{"focus":"How current U.S.-anchored and PRC-centered strategies select, deliver, combine, and adapt the four instruments for declared objectives","intent":"Evaluate strategic coherence, implementation, cross-instrument interaction, response, outcome, cost, durability, and adaptation","question":"Given a predeclared objective, target or recipient, geography, time window, counterfactual, acceptable cost, and persistence threshold, how coherently and effectively did the system combine its available instruments, and what explains the observed result?","unit":"A bounded national strategy, strategic objective, campaign, or phase","prohibited_inference":"A strategy-document claim, simultaneous activity, domain position, or capability inventory cannot establish integration or strategic success.","cases":[{"case_id":"IS-C01","title":"U.S. and European response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","overall_ruling":"partially_effective_not_terminated","objective_result":"The coalition preserved Ukrainian state and military resistance and imposed costs, but did not terminate the war or remove binding delivery and political-continuity constraints.","mechanism_findings":["Permissioned coalition aggregation worked","Industrial and replenishment conversion remained binding","Outcome persistence depends on policy continuity and Ukrainian agency"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P10","IS-P11","IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO001","IS-AO002","IS-AO003"],"source_ids":["IS-AS001","IS-AS002","IS-AS003"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Durable settlement","Major coalition withdrawal","Measured production reaches or misses stated requirements"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO003","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C02","title":"NATO and partner engagement in Afghanistan","overall_ruling":"strategy_failure","objective_result":"The effort did not produce a self-sustaining Afghan state and security system; changing objectives, unrealistic timelines, partner exclusion and externally dependent force design failed the persistence test.","mechanism_findings":["Ends, ways and means drifted","Diplomatic bargaining undercut the partner government","Defense design and economic support did not survive withdrawal"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO004","IS-AO005","IS-AO006"],"source_ids":["IS-AS004","IS-AS005"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Material contrary evidence on sustainability or negotiated transition"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO006","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C03","title":"Advanced-semiconductor controls and allied technology coordination","overall_ruling":"bounded_denial_partial","objective_result":"Controls created friction and delay at selected frontier nodes; permanent denial, military outcome and PRC policy compliance are not established.","mechanism_findings":["Small allied chokepoint coalition achieved coverage","Target adaptation forced repeated rule changes","Ecosystem revenue, partner alignment and substitution bound durability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P09","IS-P12"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO008","IS-AO009"],"source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Equivalent PRC frontier production","Measured military delay","Partner rule divergence or strengthened common coverage"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO009","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C04","title":"Europe's exit from Russian gas dependence","overall_ruling":"effective_with_high_cost","objective_result":"Europe replaced most Russian pipeline dependence, preserved strategic freedom and institutionalized phaseout, while absorbing significant price and distributional cost.","mechanism_findings":["Diplomacy, regulation, infrastructure, markets and public demand reduction combined","Alternative supply and partner coordination restored options","Sender coercion accelerated loss of its own network position"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P10"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO010","IS-AO011","IS-AO012"],"source_ids":["IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Renewed structural dependence","Phaseout reversal","Evidence that strategic freedom was materially lost despite substitution"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO010","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO012","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C05","title":"U.S.-Philippines alliance and EDCA access conversion","overall_ruling":"access_option_effective_permissioned","objective_result":"The strategy converted assurance, diplomacy and funding into distributed prepared access and cooperation; wartime activation and deterrence remain untested.","mechanism_findings":["Threat alignment increased host demand","Local permission and investment made agreement operational","Sovereign caveats remain part of capability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P09","IS-P11"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO013","IS-AO014","IS-AO015"],"source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013"],"confidence":"high_for_access_low_for_deterrence","revision_triggers":["Mission-specific authorization or refusal","Host government policy reversal","Measured throughput and survivability"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C06","title":"Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","overall_ruling":"bounded_objective_effective_persistence_incomplete","objective_result":"The coalition achieved territorial defeat through local partners and cross-instrument coordination; enduring defeat of the organization and ideology remains incomplete.","mechanism_findings":["Military, intelligence, finance and diplomacy reinforced one another","Local partner forces were decisive","Transition and detention risks limit persistence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P12","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO016","IS-AO017","IS-AO018"],"source_ids":["IS-AS006","IS-AS007"],"confidence":"high_for_territorial_outcome","revision_triggers":["Sustained ISIS territorial return","Partner transition failure","Independent attribution of coalition lines"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO017","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO018","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C07","title":"JCPOA bargaining, implementation, withdrawal, and durability","overall_ruling":"initial_success_reversed_into_failure","objective_result":"Negotiation produced verified limits and reciprocal implementation; unilateral withdrawal destroyed persistence and renewed pressure did not restore the bargain.","mechanism_findings":["Economic pressure needed a diplomatic off-ramp","Verification made compliance observable","Policy reversal created cross-instrument fratricide and credibility cost"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P12","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO019","IS-AO020","IS-AO021"],"source_ids":["IS-AS014","IS-AS015","IS-AS016","IS-AS017"],"confidence":"high","revision_triggers":["Restored verified limits","Evidence that reimposition produced a superior durable outcome"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C08","title":"FOCAC action-plan and PRC development-finance conversion in Africa","overall_ruling":"coherent_design_delivery_and_influence_unresolved","objective_result":"FOCAC displays broad policy-message coherence and exceptional means, but the current action plan is prospective and recipient-level conversion varies too much for an overall effectiveness call.","mechanism_findings":["Finance, infrastructure, security, governance and information are formally integrated","Provision scale is a real source of agenda access","Recipient agency and delivered performance prevent automatic influence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO022","IS-AO023","IS-AO024"],"source_ids":["IS-AS018","IS-AS019","IS-AS040"],"confidence":"moderate_for_design_low_for_outcomes","revision_triggers":["Audited 2025–2027 delivery","Recipient policy or access decisions causally linked to programs","Large cancellation or backlash wave"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO024","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C09","title":"World Bank and AIIB pandemic response and project delivery","overall_ruling":"both_delivered_no_zero_sum_influence_call","objective_result":"Both institutions rapidly converted capital and relationships into crisis operations; World Bank scale was much larger, while AIIB demonstrated credible delivery without evidence of displacing or controlling the older system.","mechanism_findings":["Existing country systems and cofinance accelerated delivery","Institutional legitimacy and technical capacity mattered","Project volume did not establish geopolitical alignment"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO025","IS-AO026","IS-AO027"],"source_ids":["IS-AS020","IS-AS021"],"confidence":"high_for_delivery_low_for_influence","revision_triggers":["Independent outcome evaluations","Governance or conditionality changes","Recipient preference evidence"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO025","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO026","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C10","title":"BRICS expansion, Rio commitments, and delivery","overall_ruling":"agenda_reach_supported_taskability_unproven","objective_result":"Expansion and the Rio agenda increased convening and narrative reach, but heterogeneous interests, voluntary implementation and a short observation window prevent a coalition-delivery judgment.","mechanism_findings":["Membership scale amplifies agenda setting","Consensus language masks divergent preferences","No common enforcement or pooled capability matches formal alliance taskability"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P04","IS-P07","IS-P08"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO028","IS-AO029","IS-AO030"],"source_ids":["IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"confidence":"moderate_for_agenda_low_for_delivery","revision_triggers":["Funded common mechanisms","Repeated aligned member behavior","Implementation scorecard for Rio commitments"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO028","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO029","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO030","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C11","title":"PRC overseas port investment to military and strategic access","overall_ruling":"conditional_single_case_conversion","objective_result":"Djibouti demonstrates one real infrastructure-relationship-access sequence; Hambantota demonstrates why finance and operating control do not automatically become military permission.","mechanism_findings":["Host security interests and sovereign agreement are necessary","Commercial ownership is not military taskability","Generalization across ports is unsupported"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P07"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO031","IS-AO032","IS-AO033"],"source_ids":["IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"high_for_cases_low_for_generalization","revision_triggers":["Repeated crisis throughput at multiple ports","New host defense agreements","Evidence of denied access despite ownership"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C12","title":"PRC critical-mineral controls and diversification response","overall_ruling":"denial_effective_compellence_unproven","objective_result":"Concentration converted into real product-specific disruption, but targets adapted and no durable policy compliance was demonstrated.","mechanism_findings":["Midstream processing and qualification created leverage","Use revealed the dependency and accelerated substitution","Target agency separated cost from compellence"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P06","IS-P10","IS-P12"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO034","IS-AO035","IS-AO036"],"source_ids":["IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"confidence":"high_for_denial_low_for_compellence","revision_triggers":["Verified target policy change","Qualified substitute scale","Sustained cutoff beyond inventories"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C13","title":"PRC-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic restoration","overall_ruling":"bounded_diplomatic_success","objective_result":"China helped deliver and sustain restoration of diplomatic relations; the evidence does not support a broader claim of regional security leadership or conflict resolution.","mechanism_findings":["Good offices and trusted venue matched parties ready to settle","Clear narrow terms enabled verification","Prior mediators and party agency limit exclusive Chinese credit"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07","IS-P08","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO037","IS-AO038","IS-AO039"],"source_ids":["IS-AS028","IS-AS029"],"confidence":"high_for_restoration_moderate_for_china_contribution","revision_triggers":["Embassy closure or agreement repudiation","Independent evidence on China's indispensable role","Broader security cooperation caused by the accord"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO038","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO039","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C14","title":"Taiwan Strait deterrence, coercion, and competitive shaping","overall_ruling":"contested_indeterminate","objective_result":"The status quo persisted, but PRC coercion intensified and neither no-war nor no-unification can be causally assigned to a single strategy.","mechanism_findings":["U.S. assurance and Taiwan defense raise denial prospects","PRC pressure shapes daily operating conditions","Actions generate countervailing signaling and coalition feedback"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P01","IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P06","IS-P08","IS-P09","IS-P10","IS-P11","IS-P13","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO040","IS-AO041","IS-AO042"],"source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"confidence":"low_for_causal_deterrence","revision_triggers":["Observable decision evidence","Major blockade or invasion","Stable reduction in coercive activity after a defined action"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C15","title":"South China Sea pressure and Philippine coalition response","overall_ruling":"tactical_prc_effect_strategic_counterbalancing","objective_result":"PRC gray-zone pressure achieved intermittent tactical denial and cost imposition but strengthened Philippine-U.S. cooperation and did not remove the Philippine outpost or produce a durable settlement.","mechanism_findings":["Coast guard and militia exploit threshold ambiguity","Documentation and alliance assurance mobilized partners","Provisional arrangements managed one flashpoint without resolving the contest"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P02","IS-P03","IS-P04","IS-P11","IS-P13"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO043","IS-AO044","IS-AO045"],"source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013","IS-AS032"],"confidence":"high_for_events_moderate_for_strategy","revision_triggers":["Permanent removal or secure resupply","Treaty activation","Sustained de-escalation or new host access"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO043","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C16","title":"IPEF supply-chain institutions and crisis-response conversion","overall_ruling":"institution_created_effectiveness_unproven","objective_result":"The United States converted diplomacy into a functioning institutional framework, but no major public stress case yet demonstrates preserved supply or faster recovery.","mechanism_findings":["Agreement and bodies were delivered quickly","No market access narrows incentives","Action teams remain upstream of output"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO046","IS-AO047","IS-AO048"],"source_ids":["IS-AS033","IS-AS034"],"confidence":"high_for_institution_low_for_effect","revision_triggers":["Crisis Response Network activation","Measured diversification","Member withdrawal or expanded commitments"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO048","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C17","title":"WTO Appellate Body impasse and U.S. institutional trade-offs","overall_ruling":"pressure_achieved_reform_not_achieved_fratricide_risk","objective_result":"The United States disabled the appellate mechanism but did not secure a broadly accepted replacement; pending appeals and MPIA adaptation reduced the value of the institution to U.S. rule-based leverage.","mechanism_findings":["Appointment control provided blocking leverage","Substantive complaints did not become negotiated reform","Alternative institutional action proceeded without the United States"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P05","IS-P09","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO049","IS-AO050","IS-AO051"],"source_ids":["IS-AS035","IS-AS036","IS-AS037"],"confidence":"high_for_status_moderate_for_net_effect","revision_triggers":["Agreed reform","U.S. accession to alternative","Evidence paralysis improved bargaining outcomes net of lost enforcement"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]},{"case_id":"IS-C18","title":"PRC development-finance delivery, renegotiation, and relationship repair","overall_ruling":"extreme_provision_mixed_conversion_adapting","objective_result":"PRC finance delivered infrastructure and relationships at exceptional scale, but distressed projects, borrower agency and nonautomatic strategic access forced a portfolio reboot and collaborative repair.","mechanism_findings":["Upstream finance and construction are a real advantage","Delivery quality and debt sustainability mediate legitimacy","Renegotiation demonstrates adaptation, not proof of original coercive design or success"],"pathway_ids":["IS-P07","IS-P14"],"observation_ids":["IS-AO052","IS-AO053","IS-AO054"],"source_ids":["IS-AS019","IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS038","IS-AS039"],"confidence":"moderate","revision_triggers":["Updated project outcomes","Recipient trust and policy decisions","Repeated strategic access conversion or widespread creditor losses"],"observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO052","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]}]}],"pathways":[{"pathway_id":"IS-P01","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Industry becomes military effect only through qualified output, maintenance, logistics and mission timing. Ukraine supports allied aggregation but exposes U.S./partner physical bottlenecks; PRC scale is extreme upstream but distant operational conversion remains less observable.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO002","IS-AO007","IS-AO013"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Industrial capacity to fielded and sustained military effect","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO002","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P02","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Diplomacy can create usable access when hosts authorize, fund, exercise and sustain it. EDCA and Djibouti support the mechanism; Hambantota and sovereign caveats reject automatic conversion.","case_ids":["IS-C05","IS-C11","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO013","IS-AO015","IS-AO031","IS-AO032","IS-AO033"],"confidence":"high","title":"Diplomacy to usable access and military reach","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO015","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO032","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P03","position":"supported_bounded","ruling":"Military assurance contributes to partner commitment when threat perceptions, credible capability and political consultation align; accession and Philippine cooperation support the link, but no-war and retention cannot alone prove deterrence.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO001","IS-AO014","IS-AO040","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Military assurance to coalition commitment and durability","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO001","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C01"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P04","position":"insufficient_for_independent_effect","ruling":"Credible narratives may support coalition legitimacy, but across Ukraine, FOCAC, Taiwan and the South China Sea, material interests and threat perception dominate the observable decision record. Independent informational contribution is not isolated.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C08","IS-C10","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO014","IS-AO022","IS-AO028","IS-AO041","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"low","title":"Narrative credibility to coalition legitimacy and action","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO022","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO028","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO041","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P05","position":"supported_for_targeted_coverage","ruling":"Coalition coordination can align law and enforcement at a small number of pivotal nodes, as semiconductor, Iran and Russia cases show. Free riding, alternative routes, burden and institutional exclusion bound wider effectiveness.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C16","IS-C17"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO019","IS-AO034","IS-AO046","IS-AO049"],"confidence":"high","title":"Coalition coordination to economic denial or pressure","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO034","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P06","position":"cost_not_sufficient_for_compellence","ruling":"These purposively selected cases show that imposed costs were not sufficient for the intended policy change. Iran supports a bounded bargain, while other cases show adaptation or noncompliance. The sample identifies conversion mechanisms, not the prevalence or relative frequency of coercive success. Denial and compellence remain distinct.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C03","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C14"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO009","IS-AO019","IS-AO021","IS-AO036"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Economic pressure to target decision or behavior","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO009","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO021","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P07","position":"supported_but_nonautomatic","ruling":"Development finance and institutional delivery can create valued capability, relationships and agenda access. FOCAC, AIIB, Djibouti and BRI repair show real pathways, but host choice, project performance and nonexclusive alignment prevent automatic influence or military access.","case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C09","IS-C10","IS-C11","IS-C13","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO023","IS-AO027","IS-AO031","IS-AO033","IS-AO037","IS-AO054"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Economic development and finance to diplomatic access or institutional influence","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO023","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO027","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C09"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C11"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO054","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P08","position":"insufficient_for_state_conversion","ruling":"Cultural and informational attraction creates exposure and relationships, but the selected cases do not isolate a consequential policy choice caused by contact. Independent ecosystem attraction may advantage a country without becoming a taskable instrument.","case_ids":["IS-C08","IS-C10","IS-C13","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO024","IS-AO028","IS-AO037"],"confidence":"low","title":"Cultural and informational attraction to relationships and revealed preference","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO024","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C08"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO028","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C10"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P09","position":"supported_conditional","ruling":"Technology and standards become strategic ecosystems when technical performance, production, rules, trust and users align. Semiconductor controls, 5G host choices and IPEF institution-building support pieces of the chain; none alone establishes durable strategic effect.","case_ids":["IS-C03","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C16","IS-C17"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO007","IS-AO008","IS-AO046","IS-AO047","IS-AO050"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Technology and standards to interoperable strategic ecosystems","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO047","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C16"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P10","position":"supported","ruling":"Resilience can preserve strategic freedom when substitution and recovery arrive before the state-option deadline. Europe's gas shift is the strongest affirmative case; mineral, maritime and semiconductor cases show that nominal alternatives may remain slow or costly.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C04","IS-C12","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO011","IS-AO012","IS-AO035"],"confidence":"high","title":"Resilience to sustained instrument availability and coercion denial","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO011","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO012","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C04"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P11","position":"insufficient_comparative_basis","ruling":"The cases show public attribution and coalition messaging accompanying decisions, but they do not provide matched exposure-to-decision evidence sufficient to isolate information-integrity effects on coalition resilience.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C05","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO014","IS-AO040","IS-AO044"],"confidence":"low","title":"Information integrity to decision and coalition resilience","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C05"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P12","position":"supported_in_selected_cycles","ruling":"Observed failure can improve later design: rare-earth diversification, iterative semiconductor rules and BRI portfolio repair show adaptation. Afghanistan shows that abundant warnings do not guarantee implemented learning, and cross-system comparison remains weak.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C03","IS-C06","IS-C07","IS-C12","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO004","IS-AO008","IS-AO035","IS-AO053"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Cross-instrument learning and adaptation to improved repeated performance","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO004","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C03"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO053","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C18"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P13","position":"supported_only_with_bounded_objective_and_off_ramp","ruling":"Imposed military or economic cost can support bargaining when demands and exits are clear. JCPOA and Saudi-Iran diplomacy show off-ramp value; Afghanistan and unresolved Taiwan/South China Sea contests reject a general cost-to-termination rule.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C06","IS-C07","IS-C13","IS-C14","IS-C15"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO005","IS-AO016","IS-AO019","IS-AO037","IS-AO042","IS-AO045"],"confidence":"moderate","title":"Military capability and imposed cost to bargaining, crisis, or termination","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO005","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C02"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO016","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C06"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C13"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO042","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C14"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO045","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]}]},{"pathway_id":"IS-P14","position":"supported","ruling":"One instrument can damage the legitimacy, access, network or future option set that another requires. JCPOA withdrawal and WTO paralysis are direct U.S. cases; PRC coercive use of markets and materials can accelerate diversification and balancing.","case_ids":["IS-C01","IS-C02","IS-C07","IS-C14","IS-C17","IS-C18"],"decisive_observation_ids":["IS-AO020","IS-AO036","IS-AO044","IS-AO049","IS-AO050","IS-AO051"],"confidence":"high","title":"Cross-instrument friction, fratricide, and strategic trade-offs","observation_links":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO020","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C07"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","scope":"cross_case_context","observation_case_ids":["IS-C12"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","scope":"cross_case_context","observation_case_ids":["IS-C15"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]},{"observation_id":"IS-AO051","scope":"direct_case","observation_case_ids":["IS-C17"]}]}],"red_team":{"schema_version":"1.0","status":"strategy_internal_red_team_complete","as_of":"2026-08-14","scope":"Eighteen strategy cases, fifty-four applied observations and fourteen pathway rulings","review_type":"precommitted internal adversarial review; not external peer review","hypothesis_results":[{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT01","result":"material_and_bounded","effect":"Synergy was credited only where sequence and directional connection were observed; co-occurrence was not counted."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT02","result":"decisive","effect":"Ukraine and semiconductor cases rejected scale-to-effect shortcuts and exposed qualification, maintenance, supplier and logistics bottlenecks."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT03","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"EDCA, Nordic accession and Ukraine retained partner agency, authorization, burden and policy-continuity conditions."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT04","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"FOCAC coherence was separated from delivery; BRI repair and mineral feedback exposed centralization and information limits."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT05","result":"decisive_withholding","effect":"Narrative and cultural pathways remained insufficient because material interests, threat and independent actors were not controlled."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT06","result":"decisive","effect":"Iran supported a bounded bargain, while Russia, minerals and other cases rejected cost-to-compellence generalization."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT07","result":"decisive","effect":"Djibouti showed possible conversion; Hambantota, AIIB and BRI variation rejected automatic finance-to-alignment or base claims."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT08","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Semiconductor, 5G and institutional cases retained partner autonomy, open diffusion, commercial response and ecosystem erosion."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT09","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"European gas recovery was credited after measured substitution; nominal buffers and no-collapse were not treated as resilience elsewhere."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT10","result":"decisive_withholding","effect":"Information-integrity pathway remained unscored without exposure-to-decision evidence and error or rights costs."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT11","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Learning was supported only for observed design changes; Afghanistan demonstrated warning without effective learning."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT12","result":"decisive","effect":"Taiwan received no deterrence-success call from the absence of invasion."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT13","result":"decisive","effect":"ISIS success was bounded to territorial defeat; Saudi-Iran to diplomatic restoration; no agreement was treated as complete termination."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT14","result":"material_and_applied","effect":"Closed-system and classified observability limits prevented symmetric national comparison and an overall winner."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT15","result":"material_and_disclosed","effect":"The sample remains purposive and case-rich in coercion, conflict and documented institutions; no prevalence estimate is made."},{"hypothesis_id":"IS-RT16","result":"pass_with_deduplication","effect":"Each applied observation has one identifier and is linked downstream without tallying repeated domain edges or sources."}],"audit_results":[{"test_id":"IS-T01","result":"pass","note":"Decision question, cases, pathways and gates were frozen before adjudication."},{"test_id":"IS-T02","result":"pass","note":"Foundations remained distinct from Defense, Economics, Diplomacy and Information."},{"test_id":"IS-T03","result":"pass","note":"Every applied observation records instrument IDs and one causal stage."},{"test_id":"IS-T04","result":"pass","note":"Shared events were assigned stable observation IDs and not recounted as separate advantages."},{"test_id":"IS-T05","result":"pass_with_bounds","note":"Integration claims identify at least two delivered instruments and a directional mechanism."},{"test_id":"IS-T06","result":"pass","note":"Case findings use chronology and do not infer orchestration from simultaneity."},{"test_id":"IS-T07","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Marginal contribution is bounded where counterfactuals are unavailable."},{"test_id":"IS-T08","result":"pass","note":"Substitution, redundancy, friction, fratricide and foregone options are visible."},{"test_id":"IS-T09","result":"pass","note":"Partner, recipient, private and local-force agency is separately attributed."},{"test_id":"IS-T10","result":"pass","note":"Target preferences and adaptation remain explicit rivals."},{"test_id":"IS-T11","result":"pass","note":"Deterrence, denial, compellence, shaping, crisis management and termination are never aggregated."},{"test_id":"IS-T12","result":"pass","note":"No deterrence inference rests on no war; no compellence inference rests on cost."},{"test_id":"IS-T13","result":"pass","note":"ISIS, JCPOA and Saudi-Iran findings include implementation and durability bounds."},{"test_id":"IS-T14","result":"pass","note":"Capability, strategy choice, execution and outcome are distinct fields."},{"test_id":"IS-T15","result":"pass","note":"Fact, mechanism and outcome confidence are disclosed separately where material."},{"test_id":"IS-T16","result":"pass_with_withholding","note":"Three pathways remain insufficient and Taiwan is indeterminate."},{"test_id":"IS-T17","result":"pass","note":"Afghanistan, Hambantota, WTO, minerals and unresolved cases challenge favored theses."},{"test_id":"IS-T18","result":"pass_bounded","note":"Phase and outcome sensitivity are reflected in split JCPOA, ISIS, gas and development-finance rulings."},{"test_id":"IS-T19","result":"pass","note":"No edge count, score, average or overall national winner exists."},{"test_id":"IS-T20","result":"pass","note":"User authorized full completion and publication remains subject to preview and production verification."}],"surviving_conclusions":["The U.S./partner system has exceptional permissioned aggregation capacity but recurrent physical and political conversion constraints.","The PRC-centered system has exceptional concentrated provision and throughput but recurrent recipient-permission, trust and durable-conversion constraints.","Economic and material denial is more common than compellence.","Host and recipient agency is the decisive bridge between provision and strategic access.","Instrument use can erode the network, market or credibility that creates future power."],"withheld_conclusions":["An overall national winner or composite score","A general causal ranking of deterrence strategies","Independent narrative, cultural or information-integrity contribution","Permanent semiconductor denial or broad mineral compellence","Automatic development-finance conversion to alignment or basing"]},"observations":[{"observation_id":"IS-AO001","case_ids":["IS-C01"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Ukraine","period":"2022-2025","observation":"Roughly fifty states built capability coalitions and armaments-director mechanisms that connected Ukrainian requirements to donations, procurement, production and sustainment.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_integration","source_ids":["IS-AS003"],"limitation":"Commitments and governance do not prove sufficient or timely delivery.","adjudication_effect":"supports_coalition_conversion","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO002","case_ids":["IS-C01"],"instrument_ids":["ND","EI"],"causal_stage":"binding_constraint","system":"U.S.-partner","period":"2022-2024","observation":"Audited U.S. replacement programs faced long component and raw-material lead times even as large appropriations and capacity investments were obligated.","evidentiary_role":"negative_physical_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS002"],"limitation":"U.S. replacement is not identical to total allied delivery or Ukrainian availability.","adjudication_effect":"supports_industrial_bottleneck","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO003","case_ids":["IS-C01"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome_and_persistence","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Ukraine","period":"2022-2026","observation":"Coalition support preserved a functioning Ukrainian state and military but did not produce war termination; political continuity, production and battlefield adaptation remained binding.","evidentiary_role":"mixed_bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS001","IS-AS002","IS-AS003"],"limitation":"The no-support counterfactual and classified requirements are unavailable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_partial_not_complete_strategy","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO004","case_ids":["IS-C02"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"objective_coherence","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Afghanistan","period":"2001-2021","observation":"U.S. objectives and timelines changed repeatedly while the reconstruction effort attempted to build institutions faster than the context and sustainability allowed.","evidentiary_role":"negative_strategy_coherence","source_ids":["IS-AS004","IS-AS005"],"limitation":"Retrospective oversight cannot measure every contemporaneous trade-off.","adjudication_effect":"supports_ends_ways_means_incoherence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO005","case_ids":["IS-C02"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"integration_and_partner_response","system":"U.S.-partner_and_Afghanistan","period":"2018-2021","observation":"Excluding the Afghan government from U.S.-Taliban talks and contradictory withdrawal signaling weakened partner legitimacy and readiness.","evidentiary_role":"negative_cross_instrument_effect","source_ids":["IS-AS004"],"limitation":"Taliban strength and Afghan political choices were independent causes.","adjudication_effect":"supports_diplomatic_defense_friction","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO006","case_ids":["IS-C02"],"instrument_ids":["ND","EI"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"Afghan_partner_system","period":"2002-2021","observation":"Security forces depended on U.S. contractors, logistics, air support and a force design they could not sustain; those dependencies became decisive when external support withdrew.","evidentiary_role":"negative_partner_sustainability","source_ids":["IS-AS005"],"limitation":"Public evidence cannot precisely allocate collapse across leadership, corruption, morale and logistics.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategy_failure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO007","case_ids":["IS-C03"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"U.S.-partner_actor_PRC_target","period":"2022-2026","observation":"Controls aligned U.S. legal reach with Dutch, Japanese and other allied nodes in advanced equipment, software, materials and fabrication.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_targeted_coordination","source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"limitation":"Formal coverage differs from enforcement and some partners retain distinct rules.","adjudication_effect":"supports_coalition_denial_pathway","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO008","case_ids":["IS-C03"],"instrument_ids":["EI","ND"],"causal_stage":"target_response","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2022-2026","observation":"PRC firms redesigned products, expanded mature-node capacity and pursued indigenous tools while restrictions were repeatedly revised to cover new pathways.","evidentiary_role":"target_adaptation","source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"limitation":"Public data cannot measure the classified military counterfactual.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_durability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO009","case_ids":["IS-C03"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"Both systems","period":"2022-2026","observation":"The strategy plausibly delayed selected frontier capabilities but has not publicly demonstrated permanent denial, PRC policy compliance or a net military outcome after ecosystem costs.","evidentiary_role":"bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS008","IS-AS009"],"limitation":"A precise no-controls counterfactual is unavailable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_partial_strategy","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO010","case_ids":["IS-C04"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"initial_condition","system":"European_partner_system_Russia_supplier","period":"2021","observation":"Russian gas supplied about 45% of EU gas imports, creating relationship-specific exposure.","evidentiary_role":"vulnerability_baseline","source_ids":["IS-AS010"],"limitation":"Member dependence and contract structures varied.","adjudication_effect":"supports_severe_initial_dependency","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO011","case_ids":["IS-C04"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"European_partner_system","period":"2022-2025","observation":"REPowerEU combined procurement, infrastructure, demand reduction, regulation, alternative suppliers and public policy to reduce Russian gas imports from roughly 150 bcm to 52 bcm.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_cross_instrument_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"limitation":"Weather, prices, conservation and weak demand contributed.","adjudication_effect":"supports_integrated_recovery","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO012","case_ids":["IS-C04"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"outcome_and_persistence","system":"European_partner_system","period":"2022-2026","observation":"Europe preserved support for Ukraine and moved toward legal phaseout while Russian pipeline deliveries fell roughly 90% from 2021 to 2025.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_durable_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS010","IS-AS011"],"limitation":"High costs and distributional effects prevent a costless-success judgment.","adjudication_effect":"supports_success_with_cost","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO013","case_ids":["IS-C05"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND","EI"],"causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","system":"U.S.-Philippines_alliance","period":"2023-2025","observation":"The allies expanded EDCA to nine sites, funded infrastructure, exercised forces and linked maritime security to treaty consultation.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_access_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013"],"limitation":"Prepared sites do not guarantee mission-specific wartime use.","adjudication_effect":"supports_diplomacy_to_access","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO014","case_ids":["IS-C05"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND","II"],"causal_stage":"partner_response","system":"Philippines","period":"2022-2025","observation":"Philippine policy shifted toward deeper U.S. and trilateral cooperation as PRC maritime pressure intensified.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_partner_choice","source_ids":["IS-AS013"],"limitation":"The Philippines acted for its own interests; U.S. assurance is not the sole cause.","adjudication_effect":"supports_partner_agency_and_assurance","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO015","case_ids":["IS-C05"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"U.S.-Philippines_alliance","period":"2023-2026","observation":"Access remains legally and politically permissioned under Philippine sovereignty, making local legitimacy and consultation part of operational capacity.","evidentiary_role":"binding_permission_constraint","source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013"],"limitation":"Future administrations and crisis decisions are unobserved.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_access_claim","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO016","case_ids":["IS-C06"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"Global_Coalition_and_local_partners","period":"2014-2019","observation":"The coalition and local forces removed ISIS territorial control in Iraq by 2017 and Syria by 2019.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS006"],"limitation":"Territorial defeat does not equal ideological or organizational elimination.","adjudication_effect":"supports_declared_territorial_objective","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO017","case_ids":["IS-C06"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"integration","system":"Global_Coalition","period":"2014-2026","observation":"Military action was paired with partner training, intelligence, finance, foreign-fighter and stabilization work under a multinational framework.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_cross_instrument_mechanism","source_ids":["IS-AS006","IS-AS007"],"limitation":"Public records do not quantify each line's marginal contribution.","adjudication_effect":"supports_integrated_campaign","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO018","case_ids":["IS-C06"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"Iraq_and_Syria","period":"2019-2026","observation":"ISIS lost territorial rule but retained cells, ideology and detainee-camp risks, requiring transition to enduring partner capacity.","evidentiary_role":"negative_persistence_limit","source_ids":["IS-AS006","IS-AS007"],"limitation":"Threat reporting varies and the campaign remains active.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_success_to_territorial_defeat","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO019","case_ids":["IS-C07"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"bargain_and_delivery","system":"E3_EU_plus_3_and_Iran","period":"2015-2016","observation":"A negotiated exchange of verified nuclear limits for sanctions relief reached Implementation Day after the IAEA confirmed required Iranian actions.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_bargaining_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS014","IS-AS015","IS-AS017"],"limitation":"Sanctions were one cause among diplomacy, threat perceptions and Iranian politics.","adjudication_effect":"supports_initial_strategy_success","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO020","case_ids":["IS-C07"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"friction_and_reversal","system":"U.S.-anchored_and_partners","period":"2018","observation":"The United States withdrew and reimposed sanctions despite verified implementation, requiring partners and firms to wind down activity.","evidentiary_role":"negative_cross_instrument_reversal","source_ids":["IS-AS016"],"limitation":"U.S. objections included issues outside the nuclear agreement and later Iranian nonperformance matters.","adjudication_effect":"supports_credibility_and_durability_failure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO021","case_ids":["IS-C07"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"persistence","system":"Iran_and_multilateral_system","period":"2018-2026","observation":"Maximum pressure did not restore the JCPOA limits; the monitoring and legal framework deteriorated and prior UN measures were eventually reapplied.","evidentiary_role":"negative_durable_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS014","IS-AS016","IS-AS017"],"limitation":"Regional conflict and other parties' choices also shaped the outcome.","adjudication_effect":"supports_strategy_reversal_failure","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO022","case_ids":["IS-C08"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II","ND"],"causal_stage":"strategy_and_commitments","system":"PRC-centered_and_African_partners","period":"2024-2027","observation":"FOCAC adopted a detailed plan spanning finance, infrastructure, industrial chains, health, media, governance, security and people-to-people programs.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_policy_coherence","source_ids":["IS-AS018"],"limitation":"A comprehensive action plan is actor theory, not delivery or recipient effect.","adjudication_effect":"supports_cross_instrument_design","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO023","case_ids":["IS-C08"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"means_and_scale","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2013-2021","observation":"PRC infrastructure finance in selected sectors was estimated at USD679 billion versus USD76 billion from the United States, demonstrating exceptional upstream means.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_resource_scale","source_ids":["IS-AS019"],"limitation":"Finance estimates do not establish completion, quality, additionality or influence.","adjudication_effect":"supports_extreme_provision_capacity","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO024","case_ids":["IS-C08"],"instrument_ids":["DC","II","EI"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"African_recipients_and_PRC","period":"2000-2026","observation":"Recipient benefit, relationship durability and policy conversion vary by project; 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the 2025 summit adopted a 126-paragraph declaration plus climate, AI and health initiatives.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_agenda_and_narrative","source_ids":["IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"limitation":"Document volume does not measure implementation or unity.","adjudication_effect":"supports_convening_power","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO029","case_ids":["IS-C10"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"integration_constraint","system":"BRICS_members","period":"2025","observation":"The declaration aggregates heterogeneous interests and generally relies on voluntary national or existing-institution action rather than common enforcement or pooled resources.","evidentiary_role":"negative_taskability","source_ids":["IS-AS022"],"limitation":"Some specialized initiatives may later acquire institutions and funding.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_coalition_comparison","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO030","case_ids":["IS-C10"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome_and_persistence","system":"BRICS_members","period":"2025-2026","observation":"At the evidence cutoff, many Rio commitments remained prospective; expansion and common rhetoric did not establish consistent member alignment in security or economic policy.","evidentiary_role":"withholding","source_ids":["IS-AS022","IS-AS023"],"limitation":"The observation window is short.","adjudication_effect":"withholds_delivery_and_strategic_outcome","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO031","case_ids":["IS-C11"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"positive_conversion","system":"PRC-centered_and_Djibouti","period":"2013-2025","observation":"PRC finance and port relationships preceded a defense agreement and operational base in Djibouti.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_single_case","source_ids":["IS-AS024","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"Sequence does not prove finance purchased permission.","adjudication_effect":"supports_possible_port_to_access_path","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO032","case_ids":["IS-C11"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"negative_case","system":"PRC-centered_and_Sri_Lanka","period":"2017-2026","observation":"Hambantota produced long-duration commercial operating control but not a debt-for-equity loan cancellation or demonstrated PRC military base.","evidentiary_role":"negative_generalization","source_ids":["IS-AS025"],"limitation":"Incomplete contracts leave narrower access and influence channels uncertain.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_automatic_conversion","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO033","case_ids":["IS-C11"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"cross_case_outcome","system":"PRC-centered_and_hosts","period":"2013-2026","observation":"Across the observed ports, host security authorization—not finance or ownership alone—decided military taskability.","evidentiary_role":"mechanism_ruling","source_ids":["IS-AS024","IS-AS025","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"The sample is small and purposive.","adjudication_effect":"supports_conditional_pathway","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO034","case_ids":["IS-C12"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"initial_power","system":"PRC-centered","period":"2010-2026","observation":"PRC refining and magnet concentration created product-specific licensing and denial power.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_power_source","source_ids":["IS-AS026"],"limitation":"Aggregate shares do not reveal every product, inventory or military end use.","adjudication_effect":"supports_material_control","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO035","case_ids":["IS-C12"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"target_response","system":"Japan_and_other_targets","period":"2010-2026","observation":"Targets used inventory, thrift, recycling, alternative supply, investment and legal action; current diversification remains slower for difficult midstream products.","evidentiary_role":"adaptation_and_persistence","source_ids":["IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"limitation":"Forecast projects may slip and attribution of the 2010 bilateral interruption remains contested.","adjudication_effect":"bounds_duration_and_reveals_residual_risk","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO036","case_ids":["IS-C12"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"strategic_outcome","system":"PRC-centered_and_targets","period":"2010-2026","observation":"Controls imposed real costs and occasional production curtailment but did not publicly demonstrate durable target policy compliance; use intensified counter-coalition investment.","evidentiary_role":"negative_compellence_and_feedback","source_ids":["IS-AS026","IS-AS027"],"limitation":"Exact PRC demands and private policy deliberations are partly unavailable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_denial_not_compellence","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO037","case_ids":["IS-C13"],"instrument_ids":["DC","II"],"causal_stage":"bargain","system":"China_Saudi_Arabia_Iran","period":"2023","observation":"China hosted a bounded agreement to restore diplomatic relations, reopen missions and resume prior cooperation frameworks.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_diplomatic_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS028"],"limitation":"Iraq and Oman had supported earlier talks, and the parties retained decisive agency.","adjudication_effect":"supports_mediation_success","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO038","case_ids":["IS-C13"],"instrument_ids":["DC"],"causal_stage":"implementation","system":"Saudi_Arabia_and_Iran","period":"2023-2025","observation":"Embassies reopened, ministers met and a trilateral committee continued to review implementation through 2025.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_persistence","source_ids":["IS-AS028","IS-AS029"],"limitation":"Diplomatic contact does not equal trust or settlement of regional conflicts.","adjudication_effect":"supports_bounded_durability","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO039","case_ids":["IS-C13"],"instrument_ids":["DC","II","ND"],"causal_stage":"strategic_outcome","system":"Middle_East","period":"2023-2026","observation":"The agreement achieved restoration but did not establish China as regional security guarantor or resolve the parties' proxy, nuclear and security disputes.","evidentiary_role":"bounded_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS028","IS-AS029"],"limitation":"Some effects may emerge over a longer horizon.","adjudication_effect":"rejects_regional_peace_overclaim","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO040","case_ids":["IS-C14"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II","EI"],"causal_stage":"strategic_condition","system":"U.S.-partner_PRC_Taiwan","period":"2016-2026","observation":"The cross-Strait status quo persisted without invasion while PRC military and gray-zone pressure intensified and U.S. support expanded.","evidentiary_role":"mixed_condition","source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"The absence of war cannot identify which action deterred whom.","adjudication_effect":"withholds_deterministic_deterrence_call","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO041","case_ids":["IS-C14"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"feedback","system":"Both systems","period":"2022-2026","observation":"U.S. support and political engagement can strengthen Taiwan's defense while triggering additional PRC coercion; PRC coercion can intimidate while hardening external balancing.","evidentiary_role":"cross_instrument_feedback","source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"Intentions and private decision thresholds are not observable.","adjudication_effect":"supports_competing_shaping_not_clean_success","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO042","case_ids":["IS-C14"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"Both systems","period":"2016-2026","observation":"Neither side achieved its maximal objective: the PRC did not unify Taiwan, and the U.S./partner system did not end coercion or create a stable, attributable deterrence equilibrium.","evidentiary_role":"contested_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS030","IS-AS031"],"limitation":"Maximal objectives may not be the operational objectives in every period.","adjudication_effect":"classifies_case_indeterminate","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO043","case_ids":["IS-C15"],"instrument_ids":["ND","DC","II"],"causal_stage":"pressure","system":"PRC-centered_actor_Philippines_target","period":"2023-2025","observation":"PRC coast guard and maritime-militia pressure disrupted Philippine operations and produced tactical control or denial at selected moments.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_tactical_conversion","source_ids":["IS-AS013","IS-AS032"],"limitation":"Incident accounts are contested and tactical gains vary by feature.","adjudication_effect":"supports_prc_gray_zone_effect","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO044","case_ids":["IS-C15"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND","II"],"causal_stage":"counter_coalition","system":"Philippines_and_U.S.-partners","period":"2023-2025","observation":"Pressure strengthened Philippine public documentation, U.S. treaty assurance, EDCA implementation and trilateral cooperation.","evidentiary_role":"negative_strategic_feedback","source_ids":["IS-AS012","IS-AS013","IS-AS032"],"limitation":"Alliance deepening also reflected leadership change and long-term trends.","adjudication_effect":"supports_coercion_backfire","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO045","case_ids":["IS-C15"],"instrument_ids":["DC","ND"],"causal_stage":"bounded_outcome","system":"PRC_and_Philippines","period":"2024-2025","observation":"A provisional arrangement allowed continued resupply at Second Thomas Shoal while harassment persisted elsewhere, leaving tactical accommodation without a durable settlement.","evidentiary_role":"mixed_crisis_management","source_ids":["IS-AS013"],"limitation":"The arrangement's terms and durability are partly undisclosed.","adjudication_effect":"classifies_both_strategies_partial","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO046","case_ids":["IS-C16"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"institution_building","system":"IPEF_partners","period":"2023-2024","observation":"Fourteen partners negotiated a supply-chain agreement that entered into force and established a Council, Crisis Response Network and Labor Rights Advisory Board.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_institutional_delivery","source_ids":["IS-AS033","IS-AS034"],"limitation":"Not all partners entered simultaneously and there is no market-access pillar.","adjudication_effect":"supports_diplomatic_rule_conversion","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO047","case_ids":["IS-C16"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"implementation","system":"IPEF_partners","period":"2024-2026","observation":"Partners designated officials and organized work on semiconductors, chemicals and critical minerals.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_early_implementation","source_ids":["IS-AS034"],"limitation":"Meetings and action teams are upstream of diversified supply or crisis performance.","adjudication_effect":"supports_process_not_outcome","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO048","case_ids":["IS-C16"],"instrument_ids":["EI","DC"],"causal_stage":"outcome","system":"IPEF_partners","period":"2024-2026","observation":"No admitted public case yet shows the Crisis Response Network preserving a strategic function during a major disruption.","evidentiary_role":"insufficient_outcome","source_ids":["IS-AS033","IS-AS034"],"limitation":"The institution is young and may be intentionally preventive.","adjudication_effect":"withholds_effectiveness_ruling","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO049","case_ids":["IS-C17"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI"],"causal_stage":"institutional_action","system":"United_States_and_WTO","period":"2017-2026","observation":"The United States blocked appointments to press longstanding legal concerns; the Appellate Body became unable to hear appeals and had no members.","evidentiary_role":"affirmative_disruption","source_ids":["IS-AS035","IS-AS036"],"limitation":"Other members and the body's prior practices contributed to the impasse.","adjudication_effect":"supports_us_instrument_conversion_to_paralysis","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO050","case_ids":["IS-C17"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI"],"causal_stage":"substitution","system":"MPIA_participants","period":"2020-2026","observation":"A subset of members including China and the EU used Article 25 arbitration to preserve appeal review outside the disabled body.","evidentiary_role":"institutional_adaptation","source_ids":["IS-AS037"],"limitation":"MPIA is nonuniversal and has few awards.","adjudication_effect":"supports_workaround_and_us_exclusion_cost","status":"applied"},{"observation_id":"IS-AO051","case_ids":["IS-C17"],"instrument_ids":["DC","EI","II"],"causal_stage":"strategic_outcome","system":"United_States_and_multilateral_system","period":"2017-2026","observation":"Paralysis was achieved, but a broadly accepted reform was not; 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announcement; signature; content volume; potential reach; force inventory; meeting count; partner promise.","decision_rule":"Two or more delivered actions are necessary for an integration claim, but simultaneity alone is insufficient.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M07","causal_stage":"instrument_delivery","name":"Domain-stage integrity","decision_question":"Does each claimed input stop at the deepest stage actually supported by its originating evidence?","definition_or_formula":"Record the originating domain's causal stage and prohibit promotion beyond it when imported into the synthesis.","unit":"deepest_supported_domain_stage","required_denominator":"all imported instrument observations","comparison_requirement":"Use existing Statecrafts domain contracts and evidence cutoffs; a synthesis cannot raise confidence or causal depth merely by combining sources.","admissible_evidence":"Current domain assessment trace plus new case-specific evidence that explicitly advances the stage.","mandatory_exclusions":"Copying a domain position; tallying edges; treating reach as influence, commitment as delivery, capacity as mission effect, or cost as behavior.","decision_rule":"The synthesis inherits the lowest relevant evidence boundary and must disclose any newer evidence that changes it.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M08","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Sequence and timing","decision_question":"Did the actions occur in the order and window required for the hypothesized mechanism?","definition_or_formula":"Observed elapsed time between predeclared action nodes compared with the pathway's maximum useful interval; record premature, late, reversed, and interrupted sequences.","unit":"hours_days_months_and_sequence_state","required_denominator":"all required links in the pathway","comparison_requirement":"Match event trigger and time horizon; faster is not better when consultation, credibility, or de-escalation requires delay.","admissible_evidence":"Decision logs, dated laws and orders, delivery records, platform archives, diplomatic chronology, operational reports, and target response timing.","mandatory_exclusions":"Same calendar year; post hoc narrative order; publication date used as action date; speed without quality.","decision_rule":"A missed necessary sequence or time window bounds or contradicts the integration claim unless an observed substitute mechanism succeeds.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M09","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Reinforcement and marginal contribution","decision_question":"Did one instrument materially increase another instrument's reach, credibility, access, coverage, speed, survivability, or effect?","definition_or_formula":"Difference between observed joint performance and the best supported single-instrument or alternative-package counterfactual, expressed quantitatively where possible and as a process-traced contribution otherwise.","unit":"effect_difference_or_contribution_grade","required_denominator":"all claimed reinforcing pairs","comparison_requirement":"Require a directional connection and test whether background threat, target weakness, or partner self-interest explains the apparent gain.","admissible_evidence":"Factorial or phased design, natural experiment, matched cases, mediation evidence, decision records, or hoop and smoking-gun process tests.","mandatory_exclusions":"Co-occurrence; common owner; shared slogan; greater total spending; favorable final outcome.","decision_rule":"No reinforcement finding without evidence that the receiving instrument or downstream response changed because of the contributing action.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M10","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Substitution and redundancy","decision_question":"Could another instrument or partner role replace a failed or unavailable link without losing the objective?","definition_or_formula":"For each necessary link, identify observed substitute, activation time, capacity, cost, quality, and outcome difference relative to the original pathway.","unit":"coverage_percent_and_recovery_time","required_denominator":"all failed or stressed links","comparison_requirement":"Compare functional roles rather than labels; disclose when substitution shifts cost or risk to partners or creates a different outcome.","admissible_evidence":"Rerouting, alternative supplier, partner lead, diplomatic off-ramp, reserve use, independent messenger, distributed access, or policy redesign with observed performance.","mandatory_exclusions":"Hypothetical alternative; nominal spare capacity; unused authority; announced contingency.","decision_rule":"Redundancy receives credit only when activated or representatively tested within the relevant time window.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M11","causal_stage":"integration","name":"Friction, fratricide, and integration cost","decision_question":"Did an instrument degrade another instrument, foreclose an option, shift risk, or impose a cost material to the objective?","definition_or_formula":"Record negative cross-effects, affected actor, timing, magnitude, opportunity cost, recovery, and whether the effect was anticipated and accepted.","unit":"cost_and_cross_effect_profile","required_denominator":"all materially affected instruments and partners","comparison_requirement":"Use the same cost categories for both systems and keep short-run gains separate from long-run ecosystem, legitimacy, escalation, and partner costs.","admissible_evidence":"Budget displacement, commercial exit, partner defection, access loss, credibility change, escalation record, delayed delivery, or documented policy reversal.","mandatory_exclusions":"Criticism; disagreement; any cost; final failure without a connecting mechanism; moral judgment without a declared criterion.","decision_rule":"A pathway cannot be called reinforcing when an unaddressed cross-effect is large enough to reverse the declared net objective.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M12","causal_stage":"response","name":"Target or recipient uptake","decision_question":"Did the relevant actor notice, understand, accept, use, authorize, or respond to the integrated package?","definition_or_formula":"Observed target or recipient movement from awareness through comprehension, belief, decision opportunity, authorization, and behavior, stopping at the deepest supported stage.","unit":"stage_and_behavior_change","required_denominator":"all pivotal targets, recipients, and partners","comparison_requirement":"Use actor-specific baselines and separate voluntary preference, coercion, threat response, material incentive, and independent domestic causes.","admissible_evidence":"Survey experiment, interview, vote, authorization, procurement, basing decision, compliance act, force move, trade rerouting, or other consequential choice.","mandatory_exclusions":"Potential exposure; elite statement; meeting; favorable polling; agreement signature; contemporaneous movement without source or mechanism evidence.","decision_rule":"No strategic conversion claim when the pathway stops at exposure, activity, cost, or stated support.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M13","causal_stage":"response","name":"Opponent adaptation and counteraction","decision_question":"How did the opponent or target substitute, evade, escalate, learn, or impose reciprocal costs?","definition_or_formula":"Track adaptation onset, mechanism, restored capacity or behavior, residual effect, counter-cost, and time to stabilization after each major action.","unit":"time_to_adapt_and_residual_effect","required_denominator":"all consequential target and opponent responses","comparison_requirement":"Apply identical observability rules; opaque adaptation remains unknown, not absent; distinguish expected response from action caused by the intervention.","admissible_evidence":"Trade and production shift, sanctions evasion, doctrine or posture change, counter-coalition, counternarrative, legal retaliation, bargaining move, or verified learning.","mandatory_exclusions":"Rhetorical threat; unrelated trend; adaptation announced but not implemented; adversary failure credited automatically to the defender.","decision_rule":"Durable contribution requires the claimed effect to survive or adapt faster than material counteraction within the declared window.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M14","causal_stage":"outcome","name":"Strategic objective attainment","decision_question":"Was the predeclared outcome achieved at acceptable cost and without replacing it with a weaker retrospective goal?","definition_or_formula":"Observed distance from baseline to the predeclared success threshold, with cost, distribution, unintended effects, and target behavior reported separately.","unit":"objective_specific_result","required_denominator":"all declared objectives and affected groups","comparison_requirement":"Match objectives and windows before comparing systems; do not merge deterrence, denial, compellence, shaping, crisis management, and termination.","admissible_evidence":"Behavioral, territorial, institutional, access, production, compliance, violence, settlement, or other outcome measure defined before adjudication.","mandatory_exclusions":"Output totals; activity; target cost; process milestone; ceasefire without terms; absence of war without a deterrence design.","decision_rule":"A strategic outcome exists only when the declared threshold is met; partial movement is reported as bounded contribution, not relabeled success.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M15","causal_stage":"outcome","name":"Contribution strength and rival causes","decision_question":"How strongly did the observed integrated pathway contribute relative to plausible alternatives?","definition_or_formula":"Rate the contribution claim by theory-of-change completeness, implementation fidelity, temporal fit, mechanism evidence, counterfactual strength, disconfirmation tests, and unresolved rival causes.","unit":"insufficient_bounded_moderate_strong","required_denominator":"all outcome claims","comparison_requirement":"Use the same probative-evidence tests; centralization, transparency, secrecy, or actor confidence cannot substitute for mechanism evidence.","admissible_evidence":"Experimental or quasi-experimental estimate where feasible; otherwise structured process tracing, contribution analysis, matched cases, and contrary evidence.","mandatory_exclusions":"Citation count; source prestige alone; official certainty; analyst intuition; policy popularity; absence of an alternative explanation search.","decision_rule":"A comparative edge requires convergent outcome-level contribution evidence from matched or meaningfully comparable cases; one-sided evidence remains unscored.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M16","causal_stage":"persistence","name":"Persistence and second-order effects","decision_question":"Did the outcome survive time, cost, leadership change, counteraction, and policy shock without unacceptable downstream damage?","definition_or_formula":"Measure outcome retention at predeclared checkpoints and after at least one material shock; record attrition, reversal, spillover, distribution, and repair cost.","unit":"retention_rate_and_checkpoint","required_denominator":"all actors initially counted in the outcome","comparison_requirement":"Use comparable checkpoints and shocks; distinguish durable settlement from temporary compliance and resilient adaptation from costly exhaustion.","admissible_evidence":"Longitudinal behavior, renewed authorization, continued delivery, compliance monitoring, relationship retention, recurring survey panel, and second-order outcome data.","mandatory_exclusions":"Immediate post-action result; no formal withdrawal; repeated summit attendance; surviving institution; continuing conflict at lower intensity.","decision_rule":"No lead or durable-success claim without a persistence test or an explicit disclosure that the required horizon has not elapsed.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"},{"metric_id":"IS-M17","causal_stage":"persistence","name":"Repeated-cycle learning","decision_question":"Did measured evidence change cross-instrument design and improve a later comparable result?","definition_or_formula":"Trace finding to owner, decision, implemented design change, later comparable cycle, outcome difference, rival causes, and retained institutional memory.","unit":"closed_loop_and_effect_change","required_denominator":"all consequential failed, mixed, or repeated campaigns","comparison_requirement":"Use common outcome definitions and disclose turnover, changed threat, and changed resources; public transparency is not automatically better learning.","admissible_evidence":"Evaluation, after-action record, revised authority or sequence, budget shift, exercise correction, repeated operation, and measured later result.","mandatory_exclusions":"Lessons document; doctrine update; reorganization; new technology; success claim; absence of repeated failure.","decision_rule":"Learning is unscored when the public record lacks either implemented change or comparable improved performance.","status":"architecture_contract_unapplied"}],"case_contracts":[{"case_id":"IS-C01","title":"U.S. and European response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine","period":"2022-present; phase boundaries required","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with autonomous European and other partners","region":"Euro-Atlantic|Global","case_role":"mixed_high_integration_case","selection_reason":"Contains a failed prewar deterrence phase followed by military support, coalition activation, sanctions, energy adaptation, strategic communication, target counteradaptation, burden change, and unresolved termination.","predeclared_outcome":"Assess prewar deterrence, Ukraine's defense and territorial control, coalition delivery, imposed Russian constraints, bargaining movement, sender cost, and durability as separate outcomes rather than one success label.","strongest_counterclaim":"Russia's choice, Ukrainian agency and combat performance, European threat perception, and Russia's own errors may explain more than U.S. orchestration; post-invasion delivery cannot repair the initial deterrence failure or establish termination.","evidence_gaps":"Phase-specific objectives; complete military and economic delivery; partner counterfactuals; Russian adaptation; information exposure; bargaining records; territorial and durability endpoints."},{"case_id":"IS-C02","title":"NATO and partner engagement in Afghanistan","period":"2001-2021 with post-2021 durability","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with NATO and non-NATO partners","region":"Middle East|Global","case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"A broad, long, heavily resourced campaign tests whether large multi-instrument activity, coalition delivery, institution building, and narrative effort produced a durable political objective.","predeclared_outcome":"Reconstruct objectives by phase and test whether security, governance, partner-force, economic, and settlement outcomes met their own thresholds and survived withdrawal.","strongest_counterclaim":"The final political collapse does not prove every military or development output failed, while shifting objectives, Afghan agency, Pakistan, insurgent adaptation, corruption, and withdrawal decisions complicate orchestration claims.","evidence_gaps":"Phase-specific objective ledger; Afghan and partner sources; spending-to-delivery trace; information and legitimacy effects; force and institution outcomes; counterfactual strategy; post-withdrawal persistence."},{"case_id":"IS-C03","title":"Advanced-semiconductor controls and allied technology coordination","period":"2022-present; rule vintages separated","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with technology-producing partners","region":"Indo-Pacific|Global","case_role":"us_partner_bounded_affirmative_candidate","selection_reason":"Connects technological chokepoints, partner rules, enforcement, narrative legitimacy, ecosystem revenue, PRC substitution, and military-relevant capability without requiring a policy-compellence claim.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure denied or delayed access to predeclared technologies, effective partner coverage, leakage, PRC substitution, U.S./partner ecosystem cost, and resulting capability timelines.","strongest_counterclaim":"Market cycles, firm choices, indigenous policy, and technological difficulty may explain delays; controls may accelerate substitution or weaken the open ecosystem that creates the chokepoint.","evidence_gaps":"Rule-by-rule objective; covered items and foreign availability; licensing and enforcement; company and partner behavior; PRC inventories and substitution; capability and revenue counterfactuals."},{"case_id":"IS-C04","title":"Europe's exit from Russian gas dependence","period":"2021-present with 2025-2027 legal milestones","anchor_system":"European partner-led with U.S. supply and support","region":"Euro-Atlantic","case_role":"partner_affirmative_resilience_candidate","selection_reason":"Offers a measured physical conversion from exposure through law, infrastructure, demand change, alternative supply, and coalition endurance under shock.","predeclared_outcome":"Test whether Russian gas dependence fell and remained below the declared threshold at acceptable fiscal, industrial, distributional, and security cost, while keeping any effect on Russian war policy separate.","strongest_counterclaim":"Mild weather, market demand, preexisting infrastructure, Russian supply decisions, high prices, and European agency may explain much of the shift; reduced dependence does not establish compellence.","evidence_gaps":"Common denominator across pipeline and LNG; legal implementation; price and subsidy cost; industrial curtailment; U.S. additionality; Russian revenue; durability through a severe winter or supply shock."},{"case_id":"IS-C05","title":"U.S.-Philippines alliance and EDCA access conversion","period":"2014-present; emphasis 2023-present","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored bilateral alliance with Philippine agency","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"us_partner_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Directly tests whether commitment, local legitimacy, infrastructure, exercises, economic support, and information resilience create scenario-usable access and change coercive expectations.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure site readiness, legal permission, logistics throughput, exercise and crisis activation, local and national support, partner burden, and adversary behavior against a declared scenario.","strongest_counterclaim":"Shared Philippine threat perception and domestic politics may drive cooperation independently; sites can remain vulnerable, conditional, or unused, and the absence of attack cannot prove deterrence.","evidence_gaps":"Site-by-site funding and readiness; crisis authorities; logistics and survivability; Philippine sources; local consent; PRC response; economic package; counterfactual access and deterrence design."},{"case_id":"IS-C06","title":"Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS","period":"2014-present; transition phases separated","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored mission coalition with local-force primacy","region":"Middle East|Global","case_role":"us_partner_mixed_case","selection_reason":"Combines bounded adversary territorial objectives, military and local-force action, coalition roles, financial pressure, counter-messaging, governance limits, and a long durability window.","predeclared_outcome":"Separate territorial denial, attack capacity, financing, recruitment, partner-force performance, civilian harm, political stabilization, transition, and recurrence at declared checkpoints.","strongest_counterclaim":"Local forces carried decisive burdens; territorial defeat did not eliminate the organization or solve governance; military effects may dominate while other instruments are additive or weakly attributable.","evidence_gaps":"Original objectives and phase changes; coalition role outputs; local actor evidence; financial network effects; message exposure and recruitment; civilian costs; recurrence and governance outcomes."},{"case_id":"IS-C07","title":"JCPOA bargaining, implementation, withdrawal, and durability","period":"2013-present; 2015-2019 core outcome window","anchor_system":"Multilateral bargaining coalition with U.S., European, PRC, Russian, and Iranian agency","region":"Middle East|Global","case_role":"matched_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Provides a documented chain from pressure and military risk through diplomacy, agreement, verification, compliance, unilateral withdrawal, reciprocal adaptation, and durability failure.","predeclared_outcome":"Test movement from stated nuclear and sanctions baselines through verified implementation, economic relief, compliance, breakout risk, coalition continuity, withdrawal, and later settlement or escalation.","strongest_counterclaim":"Iranian domestic politics, covert action, regional threats, election change, and independent technical constraints may explain behavior; initial agreement success and later durability failure require separate attribution.","evidence_gaps":"Objective and counterfactual by actor; verified nuclear measures; sanctions relief and economic effect; bargaining chronology; public legitimacy; withdrawal causes; post-2019 behavior and persistence."},{"case_id":"IS-C08","title":"FOCAC action-plan and PRC development-finance conversion in Africa","period":"2000-present; 2024-2027 action-plan focus","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with diverse African partner agency","region":"Africa","case_role":"prc_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Connects finance and project delivery, formal and party networks, narrative and cultural programs, recipient demand, institutional continuity, and possible diplomatic or access outcomes.","predeclared_outcome":"Track obligation-level delivery, additional assets and services, recipient ownership and satisfaction, relationship retention, policy choices, institutional participation, and any scenario-specific access without assuming pooled African alignment.","strongest_counterclaim":"African development demand, commercial value, domestic politics, and alternative partners may explain participation; projects and forum continuity do not prove affinity, policy alignment, or PRC control.","evidence_gaps":"Country and project sample; finance types; disbursement and completion; recipient audits and public opinion; party and alumni conversion; votes and policy decisions; military-access attribution; failures and exits."},{"case_id":"IS-C09","title":"World Bank and AIIB pandemic response and project delivery","period":"2020-present with completed-project checkpoints","anchor_system":"Matched U.S.-influenced and PRC-initiated multilateral institutions","region":"Global","case_role":"matched_institutional_case","selection_reason":"Uses institutions with different governance and sponsorship to compare activation, finance, delivery, oversight, legitimacy, member agency, and reputational claims under a common shock.","predeclared_outcome":"Compare trigger-to-approval time, disbursement, completion, output and outcome quality, recipient agency, oversight, burden, and member retention in matched project and country sets.","strongest_counterclaim":"Different mandates, borrower pools, project types, disclosure, and preexisting pipelines can explain observed differences; institution output cannot be assigned automatically to Washington or Beijing.","evidence_gaps":"Matched project sample; common outcome definitions; independent recipient evidence; governance decisions; sponsor additionality; implementation failures; persistence and institutional legitimacy."},{"case_id":"IS-C10","title":"BRICS expansion, Rio commitments, and delivery","period":"2023-present; 2025-2027 implementation window","anchor_system":"PRC-influenced but member-driven coalition","region":"Global|Africa|Middle East|Indo-Pacific","case_role":"prc_influenced_mixed_case","selection_reason":"Tests whether agenda attraction and narrative alignment among heterogeneous members become authorized and delivered economic, institutional, or diplomatic action rather than summit volume.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure pivotal membership and agency, obligation specificity, authorization, resources, implementation, common external behavior, internal dissent, and durability after cost or disagreement.","strongest_counterclaim":"Expansion may reflect dissatisfaction with Western institutions, member hedging, or status seeking rather than PRC influence; consensus and heterogeneity may limit delivery.","evidence_gaps":"Commitment-level ledger; national implementation; finance and trade outputs; partner motives; PRC sponsorship and burden; contrary votes; failed initiatives; durability through disputes."},{"case_id":"IS-C11","title":"PRC overseas port investment to military and strategic access","period":"2000-present; 2017-present access focus","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with sovereign hosts and commercial operators","region":"Global|Indo-Pacific|Africa|Middle East","case_role":"prc_affirmative_candidate","selection_reason":"Tests a widely asserted conversion from economic infrastructure through relationships and permissions to military logistics, presence, or crisis options using site-level evidence.","predeclared_outcome":"For each sampled port, trace ownership and finance, delivered commercial capacity, host relationship, legal permission, military use, resupply throughput, crisis availability, revocability, and strategic effect.","strongest_counterclaim":"Commercial logic, host development goals, routine port calls, and diversified foreign users may explain investment; access can be conditional, limited, or vulnerable rather than a base pathway.","evidence_gaps":"Global site universe; contracts and ownership; host law and consent; repeated military use; logistics capacity; crisis activation; local politics; matched U.S./partner commercial-to-access cases."},{"case_id":"IS-C12","title":"PRC critical-mineral export controls and diversification response","period":"2023-present; measure each control separately","anchor_system":"PRC-centered pressure with U.S., partner, and firm adaptation","region":"Global|Indo-Pacific|Euro-Atlantic","case_role":"prc_coercion_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Links concentrated processing, legal controls, official signaling, diplomatic bargaining, target costs, stockpiles, substitution, partner diversification, and defense-industrial exposure.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure licensed and denied volume, price and production effects, inventory drawdown, substitution and qualification, partner coordination, target policy movement, PRC cost, and residual leverage.","strongest_counterclaim":"Market concentration and precautionary buying may cause price effects independently; controls may seek security compliance or industry policy rather than compellence, and diversification may erode leverage.","evidence_gaps":"Commodity- and product-level denominators; licensing data; target inventory and output; declared demands; policy response; substitution timelines; allied delivery; PRC producer cost and adaptation."},{"case_id":"IS-C13","title":"PRC-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic restoration","period":"2021-present; 2023 agreement and durability","anchor_system":"PRC-brokered with Saudi, Iranian, Iraqi, and Omani agency","region":"Middle East","case_role":"prc_affirmative_candidate","selection_reason":"Provides a bounded diplomatic agreement with prior facilitators, strong economic relationships, reputational consequences, observable implementation steps, regional shocks, and a durability test.","predeclared_outcome":"Track restored relations, implementation of agreed steps, crisis communication, regional proxy behavior, trade and security interaction, relapse, and PRC follow-up at declared checkpoints.","strongest_counterclaim":"Saudi and Iranian interests, Iraqi and Omani mediation, conflict fatigue, and economic priorities may explain the agreement; restoration of ties is not regional conflict termination.","evidence_gaps":"Negotiation chronology; prior mediation; PRC material contribution; implementation ledger; proxy and crisis behavior; participant evidence; counterfactual timing; persistence after shocks."},{"case_id":"IS-C14","title":"Taiwan Strait deterrence, coercion, and competitive shaping","period":"2016-present with event-specific windows","anchor_system":"Both systems with Taiwan and regional partner agency","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"matched_high_stakes_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Stress-tests every major pathway under a live but nonwar condition where military posture, economic dependence, diplomatic recognition, partner access, information, resilience, and escalation interact.","predeclared_outcome":"Define and measure discrete deterred or compelled behaviors, coercive actions, Taiwan decisions, partner commitments, crisis stability, economic and societal costs, and escalation at event-specific checkpoints.","strongest_counterclaim":"The absence of invasion cannot identify deterrence or which instrument mattered; PRC preferences, Taiwan agency, U.S. policy ambiguity, commercial ties, and wider regional behavior are powerful rival causes.","evidence_gaps":"Predeclared event sample and behaviors; classified-evidence boundary; Taiwan and partner sources; military exercise and readiness effects; economic measures; information exposure; crisis channels; counterfactual deterrence design."},{"case_id":"IS-C15","title":"South China Sea pressure and Philippine coalition response","period":"2012-present; event-level matched episodes","anchor_system":"Both systems with Philippine and regional agency","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"matched_gray_zone_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Offers repeated below-war episodes connecting maritime capability, legal and diplomatic action, alliance access, economic exposure, media evidence, public legitimacy, and target adaptation.","predeclared_outcome":"For matched episodes, measure control or access behavior, coercive acts, Philippine policy and operational response, partner activation, economic cost, public support, escalation, and persistence.","strongest_counterclaim":"Local operational dynamics, Philippine leadership change, legal rulings, fishing and commercial incentives, and autonomous partner behavior may dominate U.S. or PRC cross-instrument orchestration.","evidence_gaps":"Episode universe; common coercion and response coding; vessel and access data; Philippine sources; economic measures; message exposure; alliance decisions; crisis communication and unintended escalation."},{"case_id":"IS-C16","title":"IPEF supply-chain institutions and crisis-response conversion","period":"2022-present; first live or representative trigger required","anchor_system":"U.S.-anchored with autonomous Indo-Pacific partners","region":"Indo-Pacific","case_role":"us_partner_unresolved_case","selection_reason":"Tests whether negotiated institutions, information sharing, common definitions, and standing crisis mechanisms can produce alternative supply or coordinated action rather than procedural readiness alone.","predeclared_outcome":"Measure trigger recognition, decision time, participation, shared data, assigned roles, delivered alternative supply, affected-firm outcomes, cost, and institutional learning in a real or representative disruption.","strongest_counterclaim":"The arrangement may remain procedural, partners may act through preexisting bilateral or market channels, and a mild test cannot establish performance under a major disruption.","evidence_gaps":"Common critical-sector universe; exercise or live-trigger record; decision and delivery data; firm and partner evidence; counterfactual coordination; severe-stress test; durability after government change."},{"case_id":"IS-C17","title":"WTO Appellate Body impasse and U.S. institutional trade-offs","period":"2016-present","anchor_system":"Universal institution with U.S. policy central to the causal claim","region":"Global","case_role":"us_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Tests whether pursuit of economic and legal leverage degraded institutional leadership, coalition trust, rule enforcement, and narrative credibility, and whether alternatives restored the declared objective.","predeclared_outcome":"Reconstruct stated U.S. objectives, blockage mechanism, dispute-settlement performance, negotiated reform, partner behavior, economic consequences, alternative arrangements, and institutional legitimacy.","strongest_counterclaim":"The Appellate Body had substantive flaws and member-wide bargaining failures; paralysis may create leverage or alternative reform even while imposing systemic costs.","evidence_gaps":"Objective and reform demands; appointment and negotiation chronology; case backlog and trade behavior; partner positions; alternative mechanism performance; credibility evidence; long-run rule-system effects."},{"case_id":"IS-C18","title":"PRC development-finance delivery, renegotiation, and relationship repair","period":"2000-present; matched completed, distressed, and cancelled projects","anchor_system":"PRC-centered with recipient governments and implementing firms","region":"Africa|Indo-Pacific|Latin America and the Caribbean|Global","case_role":"prc_thesis_challenge","selection_reason":"Balances celebrated projects with delay, cancellation, debt distress, renegotiation, local contestation, and repair to test whether delivery and relationship effects survive cost and failure.","predeclared_outcome":"For a preselected project portfolio, measure commitment-to-disbursement-to-completion, additionality, asset performance, debt and fiscal cost, renegotiation, recipient trust, policy or access decisions, and persistence.","strongest_counterclaim":"Recipient demand, commercial terms, domestic governance, commodity cycles, and alternative lenders may explain both projects and outcomes; renegotiation may show adaptation rather than original failure or coercion.","evidence_gaps":"Matched success-failure sample; contracts and finance types; recipient audits; project output and outcome data; local public evidence; PRC additionality; policy decisions; alternative-finance counterfactual."}],"contract_limitation":"The preserved case register supplies outcome scope, period, selection rationale, rival explanation and evidence gaps. It does not contain separately completed eleven-field objective contracts, numerical success/failure thresholds or case-specific metric applications. General metric contracts are design rules, not completed measurements. These missing fields have not been reconstructed retrospectively."}