","international_effect_threshold":"A source or vulnerability finding requires a trace from national and partner capacity through authorized delivery to Ukrainian options, Russian response, and coalition durability.","thesis_challenge":"High aggregate allied capacity may not convert quickly; burden shifts may spur European adaptation; aid delivery may not determine battlefield or negotiation outcomes alone.","required_evidence_families":"Budgets and authorizations; production and deliveries; inventories; logistics; Ukrainian use and outcomes; partner contributions; Russian adaptation; political decisions; fiscal and public burden; credibility evidence."},{"case_id":"ST-12","case_title":"Philippines EDCA access, basing distribution, and political authorization","primary_system":"U.S.-partner_access_system","period":"2014-2026","geography":"Philippines and Western Pacific","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether alliance ties and infrastructure convert into current host permission, distributed access, deterrence and response options under domestic politics, local concerns, disasters, and PRC pressure.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires exercised or credibly available access tied to a bounded mission and partner decision, not a site count or agreement alone.","thesis_challenge":"Domestic political turnover, legal limits, local opposition, escalation fears, infrastructure gaps, and mission caveats may sharply bound nominal access.","required_evidence_families":"Agreement and legal record; Philippine decisions and restrictions; local and public evidence; infrastructure and use; exercises and operations; U.S. planning; PRC response; alternatives; disaster use and mission effect."},{"case_id":"ST-13","case_title":"PRC Djibouti base and overseas infrastructure-to-access conversion","primary_system":"PRC-centered_actor_host_partner","period":"2008-2026","geography":"Djibouti, Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, and PRC overseas interests","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test when overseas finance, port relationships, diplomacy, and infrastructure become authorized military logistics and what host, commercial, political, geographic, and mission constraints remain.","international_effect_threshold":"A power finding requires demonstrated rights, use, throughput, mission effect, and host authorization; financing or port ownership alone is insufficient.","thesis_challenge":"One support base may provide limited mission utility, depend on host politics and routes, and not validate broad claims that development finance routinely converts into military access.","required_evidence_families":"Project and finance terms; ownership and rights; host and local evidence; base construction and use; port throughput; PLA missions; alternative facilities; partner and competitor response; costs and restrictions."},{"case_id":"ST-14","case_title":"Hambantota port, debt restructuring, and disputed leverage claims","primary_system":"PRC-centered_financier_Sri Lanka_recipient","period":"2007-2026","geography":"Sri Lanka, Indian Ocean, and PRC development-finance networks","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test debt, recipient agency, project economics, lease and control, domestic political and fiscal crisis, alternative explanations, military-access claims, and whether infrastructure creates usable state leverage.","international_effect_threshold":"A finding requires evidence of PRC state access or influence over Sri Lankan choices causally linked to the project and distinct from commercial lease, broader fiscal crisis, or recipient decisions.","thesis_challenge":"The case may contradict debt-trap and automatic port-to-base narratives while still revealing narrower financial, relationship, or access effects.","required_evidence_families":"Contracts and financing; project and port operations; Sri Lankan debt and fiscal record; restructuring; recipient and local evidence; PRC entities and state action; military visits or restrictions; alternative lenders; policy outcomes."},{"case_id":"ST-15","case_title":"Finland and Sweden NATO accession, combined capability, and Russian counteraction","primary_system":"partner_accession_and_alliance_system","period":"2022-2026","geography":"Nordic-Baltic and Euro-Atlantic theater","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test alliance aggregation, geographic and access effects, ratification and partner veto, interoperability, force and industrial contribution, deterrence, burden, and adversary adaptation.","international_effect_threshold":"A power finding requires authorized and integrated additional capability or access connected to strategic options or adversary expectations, not membership alone.","thesis_challenge":"Accession may improve coalition geography and capacity while creating new defense obligations, escalation, implementation lag, or uncertain deterrent effect.","required_evidence_families":"Ratification and conditions; force and infrastructure; plans and integration; exercises and deployments; industrial and intelligence contribution; partner burden; Russian posture and behavior; public and political support."},{"case_id":"ST-16","case_title":"PRC and U.S./partner vaccine provision and influence conversion","primary_system":"multi_system_competitive_provision","period":"2020-2023","geography":"Global with selected recipient comparisons","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test production, approval, delivery, quality, recipient need, diplomacy, narrative, trust, partner networks, and whether a valued good converted into durable access, affinity, alignment, or behavior.","international_effect_threshold":"An influence finding requires recipient-level relationship, trust, preference, access, decision, or behavior beyond doses pledged or delivered.","thesis_challenge":"Provision may meet urgent needs without durable influence; efficacy, timing, transparency, commercial terms, local agency, and rival offers may dominate state narrative.","required_evidence_families":"Production and delivery; regulatory and quality evidence; recipient need and alternatives; contract and aid terms; local public and government evidence; diplomacy and media; subsequent decisions and relationship; contrary cases."},{"case_id":"ST-17","case_title":"Confucius Institutes, closures, rebranding, and cultural-network taskability","primary_system":"PRC-centered_supported_network_foreign_hosts","period":"2004-2026","geography":"Universities and education systems across selected countries","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether state-supported language and education networks create attraction, access, relationships, narrative influence, or vulnerability to host restrictions and legitimacy loss while preserving university and participant agency.","international_effect_threshold":"A power or vulnerability finding requires evidence beyond institute count: state access or benefit, recipient trust or choice, relationship effect, host response, and durability.","thesis_challenge":"Closures may reflect domestic politics and security concerns without proving prior influence; rebranding or alternative providers may preserve language demand while eroding PRC state benefit.","required_evidence_families":"Contracts and governance; funding and curricula; participant and university evidence; state direction; host investigations and decisions; closures and successors; public attitudes; relationships and policy effects; comparator programs."},{"case_id":"ST-18","case_title":"Taiwan earthquake exposure and semiconductor strategic recovery","primary_system":"partner_and_global_technology_system","period":"2024","geography":"Taiwan and global semiconductor supply chains","power_source_or_vulnerability_test":"Test whether geographic concentration plus an exogenous shock materially constrains international technology, military, market, or state options after redundancy, inventories, rapid shutdown, recovery, and global supplier response.","international_effect_threshold":"A strategic-vulnerability finding requires an externally consequential capability or option loss beyond temporary plant interruption, with functional recovery measured at customer and end-use level.","thesis_challenge":"High concentration may coexist with strong engineering, seismic design, inventories, multiple fabs, customer buffers, and rapid recovery, bounding simplistic vulnerability claims.","required_evidence_families":"Hazard and facility data; production and yield; safety shutdown; inventory and customer exposure; recovery; alternate fabs and suppliers; market and end-use effects; government and partner response; future investment."}],"contract_limitation":"Case scope, international-effect thresholds, required evidence and thesis challenges are reproduced from the stress-case plan. Metric contracts are unapplied design rules, not a completed measurement table. Portfolio-context observations may have no assigned stress case; cross-case context is not direct case evidence."}