Economic & Industrial Statecraft · Analysis
What campaigns actually changed.
Six cases trace policy tools through implementation, target adaptation, coalition cost, observed results, and the evidence that could change the judgment.
6 campaigns37 shared sourcesCurrent through August 8, 2026
Campaign analyses
Six tests of economic power.
Policy activity is not treated as strategic effect. Each case distinguishes the instrument used from delivery, behavior change, substitution, evasion, and sender cost.
EI-C01Partial strategic effect
Russia sanctions, export controls & the oil price cap
ObjectiveRaise the cost of aggression, constrain access to finance and technology, and reduce energy revenue while limiting global supply disruption.
- Asset freezes
- Financial sanctions
- Export controls
- Oil price cap
- Coalition enforcement
The campaign imposed real costs and technology friction but did not compel near-term policy reversal; adaptation and measurement gaps materially limited efficacy.
Observed
- GAO estimated a large 2022 growth effect but did not find statistically different growth in 2023–24.
- The price cap likely helped preserve export volume while reducing revenue, but the shadow fleet and routing alternatives weakened leverage.
- Export controls hindered access to U.S. military-relevant technology without fully preventing acquisition.
TransmissionFinancial restrictions, technology denial, and the price cap were intended to reduce access, revenue, and war-supporting capacity while preserving global supply.
Adaptation / leakageFiscal mobilization, rerouting, transshipment, alternative suppliers, and the shadow fleet absorbed or bypassed part of the pressure.
Observed outcomeThe campaign imposed measurable costs and technology friction, but public evidence does not show near-term policy reversal and later macroeconomic effects are harder to isolate.
Sender / partner costThe coalition balanced pressure against energy-market disruption and enforcement burden; a consolidated public cost series is not available.
- Uncertainty
- The invasion, fiscal mobilization, commodity prices, capital controls, sanctions, and export controls are simultaneous; public evidence cannot cleanly isolate each instrument.
- Evidence that could change this assessment
- Clear outcome targets, item-level denial and substitution data, verified revenue effects, coalition leakage measures, and evidence of changed Russian capacity or behavior.
EI-C02Chokepoint under adaptation
Advanced-semiconductor controls
ObjectiveLimit access to advanced computing and manufacturing capabilities with military and intelligence applications while preserving the innovation base.
- Item controls
- End-use controls
- Entity restrictions
- Foreign-produced item rules
- Licensing
- Partner alignment
The control architecture reaches genuine chokepoints, but its durable effect depends on foreign availability, enforcement, threshold updates, partner coverage, and the balance between denial and ecosystem revenue.
Observed
- BIS retains supercomputer and semiconductor-manufacturing end-use restrictions in the current EAR.
- Licensing policy changed again in January 2026 for specified advanced chips, demonstrating that the instrument is actively recalibrated.
- GAO documented implementation and compliance challenges but did not establish a complete outcome measure.
TransmissionItem, end-use, entity, foreign-produced-item, and licensing controls constrain access to advanced computing and semiconductor-manufacturing capability.
Adaptation / leakageDiversion, foreign availability, threshold workarounds, stockpiling, efficiency gains, and indigenous substitution reduce durable denial.
Observed outcomeThe architecture reaches real chokepoints and creates friction, but no complete public series measures the resulting military-relevant capability loss.
Sender / partner costThe policy trades denial against partner alignment, compliance burden, ecosystem revenue, and the innovation base; the net cost is not comprehensively measured.
- Uncertainty
- Public data do not provide a complete counterfactual for Chinese capability, diversion, performance degradation, indigenous substitution, or lost U.S. innovation funding.
- Evidence that could change this assessment
- A recurring, public foreign-availability and outcome assessment that links controlled performance, diversion, indigenous alternatives, and military-relevant capability.
EI-C03Exposure revealed; diversification incomplete
Critical-mineral export controls & diversification
ObjectiveUse concentrated processing as leverage—or reduce exposure to that leverage—across high-technology, energy, automotive, aerospace, and defense chains.
- Export licensing
- Stockpiles
- Public finance
- Offtake
- Allied sourcing
- Substitution and recycling
Recent restrictions made processing concentration operationally consequential. Diversification is progressing in selected stages, but midstream and downstream gaps, higher costs, and slow qualification remain decisive.
Observed
- IEA reports the number of mineral tariff codes subject to Chinese controls has tripled since 2023.
- Refining concentration increased in 2025 even as rare-earth diversification showed targeted policy can move a specific stage.
- Public-finance commitments expanded rapidly, but disbursement and balanced value-chain delivery lag.
TransmissionExport licensing converts processing concentration into leverage, while finance, offtake, stockpiles, recycling, and substitution seek to reduce exposure.
Adaptation / leakageFirms draw inventories, reroute trade, qualify substitutes, and redesign products, but grade, chemistry, and customer certification constrain speed.
Observed outcomeControls made concentration operationally consequential; selected diversification is real, but qualified midstream and downstream alternatives remain incomplete.
Sender / partner costDiversification and substitution can impose higher prices, performance penalties, financing risk, and long qualification timelines.
- Uncertainty
- Commercial inventories, contract terms, product grades, license approvals, and firm-level substitutions are often proprietary.
- Evidence that could change this assessment
- Verified qualified throughput outside the dominant supplier across refining and component stages, shorter substitution times, transparent inventories, and durable offtake.
EI-C04Large pipeline; early delivery evidence
CHIPS incentives: money to qualified output
ObjectiveRestore leading-edge and specialized semiconductor capacity, strengthen suppliers and packaging, and reduce geographic concentration.
- Grants
- Loans
- Tax incentives
- Milestone payments
- Workforce support
- R&D infrastructure
The portfolio is strategically broad and one leading-edge facility had reached certification by mid-2025, but most milestones and completion dates remained ahead. The program should be judged by qualified output, not award totals.
Observed
- GAO counted 40 projects across 19 companies covering materials through packaging.
- Nearly 40% of projects were intended for leading-edge logic, with Commerce estimating a move from 0% U.S. share in 2022 to 20% by 2030.
- Only 24 of 161 milestones had completion reports as of July 2025, so the dominant evidence was still prospective.
TransmissionGrants, loans, tax incentives, milestone payments, workforce support, and R&D infrastructure lower the cost and risk of building domestic capacity.
Adaptation / frictionPermitting, construction, equipment installation, workforce fill, qualification, yield, customer demand, and policy renegotiation separate awards from output.
Observed outcomeThe portfolio is broad, 24 of 161 milestones were reported complete, and one leading-edge facility was certified complete by mid-2025.
Sender / partner costPublic support combines unlike grants, loans, tax incentives, and private commitments; comparable lifetime cost and competitiveness remain unknown.
- Uncertainty
- Awards, company commitments, later renegotiations, tax support, and private capital are not directly comparable; future yield and cost competitiveness are unknown.
- Evidence that could change this assessment
- On-time construction, equipment installation, product qualification, sustained yield and utilization, workforce fill, supplier localization, and transparent milestone reporting.
EI-C05Substantial resilience gain
Europe's exit from Russian gas dependence
ObjectiveReduce an exploitable energy dependency without losing security of supply or coalition political cohesion.
- Diversified imports
- LNG infrastructure
- Storage
- Demand adjustment
- Renewables
- Binding phase-out rules
This is a strong case of an exposed coalition changing physical supply and law together: Russian gas fell from 45% of EU imports in 2021 to 12% in 2025, with a binding phase-out now underway.
Observed
- The EU reduced Russian gas volumes from 152 bcm in 2021 to 36 bcm in 2025.
- IEA reports Russian piped deliveries to the EU fell 90% between 2021 and 2025.
- The 2026 regulation phases out remaining LNG and pipeline contracts on staged timelines through 2027.
TransmissionAlternative imports, LNG infrastructure, storage, demand adjustment, renewables, and binding phase-out rules changed the physical and legal supply system.
Adaptation / frictionConsumers, firms, and governments absorbed price, subsidy, infrastructure, and demand adjustments while suppliers and routes shifted.
Observed outcomeRussian gas fell from 45% to 12% of EU imports, physical volumes dropped sharply, and a staged legal phase-out is underway.
Sender / partner costThe resilience gain carried price, subsidy, industrial-demand, infrastructure, and replacement-dependency costs that are not consolidated here.
- Uncertainty
- The transition involved price, subsidy, industrial-demand, infrastructure, and third-country effects; resilience gains do not imply zero cost.
- Evidence that could change this assessment
- Secure completion of the phase-out without emergency reversal, persistent supplier diversity, manageable industrial costs, and no replacement with an equally concentrated dependency.
EI-C06Institution built; performance unproven
IPEF supply-chain institutions
ObjectiveCreate standing Indo-Pacific mechanisms to map critical sectors, coordinate resilience projects, and respond collectively to disruptions.
- Supply Chain Council
- Crisis Response Network
- Exercises
- Information sharing
- Business matching
- Workforce cooperation
The agreement created useful standing bodies and a crisis channel. Public evidence remains too thin to judge whether they can deliver alternative supply or coordinated action under a major disruption.
Observed
- The Supply Chain Agreement entered into force in February 2024 and established three implementation bodies.
- The design includes mapping, simulations, emergency communication, business matching, and alternative logistics coordination.
- A signed architecture is an input; the missing evidence is stress-test performance and delivery against named sector vulnerabilities.
TransmissionStanding councils, a crisis-response network, information sharing, exercises, and business matching are intended to shorten coordination and supply-response time.
Adaptation / frictionDifferent legal authorities, commercial exposure, domestic costs, information limits, and partner priorities can slow or narrow collective action.
Observed outcomeThe agreement and implementation bodies exist, but public evidence does not yet show faster crisis response or alternative supply delivered under stress.
Sender / partner costPartner-specific commitments, exercise burdens, project costs, and distribution of adjustment costs are not comprehensively public.
- Uncertainty
- Detailed vulnerability maps, exercise findings, response times, investment pipelines, and partner-specific commitments are not comprehensively public.
- Evidence that could change this assessment
- Published sector work plans, exercise after-action results, response-time standards, funded projects, and evidence the network solved an actual disruption.
How to interpret these casesOne campaign does not establish a universal rule.
Effects depend on the objective, instrument, market structure, coalition, target adaptation, enforcement, timing, and cost. The methodology keeps those causal steps visible.
Read the methodology →